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By Lou Grossman

On January 9, 2018, a split panel of the United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed an order from the district court, denying a motion to remand a matter removed under the Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”). The 2-1 decision In Warren Lester, et. al. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., et. al., No. 14-31383, __F3d___ (5th Cir. 1/9/2018) addressed two issues of first impression for the Fifth Circuit: (1) whether a motion to transfer and consolidate can effectively create a “mass action” removable under CAFA; and (2) if so, whether CAFA may be invoked as a basis for removal when one of the underlying suits comprising the new “mass action” commenced well before the 2005 effective date of CAFA. In affirming the action of the district court below, the Fifth Circuit answered both questions in the affirmative. A full copy of the opinion can be found here.  

The removed actions included two separate matters filed in the Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans, State of Louisiana – Warren Lester, et. al. v. Exxon Mobil Corporation, et. al. and Shirely Bottley, et. al. v. Exxon Mobil Corporation, et. al. The Lester matter was filed by over 600 plaintiffs for personal injuries and property damages allegedly resulting from Naturally Occurring Radioactive Materials (“NORM”) in 2002. The Bottley matter, on the other hand, was filed in 2013 as a wrongful death and survival suit filed on behalf of Cornelius Bottley, a decedent-plaintiff in Lester, by his three remaining heirs. Following the selection of a trial flight in the Lester matter, which was to include the claims of Mr. Cornelius Bottley, the Bottley Plaintiffs moved to transfer and consolidate their suit with Lester. The matter was promptly removed by a defendant named only in the Bottley matter.

The Fifth Circuit rejected Plaintiffs’ argument that the consolidation was meant to attach the Bottley matter only to the pending trial flight such that it did not, as CAFA requires, propose a single trial with more than 100 individual plaintiffs. Rather, the Fifth Circuit held that the focus under CAFA is on the consolidation proposed, which in the case of the Bottley plaintiffs, was a consolidation of cases involving “overlapping liabilities, damages and questions of law and fact…the determination [of which] in either case will have great bearing on the other….” Plaintiffs’ Motion did not and, as a matter of law could not, limit consolidation to only the claims set for trial. As such, the Fifth Circuit found that it proposed a “mass action,” i.e. a joint trial of 100 or more plaintiffs’ claims, under CAFA.

More importantly, the Fifth Circuit examined the date of the proposed consolidation as determining the applicability of CAFA. Though Lester had been filed before CAFA’s enactment, the proposed consolidation was proposed years later. The Fifth Circuit found that the proposed consolidation created a new “mass action.” The Fifth Circuit reasoned that a civil action may commence before it becomes a “mass action,” and that the Bottley suit became a “mass action” when Plaintiffs proposed that the claims be tried jointly with those in the Lester matter. Bottley was a “civil action” commenced after CAFA’s effective date that subsequently became a mass action subject to CAFA’s removal provisions.

In affirming the denial of Plaintiffs’ Motion to Remand below, the Fifth Circuit established two compelling rules: (1) that a consolidation is effective to create a “mass action” under CAFA; and (2) that CAFA’s Section 9 requirements are met if one of the two consolidated actions was commenced after CAFA’s effective date.  In addition to providing guidance and interpretation regarding the commencement of a mass action, this opinion demonstrates a broad approach to CAFA.

By Tyler Kostal

Consistent with public comments that it will pursue all available appellate remedies, today the South Louisiana Flood Protection Authority filed a petition for a writ of certiorari with the United States Supreme Court, to seek review of the decision in Board of Comm. of the Southeast Louisiana Flood Protection Authority-East v. Tennessee Gas Pipeline Company, LLC,  850 F.3d 714 (5th Cir. 2017).

The questions presented focus on claims arising under federal law pursuant to the standard developed in Grable & Sons Metal Prods. v. Darue Engineering & Manufacturing, 125 S. Ct. 2363, 2368 (2005), and succeeding cases.  Specifically, the questions presented are:

  1. Whether the “substantial[ity]” and “federal-state balance” requirements of Grable are satisfied whenever a federal law standard is referenced to inform the standard of care in a state-law cause of action, so long as the parties dispute whether federal law embodies the asserted standard.
  2. Whether a federal court applying Grable to a case removed from state court must accept a colorable, purely state-law claim as sufficient to establish that the case does not “necessarily raise” a federal issue, even if the court believes the state court would ultimately reject the purely state-law basis for the claim on its merits.

