Act 458 of the 2025 Louisiana legislative session (“Act 458” or the “the Act”), recently signed into law by Governor Jeff Landry, introduced changes to the regulation of oil and gas operations in Louisiana. In addition to enacting changes to the laws regarding oilfield legacy suits (summarized in this recent post), Act 458 also changed the structure of the government offices charged with managing the state’s energy resources. Governor Landry signed the Act into law on June 24, 2025.

Act 458 reorganizes the Department of Energy and Natural Resources (“LDENR”), renaming it as the Department of Conservation and Energy (“Department”).[1] This reorganization and rebranding will formally take effect on October 1, 2025.[2] “All natural resources of the state not within the jurisdiction of other state departments or agencies are within the jurisdiction of the department.”[3] The Act also creates three new offices within the Department: an Office of Permitting and Compliance, an Office of Enforcement, and an Office of State Resources.[4] The Office of State Resources is given a broad mandate to “oversee all portions of state law within the jurisdiction of the department which relate to management of the state’s natural resources, included but not limited to mineral and energy leasing.”[5]

The Department will be led by a Secretary, appointed by the Governor with the consent of the Senate.[6] This Secretary will assume all duties and functions of the former Commissioner of Conservation.[7] In addition, the Secretary shall have the power to “[i]ssue directives . . . that establish immediate agency policy effective upon issuance,”[8] and to “[e]stablish a formal certification process to recognize academic and research institutions within the state who possess specialized expertise in areas such as energy technologies, natural resources management, environmental stewardship, resource economics, and other strategically significant fields of research and development related to the mission of the department.”[9] The Secretary also has broad power to “[r]eorganize, consolidate, create, merge or abolish” units within the Department in order to streamline operations and provide flexibility to respond to changing conditions.[10]

The Secretary will be assisted by a Deputy Secretary, appointed by the Secretary with the consent of the Senate.[11] The Department will also include an Undersecretary, appointed by the Governor with the consent of the Senate, who shall direct the Office of Administration and the Louisiana Natural Resources Trust Authority (“Trust Authority”).[12] The Undersecretary will oversee the Department’s finances and report to the Secretary, and will have contracting authority to hire third parties to assist in this role. The Trust Authority’s powers include “[b]onding, financing, or otherwise acting as a State Energy Financing Institution pursuant to federal law, to fund or assist in funding a plant or facility demonstrating technological advances of new methods and procedures and prototype application for the exploration, development, production, transportation, conversion, and use of energy resources.”[13]

Act 458 reestablishes the former Natural Resources Commission (“Commission”) within the Department, but the Commission will not have its traditional authority to grant or deny permits or take enforcement actions.[14] Instead, the Commission will “[s]erve as primary coordination body for water management planning, statewide flood protection, and develop a process for its centralization striving for uniformity.”[15] The Commission will develop processes to help government agencies coordinate their responses to floods and other major events. The Commission is directed to meet quarterly.[16] Also, the Capital Area Groundwater Conservation District will be moved under the supervision of the Department.[17]

Act 458 then defines eight offices within the Department, and their functions, including the three offices created earlier in the Act.

The Executive Office of the Secretary “shall be responsible for assisting the secretary in the exercise of the functions and duties established in law of the secretary.”[18]

The Office of the Natural Resources Commission will support that Commission in its duties as a coordination body and will provide “intergovernmental affairs and communications support to the commission and the department.”[19]

 The Office of Legal Services will provide legal support and will administer the Saltwater and Oil Assessment Process once that process is established in law.[20]

The Office of Administration “shall be responsible for accounting and budget control, procurement and contract management, data processing, management and program analysis, information technology and geographic information systems, strategic planning, and personnel management for the department and all of its offices.”[21]

The Office of Permitting and Compliance will handle all permitting and regulatory compliance functions within the Department.[22]

The Office of State Resources will “[p]erform the functions of the state relating to the lease of or other contracts for the use of lands and water bottoms of the state” for energy purposes (including oil and gas production), work with the Center for Energy Studies to maintain geological surveys of the state, and provide for the administration of state water bottoms, including drilling therein and the management of groundwater, surface water, and other water resources.[23]

The Office of Enforcement will enforce regulations within the Department’s jurisdiction.[24]

Finally, the Office of Energy will “organize, plan, supervise, direct, administer, execute, and be responsible for the functions and programs relating to the deployment and operation of alternative energy infrastructure in this state in a manner that results in affordable and reliable energy.”[25]

In conclusion, Act 458 substantially reorganizes the regulatory structure for the oil and gas industry in Louisiana. Tyler Gray, the current Secretary of LDENR, stated that the reorganization is intended to make the Department “more effective and efficient in its role of balancing the needs of supporting energy and sustaining our shared environment.”[26]

[1] 2025 Regular Session, Act 458 (available here), p. 7, lines 8–9.

[2] Id., p. 227, line 3.

[3] Id., p. 7, lines 15–17.

[4] Id., pp. 7–8.

[5] Id., p. 7, line 30 – p. 8, line 3.

[6] Id., p. 184, lines 18–20.

[7] Id., p. 184, lines 28–30.

[8] Id., p. 187, lines 22–24.

[9] Id., p. 188, lines 2–6.

[10] Id., p. 188, lines 17–25.

[11] Id., p. 190, lines 1–3.

[12] Id., p. 190, 27–30.

[13] Id., p. 192, lines 23–27.

[14] Id., p. 182, lines 5–9.

[15] Id., p. 183, lines 4–6.

[16] Id., p. 183, lines 16–17.

[17] Id.,p. 198, lines 21–24.

[18] Id., p. 194, lines 13–14.

[19] Id., p. 194, lines 18–21.

[20] Id., p. 194, lines 22–25.

[21] Id., p. 195, lines 7–11.

[22] Id., p. 195, lines 13–16.

[23] Id., p. 195, line 18 – p. 196, line 15.

[24] Id., p. 196, lines 16–19.

[25] Id., p. 196, lines 20–23.

