Under the “design-build” construction method, the property owner enters into one contract with a single entity that provides the owner with both design and construction services. The advantages of “design-build” include faster construction and delivery, slower cost and schedule growth, and the elimination of potential disputes between the designer and contractor. Due to these advantages, the design-build method is becoming increasingly more common on private construction projects.

However, with respect to state-owned public construction projects, the design-build construction method is heavily disfavored—if not completely prohibited—under Louisiana state law. Two recent Attorney General opinions serve to reiterate that the Louisiana Public Bid Law continues to be driven instead by the traditional “design-bid-build” project delivery method. “Design-bid-build” is the traditional method of project delivery whereby the public entity/owner enters into two separate contracts, one with the design professional and one with the contractor. (1)

Under the Louisiana Public Bid Law, construction contracts for “public works” (2) are generally awarded to the contractor who is the “lowest responsible and responsive bidder,” (3) while the design professional is selected “on the basis of competence and qualifications for a fair and reasonable price.” (4)  The purpose of competitive bidding in the public construction arena is to protect taxpaying citizens “against contracts of public officials entered into because of favoritism and involving exorbitant and extortionate prices.” (5) Contrary to the objective selection process involved in competitive bidding, the “design-build” method of project delivery allows for subjective considerations based on qualifications and/or performance.

The 2014 Louisiana Legislative Session passed a new statute providing for the “construction management at risk” (CMAR) project delivery method. (6)  The advantages of CMAR over the traditional “design-bid-build” are that the public entity/owner is able to select the contractor based on more than price and that the design professional and contractor are able to work together during the design phase to minimize design disputes. The benefits of CMAR are limited in nature because La. R.S. 38:2225.2.4 only applies to projects worth $25 million or more. More importantly, CMAR still does not provide all of the advantages of “design-build” because the public entity/owner is still required to enter into separate contracts with the design professional and contractor.

Two recent Louisiana Attorney General Opinions discuss the lack of authority of a public entity to enter a “design-build” contract for a public work under the Louisiana Public Bid Law. Specifically, the two Opinions discuss La. R.S. 38:2225.2, which states:

Neither the state nor any local entity, unless specifically authorized by law, may execute any agreement for the purchase of unimproved property which contains provisions related to the successful design and construction of a construction project prior to the transfer of title to the state or local entity.

In Louisiana Attorney General Opinion No. 13-0182 (Nov. 26, 2013), the Attorney General stated that the Houma-Terrebone Airport Commission (H-TAC) is a public entity subject to the Louisiana Public Bid Law, which requires the “design-bid-build” method for projects exceeding $150,000. The Attorney General interpreted La. R.S. 38:2225.2 as expressly providing that “unless specifically authorized by law, a public entity has no authority to enter into a design-build contract.” Therefore, the Attorney General’s opinion was that the H-TAC could not enter a design-build contract for the construction of its capital improvement project because it had no special statutory authorization.

In Louisiana Attorney General Opinion No. 14-0033 (Mar. 31, 2014), the Attorney General was asked to state his opinion on whether the Orleans Judicial District Court Building Commission (Commission) could enter a design-build contract for the construction of its new courthouse. The Commission, like the judiciary, is a “public entity” subject to the Louisiana Public Bid Law. As in Op. No. 13-0182, the Attorney General interpreted La. R.S. 38:2212 to provide that the Commission could not enter a design-build contract because it had no special statutory authority to do so. In addition, the Attorney General found that the Commission acted contrary to the Louisiana Public Bid Law by hiring a consultant pursuant to a Request for Qualifications, by which the consultant would be expected to provide additional services including architectural design and construction. Therefore, the Attorney General stated that the Commission must contract with separate entities to provide the design and construction services, pursuant to the Public Bid Law.

As interpreted by the Attorney General, La. R.S. 38:2225.2 expressly prohibits the use of “design-build” contracts for the construction of “public works” unless specifically authorized by statute. Currently, Louisiana provides specific statutory authorization for “design-build” contracts to the Department of Transportation and Development pursuant to La. R.S. 250.2, to Port Commissions pursuant to a pilot program established under La. R.S. 34:3523, and to certain New Orleans public entities pursuant to La. R.S. 38:2225.2.1 “in the construction or repair of any public building or structure which has been destroyed or damaged by Hurricane Katrina, Hurricane Rita, or both or any public building or structure to be constructed or repaired to meet a homeland security or criminal justice need pursuant to a hurricane recovery plan.” (7)  In conclusion, the majority of projects under the Louisiana Public Bid Law continue to be contracted under the traditional, competitive bidding process of “design-bid-build,” and the possibility of “design-build” seems to be a distant reality.

____________________

(1) DBIA: Design-Build Institute of America, What is Design-Build?, available at http://www.dbia.org/about/Pages/What-is-Design-Build.aspx.
(2) La. R.S. 38:2211(A)(12): “‘Public work’ means the erection, construction, alteration, improvement, or repair of any public facility or immovable property owned, used, or leased by a public entity.”
(3) La. R.S. 38:2212(A).
(4) La. R.S. 38:2318.1(A).
(5) La. Atty. Gen. Op. No. 13-0182 (Nov. 26, 2013), 2013 WL 6410534.
(6) La. R.S. 38:2225.2.4.