It remains to be seen whether the Supreme Court will accept this case for review.

See prior post on this topic here.  Click here for a copy of the petition.

BSEE

By Michael J. O’Brien

Scott Angelle, a native of Breaux Bridge, Louisiana, has been appointed by the Trump Administration to head the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (“BSEE”).  Mr. Angelle first held public office in the late 1980’s. He has since served as a Parish President, Secretary of Louisiana’s Department of Natural Resources, and, most recently, as Chairman of the Louisiana Public Service Commission. Under his leadership as Louisiana’s Secretary of the Department of Natural Resources, the state’s coastal permitting system was reformed, providing for efficient permitting while increasing drilling rig counts in Louisiana by more than 150 percent during his tenure. Mr. Angelle has also served as Chairman of the Louisiana State Mineral Board, and as a member of the Louisiana State University Board of Supervisors, Southern States Energy Board, and the Louisiana Coastal Port Advisory Authority.

Mr. Angelle will become BSEE’s fourth director since it was established six years ago. BSEE was formed after the Deepwater Horizon explosion to promote safety, protect the environment, and conserve resources offshore through “vigorous regulatory oversight and enforcement.”

BSEE is headquartered in Washington D.C. and supported by regional offices in New Orleans, Louisiana, Camarillo, California, and Anchorage, Alaska.  These regional offices review applications for permits to drill, ensure safety requirements are met, conduct inspections of drilling rigs and offshore production platforms, investigate offshore accidents, issue Incidents of Non-Compliance and have the authority to fine companies through civil penalties for regulatory infractions.

Mr. Angelle’s post does not require Senate confirmation; as such, he will start working as the head of BSEE Tuesday, May 23, 2017. Secretary of the Interior, Ryan Zinke, issued the following statement about Mr. Angelle: “Scott Angelle brings a wealth of experience to BSEE, having spent many years working for the safe and efficient energy production of both Louisiana’s and our country’s offshore resources. As we set our path towards energy dominance, I am confident that Scott has the expertise, vision, and the leadership necessary to effectively enhance our program, and to promote the safe and environmentally responsible exploration, development, and production of our country’s offshore oil and gas resources.”

 

By J. Eric Lockridge

Large and small offshore service companies are turning to the Bankruptcy Code for help with restructuring their balance sheet, and turning to Washington for help with generating more work.

One of the largest offshore service companies in the world, Tidewater, announced this week that it will file a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition in Delaware on or before May 17, 2017. This is not a surprise to the markets. Tidewater received notice from the New York Stock Exchange in April that it is at risk of being delisted before the end of the year because its average stock price sat below $1.00 per share for too long. Tidewater’s press release announcing the upcoming bankruptcy says the company has secured broad support from secured creditors for a pre-packaged plan that will effectuate a form of debt-for-equity swap. The plan will also reject certain sale-lease back agreements for a portion of Tidewater’s fleet. Expect a fight over lease-rejection damages.

A smaller operator focused on the Gulf of Mexico, GulfMark Offshore, also announced this week that it is planning a Chapter 11 filing. Offshore Support Journal reported that GulfMark Offshore’s most recent SEC filing discloses the company will likely file a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition on or before May 21, 2017. The company is working with advisors to secure support for a restructuring agreement that will include a backstop commitment from certain note holders and a debt-for-equity swap.

Some in the offshore industry are lobbying the White House and others to extend the “America First” agenda to the offshore-service industry in hopes that might provide a boost. For example, see Harvey Gulf’s recent open letter to President Donald Trump here. Many in the offshore service industry would like to see the current administration enforce regulations requiring proper plugging and abandonment (P&A) of many non-producing or low-producing wells in the Gulf of Mexico’s shallow water. They have to be careful about how loudly they push that agenda, however, or they may alienate the very exploration and production (E&P) companies that would hire them. Many E&P companies would like to see enforcement of those regulations delayed as long as possible, and at least until the price of oil is higher.