[26] DENR Reorg Bill SB244 Signed Into Law | Department of Energy and Natural Resources | State of Louisiana

Nearing the end of the 2025 Regular Legislative Session, on June 11, 2025, the Louisiana Legislature passed Senate Bill No. 244 (“SB 244”), which brings significant changes to Louisiana’s oilfield site remediation statute, commonly known as “Act 312” (found at La. R.S. § 30:29). Act 312 applies to cases where environmental damage is alleged from historical oil and gas operations (commonly referred to “legacy” cases) and provides the procedure for the State to evaluate, approve, and maintain oversight over oilfield site evaluation and remediation.

Effective to legacy cases filed after September 1, 2027, SB 244, if signed by the Governor, would provide much needed clarity, not only to litigants, but to the State agencies entrusted with oversight over oilfield site remediation.

Submission of Evaluation or Remediation Plans

In legacy cases, parties that admit responsibility or are otherwise found responsible for environmental damage at trial are required to submit to the Louisiana Department of Energy and Natural Resources (“the Department”), for review and approval, plans addressing the environmental damage. The plan approved by the Department is the Most Feasible Plan for addressing environmental impacts.

In a nod to recent jurisprudence, SB 244 amends Act 312 to allow a responsible party to submit a remediation or an evaluation plan. This change to Act 312 is in harmony with its stated purpose to “ensure that damage to the environment is evaluated and if necessary remediated to a standard that protects the public interest.” This amendment will encourage responsible parties to admit responsibility under Act 312 and provides the Department with the flexibility necessary to appropriately address potential impacts to the environment.

Risk-Based Standards and Departmental Authority

The amendments to Act 312 expressly recognize the Department’s authority to use risk-based standards, such as the Risk Evaluation/Corrective Action Program (“RECAP”), and other exceptions to Statewide Order 29-B, when approving or structuring the Most Feasible Plan. While the Department shall consult with landowners regarding these exceptions, it is not required to obtain their consent to structure a plan with such exceptions, balancing environmental impacts with scientific and practical considerations.

Adoption of the Most Feasible Plan

Courts would now be mandated to adopt the Department’s plan as the Most Feasible Plan unless a party can prove by clear and convincing evidence that another timely submitted plan is a more feasible plan to adequately protect the environment and the public health, safety, and welfare. This new provision contrasts with the “preponderance of the evidence” standard, and it aims to streamline the process to adopt a Most Feasible Plan, reducing delays and avoiding unnecessary costs.

Appeals Process

Any appeal of a judgment adopting the Most Feasible Plan must be taken to the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in Baton Rouge. This centralized appeals process, located in close proximity to the Department, is designed to ensure statewide consistency and efficiency in handling disputes related to remediation or evaluation plans.

Stay of Trial on the Merits

The amendments to Act 312 would expressly provide for a stay of the trial on the merits, from the filing of a limited admission until the court adopts the Most Feasible Plan. This pause conserves costs and allows the parties to focus on proceedings with the Department to develop and approve a Most Feasible Plan – so the parties, the court, and the jury have the benefit of the Most Feasible Plan at trial.

Damages

The amendments would adopt jurisprudential guidance by clarifying that a party’s legal responsibility is satisfied by meeting the standards set forth in applicable regulations unless there is an express contractual provision for remediation to original condition or another specific contractual standard.

The amendments also would limit a plaintiffs’ recovery of non-remediation damages. Economic loss damages may be recovered if proven by a preponderance of the evidence. Other non-remediation damages are capped at 300% of the property’s fair market value, based on its undamaged surface value.

Attorneys’ Fees & Costs

Upon adoption of the Most Feasible Plan by the trial court, parties admitting responsibility or found legally responsible are no longer liable for further attorney fees or costs, including expert witness fees and environmental evaluations. Further, defendants found not to have caused or be legally responsible for environmental damage are now entitled to recover reasonable attorney fees and all costs from the plaintiff.

Voluntary Administrative Process

The amendments would establish an administrative process for alternative dispute resolution if agreed to by the parties, which offers parties a less adversarial path to resolving disputes. This option encourages collaboration and efficiency in addressing claims for environmental impacts.

A new Supreme Court decision creates potential traps for the unwary and gives the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) nationwide power to leave a taxpayer without a remedy to contest certain collection actions. Importantly, while a Collection Due Process (“CDP”) action is pending, taxpayers should ensure to the extent possible that no refunds are generated for other tax years as the IRS may seize these amounts to satisfy the liability at issue in the CDP, eliminating the taxpayer’s right to contest that liability. In Commissioner v. Zuch, with Justice Barrett delivering the majority opinion, the Supreme Court held that the United States Tax Court (the “Tax Court”) lacked jurisdiction under Internal Revenue Code (“IRC”) Section 6330 to resolve disputes between the taxpayer and the IRS when the IRS is no longer pursuing a levy. Instead, the taxpayer’s remedy in such cases is to file a suit for a refund against the IRS in federal district court. Taxpayers with similar ongoing collections issues should immediately identify refund deadlines and file refund claims with the IRS (on a protective basis or otherwise) before the statute of limitations runs out and they are potentially left with no recourse.

In Zuch, for the 2010 tax year, Jennifer Zuch (“Taxpayer”) and her then-spouse separately filed tax returns. After receiving notice that the IRS intended to levy on her property to collect an unpaid tax liability, Taxpayer requested a CDP hearing under IRC Section 6330. At the CDP hearing, Taxpayer argued that her account should have been credited with estimated taxes that were already paid to the IRS. The IRS Appeals Officer disagreed and sustained the levy action because the estimated tax payments had already been credited to her then-spouse. Taxpayer then appealed to the Tax Court, however, while this process was occurring over several years, Taxpayer filed multiple tax returns with overpayments that entitled Taxpayer to a refund. Each time, instead of issuing a refund, the IRS offset said amounts against Taxpayer’s outstanding tax liability for the 2010 tax year. Eventually, Taxpayer’s balance was zero, so the IRS moved to dismiss the Tax Court proceeding as moot. The Tax Court held that it lacked jurisdiction over the appeal because there was no longer a justification for the IRS to pursue a levy. Taxpayer appealed the Tax Court decision, and the Third Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with Taxpayer, holding that the IRS’s decision not to pursue a levy did not moot the Tax Court proceeding. The Third Circuit’s decision created a split with the Fourth and the D.C. Circuits.

