In Bollinger Shipyards, Inc. v. Director, Office of Worker’s Compensation Programs, U.S. Dept. of Labor, (5th Cir. 2010) the United States Fifth Circuit upheld the award of workers compensation benefits to an undocumented immigrant worker who was injured on the job as a pipefitter.

The Bollinger plaintiff, Jorge Rodriguez, fell and allegedly injured himself while welding for his employer, Bollinger Shipyards, Inc.  At the time of his alleged injury, Rodriguez had been working for Bollinger for approximately eight months, having initially obtained employment by falsely holding himself out as a United States citizen.  Rodriguez presented Bollinger with a false Social Security Card.  Bollinger initially paid Rodriguez temporary disability benefits and reimbursed him for a portion of his medical bills.Continue Reading Immigration Status is Irrelevent Under the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act

By the Admiralty and Maritime Team

In Solana v. GSF Development Driller I, et al., 587 F.3d 266 (5th Cir. 2009), the United States Fifth Circuit reiterated the longstanding rule that generally, a seaman belonging to a vessel in peril cannot claim a salvage compensation for saving his vessel.

The facts in Solana are quite interesting.  As Hurricane Katrina approached the Gulf Coast, Global Santa Fe (GSF) evacuated its jack-up and anchored rigs in the Gulf of Mexico, which included the Development Driller I (DDI), a $350 million dollar semi-submersible drilling rig. The DDI’s power was shut off and its crew was evacuated.  Solana, a 20 year GSF employee and Offshore Installation Manager (OIM) of the DDI, and Lally, a ballast control operator and senior dynamic positioning operator, were among those employees who were evacuated from the rig.Continue Reading United States Fifth Circuit Reiterates Rule That Crew Members Are Not Entitled to a Salvage Award for Assistance Rendered to Their Own Vessel

It is a fairly common practice for individuals purchasing pleasure yachts to take calculated steps to minimize sales taxes on their purchases. In fact, a simple “Google” search on the subject reveals many websites offering free advice on this issue. One of the tactics suggested by several websites seems fairly simple: instead of the individual purchasing the yacht, the individual forms a corporation, and the corporation purchases the yacht.
Continue Reading Structuring the Purchase of a Vessel Through a Corporate Entity for Tax Purposes Can Have Unintended Consequences

The Limitation of Liability Act provides, inter alia, that a vessel owner may petition a district court of competent jurisdiction for limitation of liability within six months of receiving written notice of a claim.  See generally 46 U.S.C.A §§ 30501-30512 (West 2010).  If the vessel owner fails to petition the court and the six month period lapses, it is thereafter precluded from seeking the Act’s protection.  The Act, however, does not address the effect that one co-owner’s failure to file a petition for limitation has on another co-owner’s right to subsequently seek limitation of liability. In other words, if co-owner “X” of a vessel receives notice of a claim against it and fails to file for limitation of liability within the requisite six-month period, is co-owner “Y,” who did not receive notice, precluded from filing for limitation of liability?
Continue Reading Limitation of Liability – Effect of Notice to a Single Co-Owner

It is well known that a seaman who is injured on the job can file suit against his employer in negligence due to the statutory provisions of the Jones Act. 45 U.S.C.A §§ 30104.  However, in a Jones Act suit, the injured seaman is prohibited from recovering “non-pecuniary” damages from his employer, a category which includes punitive damages and loss of consortium. (1).  This limitation on recoverable damages is due to the language of Jones Act itself. Miles v. Apex, 498 U.S. 19 (1990).

