Traditionally, a party seeking injunctive relief from the courts bears the burden of proving four elements: (1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of their claims; (2) a substantial threat that failure to grant the injunction will result in irreparable injury; (3) the threatened injury outweighs any damage that the injunction will cause to the adverse party; and (4) the injunction will not have an adverse effect on the public interest.  See Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Guidry, 724 F. Supp. 2d 612 (W.D. La. July 12, 2010); Mississippi Power & Light v. United Gas Pipeline Co., 760 F. 2d 618 (5^th Cir. 1985).  Due to the first element – a substantial likelihood of success on the merits – a court that is asked to rule upon a request for injunctive relief in effect pre-judges the entire case.  Although in most cases this is not problematic (and can potentially lead to the matter being resolved without the need for a full trial on the merits), the presence of a mandatory arbitration clause in the parties’ contract can lead to problems.Continue Reading If a Contract Includes a Mandatory Arbitration Clause, the Parties Should be Aware that Injunctive Relief from the Courts can be Available Without the Necessity of Satisfying the Traditional Four-Element Test

Floating oil and gas production facilities, such as the Single Point Anchor Reservoir (“SPAR”), are designed to operate in deep water environments where construction of a traditional fixed platform is not feasible. Unlike a fixed platform, floating production facilities are constructed on a floating hull.  Fields v. Pool Offshore, Inc., 182 F.3d 353 (5th Cir. 1999).  The hull is typically moored to the seabed with wire or synthetic rope attached to suction piles and/or anchors.  The structures are typically capable of limited movement by manipulation of mooring lines.  Although it is typically a complicated, expensive, and time-consuming endeavor, floating production facilities are capable of being detached from the seabed and towed from one location to another.

The 2005 U.S. Supreme Court decision in Stewart v Dutra Construction Company, 543 U.S. 481 (2005) caused many to question whether floating production facilities (traditionally not considered a vessel) may qualify as a vessel under maritime law.  Due to certain language in the decision, Stewart provided what some consider a more expansive definition of which structures may qualify as a “vessel” for purposes of maritime law.   The Stewart Court analyzed the vessel status of the Super Scoop dredge, a floating platform with a bucket that removes silt from the ocean floor and dumps it onto adjacent scows. The Super Scoop is in some ways similar to a SPAR because it has limited means of self-propulsion, but can navigate short distances by manipulating its anchors and cables.  In Stewart, the Court concluded that the Super Scoop’s practical capability of transporting equipment and people over water rendered it a vessel.  Continue Reading Vessel Status of Floating Production Facilities After Lozeman v. Riviera Beach

Recently the U.S. Fifth Circuit rendered an opinion in Barker v. Hercules Offshore, Inc., et al., 713 F.3d 208 (5th Cir. 2013), that touched on several areas of substantive and procedural aspects of marine litigation that all maritime lawyers should be aware of.  For example, the Court provided interesting commentary on the maritime nexus prong for cases involving injuries on MODUs and the availability of bystander claims under Maritime law.  However, this article focuses on the Fifth Circuit’s holding that “[m]aritime law, when it applies under OCSLA, displaces federal law only as to the substantive law of decision and has no effect on the removal of an OCSLA action,” and thus, OCSLA’s own federal question jurisdiction is sufficient to remove such cases without another independent basis for subject matter jurisdiction, regardless of the citizenship of the parties.  After twice declining to address this issue, leaving district courts to render conflicting decisions, see Hufnagel v. Omega Servs. Indus., Inc., 182 F.3d 340 (5th Cir. 1999); Tenn. Gas Pipeline v. Houston Cas. Ins. Co., 87 F.3d 150 (5th Cir. 1996), the Fifth Circuit finally decided to speak.

Traditionally, lawsuits filed in state court, to which maritime law provides the substantive rule of decision, were not removable due to the “saving-to-suitors” clause governing admiralty claims without another jurisdictional grant, such as diversity.  The issue on appeal was “whether maritime law, when it provides the substantive rule of decision under OCSLA, abrogates OCSLA’s grant of federal question jurisdiction and prohibits removal of an action filed in state court absent complete diversity.”  Barker, 713 F.3d at 219.  With an absence of guidance on the issue, district courts had “fallen on both sides of this issue.”  In reaching its conclusion, the Court chose to follow the line of cases that recognized that the determination of the substantive law of decision is a separate and distinct inquiry from subject matter jurisdiction and removal.  See, e.g., Broussard v. John E. Graham & Sons, 798 F.Supp. 370, 373 (M.D. La. 1992); Fallon v. Oxy USA, Inc., No. 2049, 2000 WL 1285397, at *3 (E.D. La. Sept. 12, 2000).Continue Reading U.S. 5th Circuit Holds that OCSLA Removal is Proper in Maritime Cases