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Third Circuit and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with the opinion, holding that a “determination” within the meaning of IRC Section 6330(d)(1) “refers to the binary decision whether a levy may proceed.” The Court reasoned that IRC Section 6330(c)(3), which sets forth the basis for the Appeals Officer’s “determination,” states that IRS Appeals “shall take into consideration” three factors, including the existence or amount of the underlying tax liability—in this case, whether the estimated tax payments were properly applied. Thus, those “considerations” are only inputs which result in the “determination” of the IRS Appeals Officer sustaining the levy, i.e., the output. The Supreme Court further reasoned that IRC Section 6330(e) only goes so far as to confer on the Tax Court the authority to issue an order enjoining a levy but no authority to order a refund or issue a declaratory judgment to resolve a tax liability dispute. The Tax Court, therefore, only has jurisdiction to review the “determination” and has no authority to resolve tax disputes that no longer have a connection to an ongoing levy. Finally, the Supreme Court reminds the Taxpayer that she does not lack recourse against the IRS and should “[r]ecall the default rule: Taxpayers cannot challenge disputes about tax liability without first paying the disputed taxes.” Taxpayer may file a post-deprivation suit for a refund (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(a)(1), 1491(a)(1)).

In light of the Supreme Court’s decision, Taxpayers should be aware that there first must be a levy action for the Tax Court to exercise jurisdiction under IRC Section 6330. That is, there will need to be an unpaid tax because otherwise there cannot be justification for a levy. According to the majority opinion, the Taxpayer in Zuch had a few options. Because the Taxpayer in Zuch had overpayments in subsequent years, she ended up in the same place—filing a refund suit—as she would have had she initially paid the tax when due. Had Taxpayer not had overpayments in subsequent years, the unpaid tax liability and the levy would have remained, and the Tax Court would have retained jurisdiction to decide whether the levy could move forward or whether to enjoin the levy. Importantly, while the Supreme Court did not cut off a taxpayer’s recourse under either circumstance, it explicitly sent the message that “[t]he Tax Court is a court of limited jurisdiction.” (citing Commissioner v. McCoy, 484 U. S. 3, 7 (1987); I.R.C. § 7442).

In addition, although the decision is rendered in the context of the Tax Court’s jurisdiction, its rationale may also be relied upon by IRS Appeals Officers looking to deny CDP hearings where the IRS has been able to collect the allegedly outstanding liabilities by offset.

In the aftermath of the ruling, similarly-placed taxpayers may find themselves in the difficult position of deciding whether to pursue a CDP proceeding knowing that the IRS could collect the liabilities at issue by offset and thereby defeat the Tax Court’s jurisdiction (as in Zuch). Or, as the dissenting opinion by Justice Gorsuch points out, the IRS could potentially drop the proposed levy at any point in the proceedings and strip the taxpayer of their Tax Court remedy.

The alternative that the majority opinion provides is for a taxpayer to pay the liabilities at issue and then file a timely administrative claim with the IRS, followed by a timely suit for refund in federal district court. However, when a pre-payment litigation option such as IRS Section 6330 exists, the decision to use a post-deprivation remedy will not be made lightly, particularly because a refund suit requires full payment of all taxes, interest, and penalties for a tax period.

If taxpayers do choose to pursue (or continue to pursue) CDP proceedings in similar matters, it will be important to calendar any deadlines for filing an administrative refund claim, as well as a refund suit, in relation to any amounts that the IRS collects by offset. As the dissent also points out, the Taxpayer in Zuch did not timely file all her administrative refund claims while she was pursuing the CDP proceedings, leaving her potentially remediless to recoup some of her overpayments from the IRS. Hence, at a minimum, taxpayers should ensure to the extent possible that taxes for other periods are not overpaid, and even if CDP proceedings are ongoing, taxpayers should consider at least filing protective refund claims for any overpayments to preserve their rights before the statute of limitations runs out and leaves them without recourse.

On May 21, 2025, the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality (“LDEQ” or “the Department”) officially approved the use of unmanned aircraft systems (“UAS”), or drones, for visual inspections of aboveground storage tanks under LAC 33:III.2103.D.2.e.[1] LDEQ estimated a potential $4 million in annual savings for the regulated community by reducing the need for scaffolding, cranes, and other equipment required by traditional visual inspection methods.

Prior to initiating the use of drones, facilities should ensure that the technical specifications of any UAS meet the requirements identified by LDEQ. The Department also encourages use of models approved by the U.S. Department of Defense.[2]

Facilities should update or prepare policies and standard operating procedures (“SOPs”) for use of a drone for tank inspections. Procedures may include: (1) direction for ensuring that the drone system specifications are compliant, (2) certification checks for the pilot(s) of the drone, (3) steps to prepare the area for safe inspection, and (4) security protocols surrounding the information captured.

As drones become more widely used in industrial and agency operations, facilities must also be prepared to respond to unauthorized drone activity. Although federal and state laws prohibit drone flights over certain critical infrastructure,[3] facilities should never attempt to disable or interfere with an unrecognized drone. If personnel observe a drone that is not accounted for, they should document the sighting and contact the Louisiana State Police, the regional Federal Aviation Administration office, and/or another appropriate authority.[4]

[1] LDEQ press release can be found here: UnmannedAircraftInspectionsPressRelease.pdf.

[2] See Blue UAS Cleared Drone List.

[3] See e.g., La. R.S. 14:337 (Unlawful use of an unmanned aircraft system); 14 C.F.R. § 99.7 (prohibits drone flight in certain areas designed in conjunction with the Department of Defense, including over certain critical infrastructure); see also 14 C.F.R. Part 107 (Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems regulations).

[4] Contact Louisiana State Police (LSP) Suspicious Activity Hotline 1-800-434-8007, use the See Send app, or file an online complaint of suspicious or criminal activity. see https://la-safe.org/suspicious-activity-reports/.