Enforcing P&A obligations would likely create thousands of jobs and boost the economy along the Gulf Coast, where President Trump received strong electoral support. The House Majority Whip, Rep. Steve Scalise (R-LA), represents a district along the Louisiana coast that is home to scores of offshore service companies and their vendors, which gives that industry some important clout on Capitol Hill. Delaying enforcement of P&A obligations and/or making them less onerous might be more consistent with a “regulation-roll-back” agenda and with the interests of many E&P companies, several of which have strong ties to the current administration and deep relationships in Congress.

Will Washington take any action to provide some relief for offshore service companies, their employees, vendors, and lenders? How will an increase in Chapter 11 cases for offshore service companies affect the industry and the companies that have (so far) avoided bankruptcy? Kean Miller and many of our clients will keep a close watch as events unfold.

 

air

By Maureen N. Harbourt

EPA is required by Section 109(d) the Clean Air Act to review the adequacy of each National Ambient Air Quality Standard (“NAAQS”) every five years to determine if new scientific evidence justifies a change to the standard.  The current primary[i] NAAQS for nitrogen dioxide (“NO2”) is 53 ppb annual mean and 100 ppb NO2 as 98th percentile of 1-hour daily maximum concentrations, averaged over 3 years.  The annual average was first adopted in 1971, and was not changed during (overdue) reviews completed in 1985 and 1996.  In the next completed review in 2010, EPA added the 1 hour NO2 NAAQS to the standard based on a conclusion that the annual standard alone was not protective enough due to potential health impacts associated with short term exposures.[ii]  The 2010 review also indicated that there was a lack of data concerning near roadway exposures, which was of concern given that 34% of NO2 emissions are estimated to be generated from roadway vehicles.  Thus, the 2010 review led to EPA requiring states to install near-roadway monitors in urban areas during the 2014-2017 period.

EPA has just completed a final Policy Assessment reviewing the adequacy of the 2010 NAAQS and has concluded that no change to the existing standard is recommended.  82 Fed. Reg. 17947, April 14, 2017. The EPA Clean Air Science Advisory Committee (“CASAC”) also recommended no change to the standard.  The EPA’s Policy Assessment indicated that the additional roadway monitors installed as a result of the 2010 NAAQS rule have not been gathering data for a sufficient period (only 1-2 years) to fully evaluate such information, although the data that was available showed higher NOx concentrations near roadways than at nearby non-roadway monitors.[iii]  The Policy Assessment is the last step of the periodic NAAQS review process before any final EPA decision to revise or not revise the existing standards. It considers the Integrated Science Assessment, the Risk/Exposure Assessment, and the advice of the CASAC.

________________________________________________

[i] The primary NAAQS are set at a level to protect human health with an adequate margin of safety.  A secondary NAAQS is set at a level to protect human welfare, including decreased visibility and damage to animals, crops, vegetation, and buildings.  The secondary NAAQS for NO2 is currently equivalent to the annual primary standard (53 ppb annual mean).  EPA has recently completed an integrated science assessment for the secondary standards for NO2, sulphur oxides and particulate matter and has requested that the CASAC review that assessment.  82 Fed. Reg. 15701, March 30, 2017.

[ii] The EPA’s decision to add the 1-hour NO2 NAAQS was upheld in American Petroleum Institute v. Environmental Protection Agency, 684 F.3d 1342 (D.C. Cir. 2012), cert. den. 133 S.Ct. 1724 (2013).

[iii] The full EPA Policy Assessment is available here.

 

 

 

GOM

By Tod J. Everage

With less than one week on the job, newly-confirmed Secretary of the Interior, Ryan Zinke announced that BOEM will offer 73,000,000 acres of lease space located in the Gulf of Mexico for oil and gas exploration. Proposed Lease Sale 249 is currently scheduled for August 16, 2017, and will include all unleased areas of federal waters in the GOM. The sale will be livestreamed from New Orleans.