In addition to bringing claims against his employer pursuant to the Jones Act, a seaman injured on the job often also files claims against non-employers. These claims are not dependant on the Jones Act, but rather general maritime law. In this situation, plaintiffs often attempt to recover non-pecuniary damages from the non-employer. Plaintiffs suggest that since there is no specific prohibition against the recovery of non-pecuniary damages in general maritime law, then why should an injured seaman be denied recovering non-pecuniary damages from non-employers?Continue Reading A Jones Act Seaman Does Not Have Greater Remedies Against A Non-Employer Than He Does Against His Employer

By the Admiralty and Maritime Team

Due to the non-pecuniary nature of pain and suffering, Jones Act seamen will often use various methods to provide the trier of fact with a concrete basis for a damage award for pain and suffering.  One method that Plaintiffs may utilize is to introduce their medical bills for the sole purpose of highlighting the cost of their medical care.  Once the bills have been admitted, Plaintiffs will argue to the trier of fact that the high dollar amount of their medical bills corroborate their pain and suffering.  Alternatively, Defendants may introduce medical bills and point to the low cost of a Plaintiff’s medical care to prove the Plaintiff’s lack of pain and suffering.Continue Reading Medical Bills Are Not Admissible to Prove Pain and Suffering

By the Admiralty and Maritime Team

In Atlantic Sounding Co., Inc., et al. v. Townsend, the United States Supreme Court held that punitive damages are available to a seaman if his employer/vessel owner has willfully failed to fulfill its maintenance and cure obligation. This decision effectively overrules recent United States Court of Appeals jurisprudence, such as Guevara v. Maritime Overseas Corp, 59 F.3d. 1496, 1995 AMC 2409 (5th Cir. 1995) and Glynn v. Roy Al Boat Management Corp., 57 F.3d 1495, 1995 AMC 2022 (9th Cir. 1995), which interpreted the prior Supreme Court case of Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 1991 AMC 1 (1990) to bar claims for punitive damages against vessel owners for the willful failure to pay maintenance and cure.Continue Reading U.S. Supreme Court Overrules U.S. Fifth Circuit Precedent and Holds that Punitive Damages Are Available in a Maintenance and Cure Claim

While a Jones Act seaman’s willful concealment of a pre-existing medical condition has long been held to preclude a seaman’s recovery for maintenance and cure benefits, willful concealment has never acted as a bar to recovery under the Jones Act.   The Fifth Circuit’s recent ruling in Leroy Johnson v. Cenac Towing, Inc. provides both comfort and caveat to the Jones Act employer. [See 2008 WL 4330553 (5th Cir. 2008)]. Continue Reading United States Fifth Circuit Holds that Willful Concealment of a Prior Medical Condition From a Jones Act Employer May Constitute Contributory Negligence

In a major victory for business interests involved in maritime operations and what many commentators say is a harbinger of things to come, the United States Supreme Court recently struck down the $2.5 billion punitive damage award against ExxonMobil in a case involving claims for individual economic damages filed by landowners, native Alaskans and commercial fisherman following the 1989 grounding of the Exxon Valdez. See Exxon Shipping Company, et al v. Grant Baker, et al, 554 U.S. ____(June 25, 2008).  The Court determined that the upper limit for punitive damages in maritime cases was a 1:1 ratio to compensatory damages and sent the case back to the appellate court to reduce the punitive damage award to $507.5 million which was the amount of compensatory damages (those agreed upon in settlement and those awarded following trial) that the trial court determined were relevant for purposes of determining punitive damages.
Continue Reading Supreme Court Reduces Punitive Damage Award in Exxon Valdez Case and Limits Punitive Damage Awards in Maritime Cases

by the Admiralty and Maritime Team

In the recent case of Cain v. Transocean Offshore USA, Inc., et al., No. 05-300963, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed its long standing decision that a watercraft under construction is not a “vessel in navigation” for purposes of the Jones Act.

The determination of whether a vessel is “in navigation” is a critical part of the “seaman status” analysis. Congress did not define the term “seaman” when it passed the Jones Act. Thus, it has been left to the Courts to interpret and define that term. The U.S. Supreme Court’s most recent holding defines a “seaman” as an “employee whose duties contribute to the function of a vessel or to the accomplishment of its mission, and who has connection to a vessel in navigation (or to an identifiable group of such vessels) that is substantial in terms of both its duration and nature.” Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis, 515, U.S. 347, 354 (1995).Continue Reading A Vessel Under Construction is (Still) NOT a Vessel