In Louisiana state courts, litigation costs can escalate quickly, especially for a defendant. While a prevailing party is generally entitled to an award of costs, the prospect of bearing unrecoverable costs quickly becomes a serious concern for defendants when facing aggressive opposing counsel on a contingency fee and a plaintiff with limited financial resources. Even when a defendant prevails in dismissing the claims against it, recovery of costs can be difficult. Fortunately, the Louisiana Revised Statutes contain an oft-overlooked remedy that may be used to require a plaintiff to post security for costs or face dismissal of their claims.

While a bond for costs is a familiar tool to federal court practitioners, state court litigators are often surprised to learn that the Revised Statutes contain two provisions which, if properly applied, may protect their clients from incurring substantial, unrecoverable costs in defense of meritless claims: La. R.S. 13:4522 (Statewide) and La. R.S. 13:1215 (Orleans Parish).  These two statutes do more than simply afford a layer of financial protection for defendants – they mandate it by providing that, if plaintiff fails to post security within the time fixed by the court, the result is a dismissal of the suit, without prejudice, La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13:4522, or a non-suit. La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13:1215.

The Statewide Rule: La. R.S. 13:4522

The defendant before pleading in all cases may by motion demand and require the plaintiff or intervenor to give security for the cost in such case, and on failure to do so within the time fixed by the court such suit or intervention, as the case may be, shall be dismissed without prejudice. This section shall not apply to the Parish of Orleans and to cases brought in forma pauperis, nor to the state or any political subdivision thereof.

La. Rev. Stat. § 13:4522 gives defendants a procedural mechanism to manage cost exposure. In most civil suits (excluding those filed in the Parish of Orleans), a defendant may move the court—before filing an answer or pleading—to require the plaintiff or intervenor to provide security for litigation costs. If the plaintiff fails to furnish the bond within the court-ordered timeframe, the case is dismissed without prejudice.

This statute applies broadly but with key exceptions:

  • It does not apply in the Parish of Orleans (see La. R.S. 13:1215),
  • It excludes cases brought in forma pauperis, and
  • It does not apply where the State or a political subdivision is the plaintiff.

The Louisiana Supreme Court has explained that the requirement for the advance posting of security for costs “secures the payment of those expenses incurred by the defendant in defense of the suit which may be taxed as court costs and which the plaintiff may finally be condemned to pay.” Bize v. Larvadain, 2018-394 (La. App. 3 Cir. 12/28/18); 263 So. 3d 584, 592, writ denied, 2019-0419 (La. 5/6/19); 270 So. 3d 577 (quoting Carter v. Phillips, 337 So.2d 187, 188 (La.1976)). However, this provision does not relate to ordinary court costs for which the clerk of court is authorized to demand security.  Whitson v. American Ice Co., 164 La. 283, 113 So. 849 (1927). 

But what costs are covered? In Romero v. Romero, 232 So. 2d 572 (La. App. 3 Cir. 1970), the Third Circuit clarified that the statute is meant to protect defendants from paying upfront necessary defense costs that could be taxed to the plaintiff should it prevail, such as:

  • Expert witness fees (e.g., auditors, surveyors, scientists),
  • Deposition costs (including notary and commission fees),
  • Other costs directly tied to preparing a defense.

Importantly, the trial judge has discretion in setting the amount of the required bond, and “the defendant bears the burden under this provision of showing how large a bond is necessary to protect him.”  Carter v. Phillips, 337 So. 2d 187, 188 (La. 1976).  “[I]t is within the discretion of the trial judge to determine whether the showing required may be made by the allegations in the motion, supporting affidavits, the arguments of counsel at the hearing, introduction of evidence, or in any other manner which the trial judge deems appropriate.” Id. at 189. However, trial judges must exercise discretion “with the regard for the actual necessity for a bond and for the interest or motive of the party demanding it.’” Id. (quoting Whitson, supra, at 851).             

The Orleans Parish Rule: La. R.S. 13:1215

For suits filed in Orleans Parish, legislators have fashioned a separate statute:

The defendant in any cause may require the plaintiff or party prosecuting the cause to give bond or other security, in such amount as may be fixed by the court, to secure the repayment on the final termination of the cause of all costs expended by the defendant therein. The order requiring such bond or security for costs shall issue ex-parte on the application of the party, without costs, and no further proceeding shall be had in the cause until such bond or security has been furnished. The court shall fix the delay within which such bond or security for costs shall be furnished, and the failure to furnish it, within such delay, shall operate a dismissal of the cause as in case of non-suit. In all cases the surety for costs shall be considered a party to the cause and shall be condemned for the amount of costs recoverable in solido with the party cast in the final judgment in the cause.

For litigation within Orleans Parish, La. R.S. 13:1215 provides a distinct procedure allowing defendants to request that the plaintiff (or any party prosecuting the action) furnish a bond or other form of security to cover the repayment of court costs the defendant may incur. Like La. R.S. 13:4522, this provision may be used as an early check on the viability, or lack thereof, of the plaintiff’s claim.

Key features of § 13:1215 include:

  • Applies to any civil matter filed in Orleans Parish, regardless of the type of claim.
  • Unlike its state-wide counterpart, in Orleans Parish the defendant may apply ex parte, meaning without notice to the other side, and the court may issue the order without hearing or court costs. Further, the statute does not require that the defendant bring the motion before filing an answer or other pleading.
  • The court sets the amount of the bond based on anticipated costs and fixes a deadline by which the plaintiff must furnish it.
  • If the plaintiff fails to meet this deadline, the case is dismissed as a non-suit.
  • Importantly, the surety becomes a party to the case and is jointly and severally liable (in solido) with the losing party for any court costs awarded at final judgment.

However, courts have limited what may be considered as costs under the Orleans Parish-specific statute. For example, in  Two Canal Street Investors, Inc. v. New Orleans Building Corporation, 2016-0825 (La. App. 4 Cir. 9/23/16); 202 So.3d 1003, the Louisiana Court of Appeals for the Fourt Circuit held that speculative or indeterminate costs—such as depositions, expert witness fees, or other litigation expenses that may or may not be taxed as costs—are not subject to security under La. R.S. 13:1215. These types of expenses often cannot be accurately quantified until after trial; therefore, the Fourth Circuit excluded such costs that a defendant may seek to secure.