This sale is the first under the new Outer Continental Shelf Oil and Gas Leasing Program for 2017-2022 (Five Year Program). The plan includes two GOM lease sales each year, including all available blocks in the combined Western, Central, and Eastern GOM. It is estimated that there are approximately 211 million to 1.118 billion barrels of oil and 0.547-4.424 trillion cubic feet of gas available for production in those available leases. The available land for lease includes approximately 13,725 unleased blocks located between 3-230 miles offshore, and ranging in depth between 9-11,115 feet of water.

Excluded from the lease sale are blocks subject to the Congressional moratorium established by the Gulf of Mexico Energy Security Act of 2006; blocks that are adjacent to or beyond the U.S. Exclusive Economic Zone in the area known as the northern portion of the Eastern Gap; and whole blocks and partial blocks within the current boundary of the Flower Garden Banks National Marine Sanctuary. The full text of BOEM’s press release can be found here.

The current Five Year Program [2012-2017] will have its final lease sale today, March 22, 2017, which includes approximately 48 million acres off the coast of Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama comprised of 9,118 blocks. The sale will be livestreamed started at 9 am via BOEM’s website.

EPA

By Brittany Buckley Salup

On March 2, 2017, the EPA withdrew its information collection request (ICR) regarding methane emissions from existing oil and gas facilities.  EPA finalized and issued the underlying ICR on November 10, 2016.  Since that time, EPA sent letters to thousands of owners and operators in the oil and gas industry, requiring them to complete surveys regarding their existing facilities.  EPA’s withdrawal of the ICR is effective immediately.  According to the EPA’s website,  industry members who previously received a letter requiring a survey response associated with this particular ICR are “no longer required to respond.”

Additional information is available here.

 

marsh-sunset1

By Claire Juneau

Governor John Bel Edwards has sued Louisiana Attorney General Jeff Landry over Mr. Landry’s refusal to approve certain private legal counsel contracts. Governor Edwards alleges that Mr. Landry is the “chief legal officer of the state,” is “charged with the assertion or protection of any right or interest of [Louisiana],” and “is ethically required by the Rules of Professional Conduct promulgated by the Louisiana Supreme Court to abide by [his] client’s decisions concerning the objective of representation and to consult with [his] client as to the means by which they are to be pursued.” Governor Edwards seeks the immediate issuance of an alternative writ of mandamus compelling Mr. Landry “to perform his statutory ministerial duty to give written approval of the choice of counsel of the executive branch entities…” Governor Edwards alleges that Mr. Landry has rejected most of the contracts “on the grounds that the contracting attorneys should not have agreed not to discriminate in employment and the rendering of services in accordance with Executive Order No. JBE 2016-11.”

Governor Edwards alleges that the procedures for retention and employment of private counsel for the State of Louisiana are found in Louisiana Revised Statute § 42:262 and Louisiana Revised Statute § 49:258. Specifically, Revised Statute § 42:262(F)(1) provides in pertinent part:

In the event it should be necessary to protect the public interest, for any state board or commission to retain or employ any special attorney or counsel to represent it in any special matter for which services any compensation is to be paid, the board or commission may retain or employ such special attorney or counsel solely on written approval of the governor and the attorney general and pay only such compensation as the governor and the attorney general may designate or approve in the written approval.

And Revised Statute § 49:258 provides in pertinent part:

Notwithstanding the provisions of any other law to the contrary and specifically the provisions of any law that authorizes the state or a state agency to appoint, employ, or contract for private legal counsel to represent the state or a state agency, including but not limited to the provisions of R.S. 42:261, 262, and 263, and R.S. 40:1299.39(E), any appointment of private legal counsel to represent the state or a state agency shall be made by the attorney general with the concurrence of the commissioner of administration.

Governor Edwards argues that Revised Statute § 42:262 cannot be read alone and the discretion set forth with respect to boards and commissions is superseded by Revised Statute 49:258, which sets forth a “ministerial process for approval of private counsel, by both the Division of Administration and the Attorney General, and appointment by the Attorney General.” Governor Edwards asserts that Mr. Landry “has refused to perform” this ministerial duty.