Practically speaking, a houseboat is still a vessel. But the same is not true for every floating house. And just when we thought that the highest tribunal in the land had a fast hold on its commitment to expanding the definition of a vessel, the Supreme Court issues a holding that not only creates confusion by curtailing its existing definition, but also indicates a new method for determining if a floating structure is, in fact, a vessel.(1)   Owners of residences afloat throughout the United States admiralty jurisdiction, now wonder, “Is my houseboat a vessel?” Houseboat owners, you are not alone! Maritime attorneys and judges alike try to answer the same question secondary to the Supreme Court’s recent contribution to the ever-developing jurisprudence attempting to define a vessel.

The controversial subject of the Supreme Court’s latest vessel status pronouncement arose in 2006 when Fane Lozman docked his 60’x 12’ floating home in a marina owned by the City of Riviera Beach, Florida. Lozman’s abode — equipped with French doors on 3 sides, a sitting room, bedroom, closet, kitchen, and an office — remained at the Riviera Beach Marina until the City, despite the absence of admiralty jurisdiction, filed an in rem suit against the vessel, purchased the home at auction, and destroyed it. The district court and the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals both found admiralty jurisdiction to exist holding that the home was a vessel. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals finding that Fane Lozman owned nothing more than a floating house.Continue Reading Not Every Boat is a Vessel: Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach

The question of whether a Medicare Set Aside (MSA) is required in a Jones Act and/or personal injury case continues to be without a definitive answer. However, in Sippler v. Trans Am Trucking, Inc., 10-CV-03550, the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey ruled in an unpublished opinion that a MSA is not necessary in a personal injury matter.

To recap: the Medicare Secondary Payer Statute (MSP) assigns primary responsibility for medical bills of Medicare recipients to private health plans when a Medicare recipient is also covered by private insurance. These private plans are therefore considered primary under the MSP. Medicare acts as the secondary payer responsible only for paying amounts not covered by the primary plan. The MSP bars Medicare payments where a payment has already been made or can reasonably be expected to be made by a primary plan. (1)

Medicare payments are subject to reimbursement to the appropriate Medicare Trust Fund once the U.S. government receives notice that a third party payment has been or could be made with respect to the same item or service. If an MSP reimbursement is not made, the MSP authorizes the government to bring an action against any entity which is required or responsible to make payment under primary plan and against any other entity that has received payment from that entity. Note that “any entity” includes the parties to a lawsuit and their legal counsel.Continue Reading Recent Developments in Medicare Set Aside

The overriding royalty interest (commonly known as “ORRI”) is prevalent in the oil and gas industry. A party who obtains an ORRI in a lease will receive a set percentage of the production that is obtained from the lease. The lease between the landowner and the lessee usually reserves an ORRI to the landowner as compensation for granting the lease, and the lease also specifically describes how that ORRI will be calculated.

Since the Outer Continental Shelf (“OCS”) off the coast of the United States is owned by the U.S. government, parties wishing to drill for oil and gas on the OCS are required to obtain those leasing rights from the U.S. government. Pursuant to federal regulation, the U.S. government, as lessor, receives a set royalty on all production that is obtained from an OCS lease.

Other parties besides the landowner can obtain ORRI’s. For instance, an investor may contribute funds towards the project in the hopes that the lease will be productive. Also, a geologist may perform surveys of a lease and receive an ORRI as compensation. Or, the lessee may wish to reduce its risk and capital outlay by sub-letting the drilling operation to another entity. In these instances, the ORRI is created by way of an agreement separate and apart from the lease between the landowner and the lessee. Oftentimes those ORRI agreements will state that the ORRI it grants “shall be calculated and paid in the same manner and subject to the same terms and conditions as the landowner’s royalty under the lease.” Ordinarily, that language makes calculating everyone’s (the landowner and any investors) ORRI a matter of simple mathematics.Continue Reading Does the Deep Water Royalty Relief Act Affect the Calculation of Overriding Royalties? The U.S. Fifth Circuit May Decide This Issue Soon