Why This Matters for Defendants:

In practice, these statutes offer strategic leverage. If a defendant is sued by a plaintiff that appears meritless, requesting security for costs can:

  • Protect the defendant from unrecoverable litigation expenses;
  • Encourage the plaintiff to seriously evaluate the financial commitment of pursuing the claim; and
  • Deter frivolous or speculative litigation.

For defendants in Orleans Parish, § 13:1215’s ex parte procedure adds even more tactical value, enabling a fast and quiet resolution before discovery even begins.

Failure to furnish court-ordered security can result in dismissal of the case. While in forma pauperis status offers an exemption, all other plaintiffs must be prepared to timely post security if the motion is granted.

Final Takeaway

Louisiana’s security-for-cost statutes are powerful underutilized tools that can help manage financial risk and protect defendants from being left with the bill after prevailing in court. Whether you’re considering filing such a motion—or need to respond to one—it’s important to understand your rights and obligations.

At Kean Miller LLP, we guide clients through all aspects of litigation strategy, including procedural safeguards like these. Contact our litigation teams to discuss how we can help you secure your position and control litigation risk in Louisiana courts.

It seems that the death of Chevron deference was not the end of agency deference. Almost a year after striking down Chevron deference, today the U.S. Supreme Court issued a decision on the role of judicial deference towards an agency’s fact and scope determinations. In an opinion penned by Justice Kavanaugh, the U.S. Supreme Court found that the U.S. Surface Transportation Board (the “Board”) rightfully excluded the environmental effects of upstream oil drilling and downstream oil refining when approving the construction of an 88-mile railroad line in Utah. Seven Cnty. Infrastructure Coal. v. Eagle Cnty., Colorado, 605 U. S. ____ (2025). Contrary to the D.C. Circuit’s decision, which found that the Board was required to evaluate these impacts, the Supreme Court held that the railway project’s Environmental Impact Statement (“EIS”) complied with the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”) requirements, focusing on the procedural nature of NEPA and the “textually mandated focus on the proposed action.”[1]

Despite the strong language in the opinion, likening NEPA to an overgrown “judicial oak that has hindered infrastructure development under the guise of just a little more process,” and demanding “course correction,”[2] the decision still leaves open questions on scoping of EIS. The Court aligned some guiderails stating: “A relatively modest infrastructure project should not be turned into a scapegoat for everything that ensues from upstream oil drilling to downstream refinery emissions.”[3] But the Court also recognized that in certain circumstances, other projects may be interrelated enough in time or place to require consideration.

Acknowledging the gray area in defining the project, the Court is leaving the decision to the agencies stating:

When assessing significant environmental effects and feasible alternatives for purposes of NEPA, an agency will invariably make a series of fact-dependent, context-specific, and policy-laden choices about the depth and breadth of its inquiry—and also about the length, content, and level of detail of the resulting EIS. Courts should afford substantial deference and should not micromanage those agency choices so long as they fall within a broad zone of reasonableness.[4]

Thus, the Court is signaling a retreat from judicial interference in the scoping of a project under NEPA and voiced overall skepticism with the way NEPA has been interpreted in the past. Projects may draw parallels to this decision to justify the exclusion of upstream and downstream oil and gas impacts in their respective evaluations.

As mentioned, last June the Supreme Court ended Chevron deference in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369 (2024), which focused on an agency’s interpretation of legal ambiguities in federal statutes, which the Court held would now be subject to de novo review. In contrasting this case and Loper Bright, Justice Kavanaugh explained that while NEPA requires an EIS to be “detailed,” and it is the Court’s power to interpret the meaning of “detailed” (under Loper Bright), what details need to be included in an EIS is a question of fact that warrants deference to the agency. “The agency is better equipped to assess what facts are relevant to the agency’s own decision than a court is.”[5]

The Kean Miller environmental regulatory and industrial project teams are closely monitoring the impacts of this decision on currently pending EIS and developing projects.

[1] Decision at p. 16 (internal citation omitted, emphasis added).

[2] Decision at p. 13.

[3] Decision at p. 19.

[4] Decision at p. 12 (emphasis added).

[5] Decision at p. 10.

While environmental justice initiatives may have experienced a recent administrative curtailment at the direction of the executive branch,[1] recent litigation trends show that EJ-related issues are far from moot. On Wednesday, April 9, 2025, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the District Court’s dismissal of Appellants’ EJ-related claims regarding racially discriminatory practices in industrial siting and remanded this case to the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana for further proceedings.[2]

The Appellants, comprising community and faith-based groups representing residents in St. James Parish,[3] appealed the dismissal of their challenge to the Parish’s[4] land use practices. In sum, Appellants alleged that the Parish caused hazardous industrial developments to be disproportionately sited in majority-Black areas, that these developments threaten health, property values, and desecrate ancestral burial sites, and that the Parish discriminates by protecting white Catholic churches and schools, but not Black Baptist churches.

The District Court dismissed all seven of the claims with prejudice: (I) Thirteenth Amendment claims (badge or incident of slavery); (II) Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection claims; (III) Fourteenth Amendment Substantive Due Process claims; (IV) 42 U.S.C. § 1982 claims (property rights); (V) 42 USC §2000cc Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”) claims (substantial burden on religious rights); (VI) 42 USC §2000cc RLUIPA claims (religious discrimination); and (VII) claims under Article XII Section 4 of the Louisiana Constitution (Preservation of Linguistic and Cultural Origins).

The District Court found some plaintiffs lacked standing and declared most claims time barred. Specifically, the court held that (1) claims I-IV and VI were time barred because they were based on a single incident—the Parish’s adoption of its 2014 Land Use Plan; (2) that claims V and VII were dismissed with prejudice because the Appellants did not allege religious injury standing; (3) that only Inclusive Louisiana had standing to sue for property injuries, and (4) that none of the Appellants had standing to sue for injuries related to unequal treatment.[5] Appellants raised these four issues on appeal.