A copy of the Petition for Writ of Mandamus can be found here:  Edwards v Landry.

 

louisiana

By Linda Akchin and Chris Dicharry

INTRODUCTION

Louisiana law imposes a sales tax on “sales at retail.”  “Sale at retail” is defined in the sales tax law, and the definition provides that the term does not include “sales of materials for further processing into tangible personal property for sale at retail.”    This provision is commonly referred to as the “further processing exclusion.”[1]  The most recent Louisiana Supreme Court’s decision interpreting this “further processing exclusion,” Bridges v. Nelson Indus. Steam Co., 2015-1439 (La. 5/3/16), 190 So.3d 276 (the “NISCO decision”), recently became final.  The decision is significant for all taxpayer-manufacturers.  It provides an excellent explanation of applicable legal principles relating generally to interpretation of the further processing exclusion and a comprehensive explanation of the three-prong jurisprudential test for application of the exclusion.  In response to the NISCO decision, and before it became final, the Legislature passed an Act amending the further processing exclusion.[2]  The purpose of this writing is to (i) provide some general information regarding applicable rules of law to be gleaned from the NISCO decision; and (ii) identify questions arising from the recent legislative amendment to the law.

THE SUPREME COURT DECISION

The further processing provision applies to byproducts.

The NISCO decision is the first in which the Supreme Court directly addresses the question of whether the further processing exclusion from tax applies to purchases of materials that are further processed into a byproduct of a manufacturing process.  The Supreme Court held that it does.  Noting that the exclusion applies to “tangible personal property,” and the sales tax regulation interpreting the exclusion provides that whether materials are further processed or simply used in the processing activity will depend entirely upon an analysis of the “end product,” the court reasoned that it found nothing in the law that requires the “end product” be the enterprise’s primary product, explaining:

“The plain language of the statute makes the exclusion applicable to articles of tangible personal property.  There simply is no distinction between primary products and secondary products. . . . At the end of the day, the ash [NISCO’s byproduct] is produced and sold . . . making it an ‘article of tangible personal property for sale at retail.’”[3]

The NISCO decision applies and interprets the long-established three-pronged test for application of the exclusion.

The Court applied the jurisprudentially-established three-pronged test for application of the further processing exclusion as it related to NISCO’s ash byproduct:  The test is:

(1) the raw materials become recognizable and identifiable components of the end products;

(2) the raw materials are beneficial to the end products; and

(3) the raw materials are materials for further processing, and as such, are purchased with the purpose of inclusion in the end products.[4]

In applying the test the Court clarifies and reinforces aspects of the application of the test that all taxpayers would be well-served to keep in mind.   Those clarifications include:

(1)       The further processing provision constitutes an “exclusion” not an “exemption” from tax, and as such, must be liberally construed in favor of the taxpayer;[5]

(2)       When the material purchased is processed into less than all of the end products produced, the analysis involves only consideration of the end product(s) into which the material is further processed, without regard to other end products.[6]

(3)       In order to satisfy the “benefit” prong of the test it is not necessary to conduct tests to determine the qualities of the material purchased or its beneficial impact on the end product.  It is sufficient that elemental components of the material purchased become integral components of the molecular makeup of the end product.  That “integration” is in and of itself of some benefit to the end product.[7]

(4)       The “purpose” prong of the test does not involve a primary purpose test; and the “purpose” test involves a “manufacturing purpose” inquiry, not a “business purpose” or “economic purpose” inquiry.  Only the manufacturing process and the physical and chemical components and the materials involved in the process are germane to the “purpose” test.[8]

(5)       There is no legal basis for an “apportionment” approach to the further processing exclusion, whether based upon the percentage of the material or some assigned value of the components that actually end up in the end product, and any such approach is impractical in application.[9]

The New Law

The 2016 Legislative amendment, effective June 23, 2016, amends the law to provide that “[t]he term ‘sale at retail’ does  not include sale of materials for further processing into articles of tangible personal property for sale at retail when all of the criteria in Subsubitem (I) of this Section are met.[10]  Those criteria consist of a re-statement of the three-pronged test:  (1) the raw materials become a recognizable and identifiable component of the end product; (2) the raw materials are beneficial to the end product; and (3) the raw materials are material for further process, and as such are purchased for the purpose of inclusion into the end product.

The amendment goes further, however, and adds a “Subitem II” to the definition of “sale at retail.”  This addition represents new law and provides, in short, that “[i]f the materials are further processed into a byproduct for sale, such purchases of materials shall not be deemed to be sales for further processing and shall be taxable.”  The term “byproduct” is defined to mean “any incidental product that is sold for a sales price less than the cost of the materials.”

QUESTIONS CREATED BY THE NEW LAW

Did the Legislature intend to overrule the NISCO decision?

The first question that arises is whether the clarifications to the three-prong jurisprudential test that are set forth in the NISCO decision may be applied under the amended law’s verbatim codification of the three-prong jurisprudential test.  It is a well-accepted rule of statutory construction that those who enact statutory provisions are presumed to act deliberately and with full knowledge of existing laws on the same subject, with awareness of court cases and well-established principles of statutory construction, with knowledge of the effect of their acts and a purpose in view; and that when the Legislature changes the wording of a statute, it is presumed to have intended a change in the law. [11]  Thus, legislative language will be interpreted based upon assumption that the Legislature was aware of judicial decisions interpreting those statutes, including among others, the NISCO decision.[12]  Because the amended law adopts the three-prong judicial test verbatim, we believe a strong argument may be made that there is no legislative intent to vary from the Supreme Court’s interpretations of that test, except to the extent the language of the amended law expressly varies from the Supreme Court’s prior interpretations.  The Legislature has never hesitated to expressly state its intent to legislatively overrule a Louisiana Supreme Court decision, when that is indeed its intent.  Here, no express statement of such intent was made, and we do not believe that the Louisiana Supreme Court will infer intent to overrule any aspect of the NISCO decision, except to the extent the language of the amendment is inconsistent with the court’s interpretation in NISCO.

What constitutes a “byproduct” for purposes of the new law?

In cases where a product is sold for a sales price less than the cost of its materials, questions will likely arise as to whether the product is an “incidental product.”  Because the term “incidental product” is not statutorily defined by the legislature, we must give the words their commonly-accepted meaning.  The word “incidental” means “being likely to ensue as a chance or minor consequence,” or “occurring merely by chance or without intention or calculation.”[13]  Many products sold for a sales price less than the cost of their materials are intentionally manufactured and sold.  They are not manufactured by accident; and they are not the result of chance.  Instead, a conscious decision is made to choose a process design that will in fact create certain byproducts, with the intention to sell all the products of the process – both “primary products” and “byproducts,” with an overall profit motive.  While any particular byproduct may be of minor consequence economically speaking, when viewed in a vacuum, it may not be of economic “minor consequence” to the overall finances of the taxpayer; or it may not be of minor consequence in terms of volumes manufactured and sold, or investment made to develop, manufacture, market and sell the byproduct.  In our opinion, the Legislature’s amendment – a clear intent to vary from the NISCO decision’s holding that the further processing exclusion applies to all end products – merely creates more uncertainty, resulting in many more sales and use tax disputes and consequent litigation.  The taxing authorities will undoubtedly argue that the intent of the amendment was to create a rule to be applied when a byproduct, viewed in a vacuum, is not profitable; but that is not what the Legislature said.  The Legislature adopted a rule to be applied to “incidental products,” without defining that term.  Thus, we believe a proper interpretation requires that a determination must first be made regarding whether the byproduct is an “incidental product;” and only if it is an incidental product, does the second part of the “test” – whether it is sold for a sales price less than the cost of its material – apply.

May the new law be applied retroactively?

Taxpayers may expect the taxing authorities to impose the new law going forward.  Serious questions arise, however, regarding the applicability of the new law to taxes already reported and paid, or incurred, before the new law became effective.