1. Statute of Limitations (Claims I-IV, VI)

The Court agreed with Appellants that their injuries were related not only to the adoption of the 2014 plan, but also to a pattern of ongoing, recent discriminatory practices. As to claims I-IV, the Court reasoned that the 2022 rejection of a pollution moratorium in Black areas and the simultaneous approval of a solar moratorium in majority-White areas fell plainly within the applicable one-year limitations period.[6] Likewise, the Court  reasoned that the Parish’s approvals of (1) a land use permit for a polyurethane manufacturing facility on a former plantation within a mile of the Appellants and a historically majority-Black Baptist Church and (2) a proposal to build a methanol production plant in the Fifth District near Mount Triumph, plainly fell within the time limit applicable to Claim VI. The Court noted that the Parish cited no authority “supporting the proposition that once a municipality’s land use plan is beyond the statute of limitations, any claims arising from that municipality’s individual land use decisions are time barred, regardless of when those decisions were made.”[7] Thus, the Court reversed the dismissal of these claims as time barred.

2. Religious and Cultural Injuries (Claims V and VII)

The Fifth Circuit held Appellants had adequately alleged religious and cultural harms caused by desecration of ancestral burial sites, such that the Appellants had established standing. The Court reasoned that these injuries were fairly traceable to the Parish’s land use decisions, not only private landowners, as the alleged injuries were not only from a lack of physical access to Appellants’ ancestors’ cemeteries, but also from the destruction and desecration traceable to the Parish through its individual land use decisions.[8]

3. Property Injuries

All three plaintiff organizations properly alleged diminished property values of their members’ property due to industrial siting. Although the Appellants could have given more detail on how the Parish’s land use decisions affected their property values, the court still found this was a concrete and traceable injury sufficient for standing, and that the Parish cited no authority to support that “Article III mandates additional specificity to establish traceability.”[9]

4. Stigmatic Harm

Finally, the Court found that Appellants had alleged they were personally subjected to unequal treatment, which supports a stigmatic injury claim under the Equal Protection Clause. Specifically, the Appellants alleged that the Parish’s land use decisions consistently steer hazardous industrial development to predominantly Black districts while shielding predominately White districts from industrial development, which sufficed to show unequal treatment.[10]

Although this decision is a reversal of a pre-trial motion to dismiss and not a final decision on the merits, it is a novel approach to land use moratoriums. Further, this decision will be instructive for future cases on environmental justice and land use policies.

[1] See, e.g., Executive Order “Protecting American Energy from State Overreach” (April 8, 2025)(directing the U.S. attorney general to identify state laws that address climate change, ESG initiatives, environmental justice and carbon emissions, and to take action to block them).

[2] Inclusive Louisiana et al. v. St James Parish et al., No. 23- 30908, (5th Cir. Apr. 9, 2025).

[3] Inclusive Louisiana, Mount Triumph Baptist Church, and RISE St. James (collectively “Appellants”).

[4] St. James Parish, St. James Parish Council, and the St. James Parish Planning Commission (collectively, “Parish”).

[5] Inclusive Louisiana, No. 23- 30908, slip copy at pp. 8-9 (5th Cir. Apr. 9, 2025).

[6] Id. at p. 12.

[7] Id. at p. 16.

[8] Id. at p. 18.

[9] Id. at p. 20-21.

[10] Id. at p. 22.

Deposing Corporate Representatives? You Might Get More Time Than You Think

In complex litigation, the strategic use of discovery tools is not just beneficial – it’s imperative. Every litigator knows that a well-executed deposition can be a game-changer by uncovering key admissions, streamlining discovery, and exposing weaknesses in an organization defendant’s case.

Among the various deposition tools available to litigators in federal court, Rule 30(b)(6) serves a distinct role in shaping the testimony of organizations. A “30(b)(6) deposition” allows a party to depose an organization and requires it to designate one or more representatives to “speak for the entity.”[1]

It’s not a secret that an organization may designate multiple representatives, but the broader litigation implications, particularly, the time restraints associated with taking the deposition, are often overlooked.

More Witnesses, More Time? Yes – But with Limits.

Under Rule 30(a)(2)(A)(i) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, each side is entitled to ten depositions before requiring court approval for additional depositions.[2] However, when an organization designates multiple 30(b)(6) witnesses, those individual depositions still count as one for the purposes of the ten-deposition limit.

So, does this mean each designee gets a full seven-hour deposition under Rule 30(d)(1)?

The answer, for the most part, is yes – but courts have discretion to impose reasonable time limits. A 2000 Advisory Committee Note to Rule 30(d)(1) clarifies:

“For purposes of this durational limit, the deposition of each person designated under Rule 30(b)(6) should be considered a separate deposition.”

This interpretation has been consistently cited by district courts across multiple circuits, reinforcing that each designee is generally entitled to a full seven-hour deposition. Courts in the First,[3] Second,[4] Third,[5] Fourth,[6] Fifth,[7] Sixth,[8] Seventh,[9] Ninth,[10] Tenth,[11] and Eleventh Circuits[12] have acknowledged and applied this guidance, often permitting deposition time for multiple designees in excess of the 7-hour presumption.

This means that in many cases, if an organization designates three representatives, you could be looking at 21 hours of deposition time. But before you start planning an all-nighter with the court reporter, take note:

Courts Can – and Do – Cap Time Limits.

While courts don’t issue carte blanche orders for seemingly endless depositions, 30(b)(6) depositions involving multiple designees often exceed the presumptive 7-hour limit.

For example, in Smith v. Smith,[13] an organization designated four different representatives. Instead of allowing the full 28 hours pursuant to a strict reading of Rule 30(d)(1), the court limited the four depositions to 14 hours total, citing the scope of the topics and potential for redundancy.

Similarly, in Buie v. D.C.,[14] the Court permitted a cumulative 18 hours for 30(b)(6) depositions – not necessarily based on the number of representatives, but in light of the topics sought by the noticing party and the understanding that multiple persons would be acting as the corporate representative.[15]

Despite consistent guidance from courts, noticed parties frequently argue that the seven-hour presumptive limit should apply collectively to all.[16] These arguments, however, have been largely unsuccessful. As the Buie Court noted:

“Although the Advisory Committee notes are not binding on the Court, they explain the intent behind the rules and ‘are nearly universally accorded great weight in interpreting federal rules.’”[17]

Conversely, in In re Rembrandt Technologies,[18] the court rejected a party’s argument that each 30(b)(6) designee should be treated as a separate deponent with a full seven-hour allowance per person. The court reasoned:

A blanket rule permitting a seven-hour deposition of each designated deponent is unfair because it rewards broader deposition notices and penalizes corporate defendants who regularly maintain business information in silos and who therefore must either designate multiple individuals to respond or spend time, energy, money and other resources preparing a single individual to respond and unduly burdensome (because of the manifest increased cost and disruption of preparing more than one person to respond to a deposition notice).

Despite this critique, the court ultimately permitted a total of ten (10) hours to depose five 30(b)(6) designees.[19]

While Rembrandt reflects one court’s rationale, it remains a minority view. Most courts reject a strict numerical cap and instead assess time limits based on the scope of the deposition notice, the number of designees, and the complexity of the issues involved.[20]

The variances between circuit courts – while not stark – are critical in shaping arguments. Even 25 years later, the Advisory Committee notes remain the prevailing authority, despite repeated attempts to impose a strict seven-hour time limit in the 30(b)(6) context.

By staying informed on the evolving applications of Rule 30(b)(6), litigators can ensure they extract the most from 30(b)(6) depositions while effectively managing court-imposed constraints. Whether you’re conducting a 30(b)(6) deposition or defending one, understanding the nuances of deposition duration and designee limitations can help you strategically maximize – or reasonably limit – important testimony.

[1] FRCP 30(b)(6).

[2] See FRCP 30(a)(2)(A)(i).

[3] Proa v. NRT Mid-Atl., Inc., No. CV AMD-05-2157, 2008 WL 11363286 at *11 (D. Md. June 20, 2008).

[4] Oakley v. MSG Networks, Inc., No. 17-CV-6903 (RJS), 2024 WL 5056111 at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 10, 2024) (Denying party’s motion to limit 30(b)(6) deposition to seven hours.).

[5] Handy v. Delaware River Surgical Suites, LLC, No. 2:19-CV-1028-JHS, 2024 WL 1539604 at *fn.1 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 21, 2024).

[6] Oppenheimer v. Scarafile, No. CV 2:19-3590-RMG, 2021 WL 5902738 at *1 (D.S.C. July 30, 2021).

[7] Payne v. Raytheon Techs. Corp., No. 3:22-CV-2675-BN, 2024 WL 5012054 at *2 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 6, 2024).

[8] ChampionX, LLC v. Resonance Sys., Inc., No. 3:21-CV-288-TAV-JEM, 2024 WL 1743101 (E.D. Tenn. Jan. 12, 2024).

[9] PeopleFlo Mfg., Inc. v. Sundyne, LLC, No. 20 CV 3642, 2022 WL 7102662 at *fn.4 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 12, 2022).

[10] Unknown Party v. Arizona Bd. of Regents, No. CV-18-01623-PHX-DWL, 2021 WL 2291380 (D. Ariz. June 4, 2021).

[11] M.G. through Garcia v. Armijo, No. 1:22-CV-0325 MIS/DLM, 2024 WL 168270 (D.N.M. Jan. 16, 2024).

[12] United States ex rel. Bibby v. Mortg. Invs. Corp., No. 1:12-CV-4020-AT, 2017 WL 8222659 (N.D. Ga. Oct. 12, 2017), report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:12-CV-4020-AT, 2017 WL 8221392 (N.D. Ga. Oct. 13, 2017).

[13] Smith v. Smith, No. 19-10330, 2020 WL 1933820 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 22, 2020).

[14] Buie v. D.C., 327 F.R.D. 1 (D.D.C. 2018).

[15] Id.

[16] See e.g., Smith v. Smith, No. 19-10330, 2020 WL 1933820 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 22, 2020).

[17] Buie v. D.C., 327 F.R.D. 1 (D.D.C. 2018).

[18] In Re Rembrandt Techs., No. 09-CV-00691-WDM-KLM, 2009 WL 1258761 at *14 (D. Colo. May 4, 2009).

[19] Id.

[20] See e.g., Oakley v. MSG Networks, Inc., No. 17-CV-6903 (RJS), 2024 WL 5056111 at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 10, 2024) (Denying party’s motion to limit 30(b)(6) deposition to seven hours.).

On March 12, 2025, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) announced its deregulatory agenda.[1] Although most of the 31 actions identified by the EPA will require formal notice and comment rulemaking, with litigation ensuing, Wednesday’s announcement makes good on the Trump Administration’s promises to roll back environmental regulation.[2]

Of particular significance to the chemical manufacturing and oil and gas industries in Louisiana and Texas, the following regulations, among others, are listed for reconsideration:

  • Clean Power Plan 2.0
  • New Source Performance Standards (“NSPS”) OOOOb and OOOOc[3]
  • Mercury and Air Toxics Standards (“MATS”)[4]
  • Greenhouse Gas Reporting Program[5]
  • PM2.5 National Ambient Air Quality Standard (“PM2.5 NAAQS”)[6]
  • Certain National Emissions Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants (“NESHAP”)[7]
  • Regional Haze[8]
  • Good Neighbor Plan[9]
  • Risk Management Plan (“RMP”)[10]
  • Implementation of Exceptional Events[11]

These major rulemakings will take time, and at this stage, the scope of reconsideration and the specific regulatory requirements included is uncertain. The Kean Miller environmental regulatory team is closely following all actions.

[1] “EPA Launches Biggest Deregulatory Action in U.S. History” available at: https://www.epa.gov/newsreleases/epa-launches-biggest-deregulatory-action-us-history.

[2] See Executive Orders, “Unleashing American Energy”, “Declaring a National Energy Emergency”, “Putting America First in International Environmental Agreements”, and others available at:  www.whitehouse.gov.

[3] 40 C.F.R. Part 60, Subpart OOOOb (Standards of Performance for Crude Oil and Natural Gas facilities for Which Construction, Modification or Reconstruction Commenced After December 6, 2022); 40 C.F.R. Part 60, Subpart OOOOc (Emissions Guidelines for Greenhouse Gas Emissions From Existing Crude Oil and Natural Gas Facilities).