The new law expressly provides that it “shall not be applicable to any existing claim for refund filed or assessment of additional taxes due issued prior to the effective date of this Act for any tax period prior to July 1, 2016, which is not barred by prescription.”  If a taxpayer’s claim or dispute with the taxing authority falls within the language of this provision, the new law should not be applied by the taxing authorities.  It is not clear what is meant by the terminology “claim for refund filed.”  Does it mean the submission of a refund request or claim with the taxing authority, or a suit for refund, or both?  Likewise, it is not clear what is meant by “assessment of additional taxes due issued” – does it include notices of intent to assess (“proposed assessments”), notices of assessment (“final assessments”), petitions for redetermination of assessments, or suits to collect tax, or all four.  We recommend that taxpayers apply the most liberal interpretation of the language unless and until guidance is provided by regulation or judicial decision.

There will undoubtedly be cases in which no claim for refund has been filed or assessment issued before the effective date of the act, but involving tax periods prior to July 1, 2016.  In such cases, we believe a strong argument may be made that retroactive application of the new law to pre-amendment tax periods is unconstitutional.  The Legislature stated in the Act that it “is intended to clarify and be interpretive of the original intent and application of” the further processing exclusion, and that “[t]herefore, the provisions of this Act shall be retroactive and applicable to all refund claims submitted or assessments of additional tax due which are filed on or after the effective date of this Act.”  Despite this statement by the legislature, we believe that the amendment to the law is not merely clarifying and interpretive.  We believe the changes are substantive in nature.  Generally, substantive laws may be applied prospectively only.  And despite express legislative intent to the contrary, it is uniquely the province of the courts to determine if an Act is substantive, or merely clarifying and interpretive.  And, if the law is substantive, it will not be applied retroactively by the courts because to do so impinges upon the authority of the judiciary in violation of the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers and divests taxpayers of substantive rights and causes of action that accrued and vested in the taxpayer before the effective date of the Act, such that imposition of the new law would constitute a denial of due process.[14]

Was the amendment to the law constitutionally enacted?

In the case of an attempt by a taxing authority to apply the new law retroactively to pre-amendment tax periods, or in the case of a purely prospective application of the new law to post-amendment tax periods, a question still exists regarding the constitutionality of the law’s enactment.  The Louisiana Constitution provides that enactments levying a new tax or increasing an existing tax require a two-thirds vote of both houses of the Legislature to become law.[15]  Here, the Act at issue did not have a two-thirds vote of the House of Representatives.  A viable legal argument exists that because the law amends definitions in a manner that makes previously non-taxable transactions taxable, it constitutes either a “new tax” or an “increase in an existing tax,” thus requiring a two-thirds vote of both houses of the Legislature. [16]  Unless and until this issue is resolved in the courts, a taxpayer would be wise to seek legal counsel and consider its options before voluntarily paying tax on materials purchased for further processing into a byproduct.

__________________________________________________________

[1] La. R.S. 47:301(10)(c)(i)(aa), before amendment effective June 23, 2016; see La. Act No. 3 (2nd Extra. Sess. 2016) (“Act 3 of 2016”).

[2] Act 3 of 2016, supra.

[3] NISCO, pp. 8-9, 190 So.3d at 282.

[4] Id. at pp. 7-8, 190 So.3d at 281, quoting International Paper, Inc. v. Bridges, 2007-1151, p. 19 (La. 1/16/08), 972 So.2d 1121, 1134.

[5] Id. at pp. 5-6, 190 So.3d at 280-281.

[6] Id. at pp. 7-9, 190 So.3d at 281-282.

[7] Id. at pp. 9-10, 190 So.3d at 282-283.

[8] Id. at pp. 4, 10-13, 190 So.3d at 279, 283-285/

[9] Id. at pp. 13-15, 190 So.3d at 285-286.

[10] Act 3 of 2016, supra (emphasis added)

[11] Borel v. Young, 2007-0419, pp. 8-9 (La. 11/2/07), 989 So.2d 42, 48 (emphasis added).

[12] State v. Campbell, 2003-3035, pp. 8-9 (La. 7/6/04), 877 So.2d 112, 118.