[4] 40 C.F.R. Part 63, Subpart UUUUU.

[5] 40 C.F.R. Part 98.

[6]  See https://www.epa.gov/pm-pollution/national-ambient-air-quality-standards-naaqs-pm (2024 rulemaking setting the primary annual PM2.5 standard to 9.0 micrograms per cubic meter).

[7] EPA has identified at least the following NESHAP for reconsideration: 40 C.F.R. Part 63 Subpart FFFFF (Integrated Iron and Steel Manufacturing), 40 C.F.R. Part 63 Subpart XXXX (Rubber Tire Manufacturing), 40 C.F.R. Part 63 Subparts F, G, H, I (Synthetic Organic Chemical Manufacturing Industry “SOCMI” including HON), 40 C.F.R. Part 63 Subpart O (Ethylene Oxide Emissions Standards for Sterilization Facilities), 40 C.F.R. Part 63 Subpart AAAAA (Lime Manufacturing Plants), 40 C.F.R. Subpart 63 Subpart L (Coke Ovens), 40 C.F.R. 63 Subpart QQQ (Copper Smelting) 40 C.F.R. 63 Subpart RRRRR (taconite ore processing).  

[8] 40 C.F.R. Sec. 51.308.

[9] 88 Fed. Reg. 49295 (July 31, 2023) and 88 Fed. Reg. 67102 (Sept. 29, 2023) (interim final actions to stay FIPs for certain states)

[10] 40 C.F.R. Part 68.

[11] See e.g., “Treatment of Data Influenced by Exceptional Events” (81 FR 68216; October 3, 2016) and https://www.epa.gov/air-quality-analysis/treatment-air-quality-monitoring-data-influenced-exceptional-events.

In M&A transactions, the seller makes representations and warranties to the buyer regarding the business being sold, its ownership, assets, operations, and liabilities.  The seller typically indemnifies the buyer from losses incurred post-closing resulting from inaccuracies in those representations and warranties.  This contractual structure is used by the parties to allocate certain known and unknown business risks between the buyer and seller.  However, negotiation of these representations and warranties and the indemnity structure in the acquisition agreement can be a contentious and lengthy process.  Buyers usually prefer broad indemnity from the seller for such post-closing losses, and sellers prefer to give a limited indemnity which is targeted to specific risks identified in the seller’s business.

Representation and warranty insurance (R&W insurance) is often an option which can help buyers and sellers avoid contentious negotiation of risk allocation by shifting some of the risks of an acquisition to an insurer.

R&W insurance provides coverage for indemnification claims a buyer may have for losses resulting from breaches of a seller’s representations and warranties in the acquisition agreement. The use of R&W insurance in M&A transactions has increased in recent years due to efficiencies in the insurance market, including lower premiums, better terms, and lower minimum transaction value.

R&W insurance policies can insure either the buyer or the seller in the transaction. Buy-side policies are the most common form of R&W insurance in private M&A transactions.

The viability of using R&W insurance in an M&A transaction depends largely on the size of the deal.  Due to pricing constraints like premium costs and professional fees and expenses, R&W insurance may be cost prohibitive for deals valued less than $20 million.  However, deals with transaction values between $10 million and $20 million are sometimes insured due to increased demand by buyers and sellers.

R&W insurance can benefit both the buyer and the seller in M&A transactions.

For the Seller, R&W insurance can (1) reduce the seller’s risk of liability for breaches of its representations and warranties by lowering or eliminating the seller’s indemnity obligations; (2) provide the seller with a cleaner exit from the business by reducing or eliminating the amount of proceeds held back by the buyer or placed in escrow; and (3) allow the seller to give the more extensive representations and warranties the buyer will want in the acquisition agreement, without as many “materiality” and “knowledge” qualifiers, leading to a quicker resolution of the form of acquisition agreement and thus an expedited closing.

For the Buyer, R&W insurance can (1) supplement or sometimes replace the indemnification protection provided by the seller by providing additional coverage beyond the liability cap and/or survival period in the acquisition agreement; (2) provide a secure source of recovery for losses resulting from breaches of the seller’s representations and warranties, particularly when recovery from the seller may be difficult; (3) allow the buyer to make a more attractive bid to the seller with no (or limited) escrow or holdback required, since the buyer will rely on the insurance for indemnification protection; and (4) preserve key relationships by mitigating the need for a buyer to pursue claims against sellers who will be working for the buyer post-closing.

The insurer will charge a premium for issuing the policy, generally ranging between 2% and 4% of the coverage amount.  The policy coverage amount is typically a dollar amount equal to 10% of the transaction value.  There will be a deductible amount under the policy that is excluded from coverage (the “retention”), generally set at 1% of the transaction value.  So, if an M&A transaction value is $50 million, the policy coverage amount will be around $5 million, the policy premium will likely be around $100,000 – $200,000, and the retention will likely be around $500,000.

The cost of R&W insurance (including the premium) is often split 50/50 between the seller and the buyer; however, this can vary depending on the leverage of the parties in the negotiation of the acquisition agreement.

R&W insurance policies generally do not cover losses resulting from:  (1) breaches of covenants; (2) purchase price adjustments; (3) contingent claims based on future events; and (4) matters that are known to the insured’s deal team before the inception of the policy (including all matters disclosed on schedules to the acquisition agreement and all matters discovered in due diligence).  Other exclusions will likely apply under the policy, based on the results of the buyer’s and the insurer’s due diligence of the seller’s business.

The insurer will typically conduct its own due diligence of the seller’s business during the underwriting process, focusing on areas or issues that could lead to material liabilities.  This process can add some additional time to close the transaction; however, efficiencies are often realized by repeat relationships between buyers, their advisors, and the insurance underwriters who have worked together on previous transactions and have developed a working understanding of each other’s processes.

Sellers and buyers should consult their advisors (attorneys, investment bank or broker) early in the process of an M&A transaction, preferably as early as in the letter of intent/term sheet stage, to determine if R&W insurance is a viable option for the transaction, as both parties may derive significant benefit from purchasing R&W insurance for the transaction.