[13] Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary (11th ed. 2012) (emphasis added).

[14] See e.g. Mallard Bay Drilling, Inc. v. Kennedy, 2004-1089 (La. 6/29/05), 914 So.2d 533); Unwired Telecom Corp. v. Parish of Calcasieu, 2003-0732 (La. 1/19/05), 903 So.2d 392; and Bourgeois v. A.P. Green Indus., Inc., 2000-1528 (La. 4/3/01), 783 So.2d 1251; La. Const. Art. II, §§1-2; La. Const. art. I, §2; U.S. Const. Amend. XIV, §1.

[15] La. Const. Art. VII, §2.

[16] See e.g. Dow Hydrocarbons & Resources v. Kennedy, 1996-2471 (La. 5/20/97), 694 So.2d 215.

 

 

marsh

By Matthew B. Smith

The first of many coastal land loss lawsuits filed by Louisiana coastal parishes has proceeded to judgment, with the result being the dismissal of the case based on the failure to exhaust administrative remedies prior to filing suit.

Since the filing of the politically-charged Southeastern Louisiana Flood Protection Authority lawsuit, four parishes – Plaquemines, Jefferson, and more recently Cameron and Vermilion – have filed 40 similar lawsuits against oil and gas exploration and production companies, and pipeline companies, alleging that these companies violated the State and Local Coastal Resources Management Act of 1978 (“SLCRMA”) and, in doing so, caused or contributed to coastal land loss. The foundation of the parish plaintiffs’ claims is that the oil and gas companies performed certain activities in Louisiana’s coastal zone either (i) without the Coastal Use Permits required by the SLCRMA or (ii) or in violation of the Coastal Use Permits which were issued under the SLCRMA. Recently, the Louisiana Attorney General and the Louisiana Department of Natural Resources, Office of Coastal Management (the “Intervenors”) intervened in the lawsuits, joining with the parish plaintiffs in order to ensure the protection of the State’s interests.

The oil and gas company defendants have raised various exceptions to the claims of the parishes and Intervenors, including the defense that the lawsuits are premature because the plaintiffs failed to pursue the administrative remedies available under the SLCRMA and related regulations prior to filing suit. This argument was considered in the case of The Parish of Jefferson v. Atlantic Richfield Company, et al., No. 732-768, 24th Judicial District Court, Jefferson Parish, with Judge Stephen D. Enright, Jr. issuing a Judgment on August 1, 2016 (published on August 8, 2016) agreeing with the oil and gas company defendants and dismissing the claims of Jefferson Parish and the Intervenors as premature for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.

In his Judgment, Judge Enright found that a comprehensive administrative remedy exists under the SLCRMA and the Louisiana Administrative Code (particularly La. Admin. Code tit. 43, pt. I sec. 723(D)(1-4)) to address potential violations of Coastal Use Permits. Accordingly, the Court ordered that Jefferson Parish and the Intervenors must pursue and exhaust this administrative remedy process prior to bringing suit in court seeking civil damages. As the Court stated, “in the absence of an exhaustion of administrative remedies, it is yet to be determined whether civil damages exist.”

While Jefferson Parish has indicated that it will file a motion for a new trial and/or appeal to the Louisiana Fifth Circuit, the Louisiana Attorney General Jeff Landry issued a statement on August 10, 2016, indicating that he will not seek to challenge Judge Enright’s ruling because the ruling is protective of the State’s interest, in that it allows the Louisiana Department of Resources to determine whether any violations of Coastal Use Permits have occurred through the administrative process established by the SLCRMA and the Louisiana Administrative Code. As stated by Attorney General Landry:

addressing the issues associated with permit violations through the administrative process is a cost-effective, efficient way to resolve any violations. That was clearly the purpose of the Legislature creating this regulatory scheme. I believe the Secretary of the Department of Natural Resources has been given ample tools by the Legislature to address these issues.

Full Statement.

While a victory for the oil company defendants, it is still expected that additional parishes will file coastal land loss lawsuits. We will continue to report on key developments in these cases.