(7) La. R.S. 38:2225.2.1(A)(1).

marijuana map

For many Louisianans, the Mardi Gras and President’s Day office and school closures equate with travel time. For some, it will mean a time to flock west to hit the slopes – including in Colorado, a state that has legalized marijuana for recreational use.

Employers in many states have grappled with the legal and practical problems associated with the legalization of marijuana. On November 4, 2014, Oregon, Alaska, and Washington, D.C. joined the host of states that have legalized marijuana for recreational and/or medicinal use. Louisiana is not among those states. (Technically, marijuana is legal in Louisiana for medicinal purposes, but the law does not allow for the legal dispensing of marijuana). However, as recently reported by sites including nola.com, Louisiana lawmakers will again consider a bill to legalize marijuana for medicinal purposes during the Louisiana Legislature’s spring session.

But, workplace concerns and questions regarding the impact of legalization are not limited to employers with operations in states where marijuana use is legal, particularly as Louisiana employees travel to other states. For example, how should a Louisiana employer react to a Facebook post that shows a “festive” Louisiana employee using marijuana for recreational purposes while on vacation in Colorado? The employee may not be “impaired” when he returns to work several days later, but the employee may still have traces of marijuana in his system or may still test positive for marijuana use. Does the employer’s knowledge of the Facebook post trigger reasonable suspicion testing? Has the employee violated company policy, particularly a “zero tolerance” policy? Can the employee be subject to discipline for engaging in an off-duty activity that is lawful in another state but which would be illegal if done in Louisiana?

For a Louisiana employer, the answer to many of these questions will turn on company policy and whether the employer is bound by state or federal regulations, such as the federal Department of Transportation and related agency regulations. Marijuana remains an illegal drug listed in Schedule 1 of the federal Controlled Substances Act, and marijuana use is still illegal under federal law. The company’s drug testing policy is another critical component of this analysis, and company policy should be considered and applied in a consistent manner.

For all employers, it is important to review and update company drug and alcohol testing policies. For some employers, it may be prudent to acknowledge that some marijuana use may be legal in some states under some circumstances, but to reiterate that any marijuana use is prohibited by federal law and company policy. Moreover, employers should consider and then properly articulate exactly what the company intends to prohibit, i.e. “working under the influence” of a controlled substance, or having “any detectable level of any controlled substance” in the employee’s system,” etc.

A comprehensive discussion of the state laws and court decisions in this emerging areas can be found here.

As previously reported, the Louisiana Supreme Court heard oral argument in Oleszkowicz v. Exxon Mobil Oil Corporation, et al. and Chauvin v. Exxon Mobil Corporation, et al., regarding the dispute as to whether claims for punitive damages are barred by res judicata. The court recently issued opinions in these cases.

To recap, a jury awarded the plaintiff in the initial Oleszkowicz case compensatory damages for the increased risk of cancer but specifically denied punitive damages. The denial was based on the jury’s express finding that that the defendant had not engaged in wanton or reckless conduct. Soon after that suit, plaintiff actually developed cancer and filed suit again, claiming that his cancer was caused by the same exposure and conduct as the first suit. He sought compensatory damages and renewed his claim for punitive damages. Contrary to the verdict in the first suit, the jury awarded plaintiff $10 million in punitive damages. The defendant appealed, and the court of appeal reduced the punitive damages award but rejected defendant’s argument of res judicata. Instead, the court of appeal found that an exception to res judicata applied, as “the complexity of and convoluted circumstances” of the case constituted “exceptional circumstances.” However, the Louisiana Supreme Court concluded that res judicata bars any re-litigation of the punitive damages claim and that no “exceptional circumstances” exist to justify an exception to res judicata. The court found it undeniable that the plaintiff’s right to bring a future cancer claim in his initial case did not change the fact that he fully prosecuted his punitive damages claim, and the jury, in deciding whether to award such damages, found that the defendant had not engaged in wanton or reckless conduct. While the court noted that the facts are unusual, the case does not involve a complex procedural situation or an unanticipated quirk in the system to which an exception to the general rules of res judicata applies. Because it found that the plaintiff’s punitive damages claim must be dismissed, the court reversed the judgment of the court of appeal.

In Chauvin, the defendant settled the plaintiff’s fear/increased risk claim and received a release from all future claims, except for future cancers. Plaintiff later developed cancer and filed another lawsuit, including a claim for punitive damages. The defendant sought dismissal of all claims barred by plaintiff’s prior settlement. The trial court agreed and granted defendant’s exception of res judicata as to all claims, including punitive damages, other than damages for future cancer. Plaintiff appealed, and the court of appeal reversed the trial court’s judgment as it pertained to punitive damages, finding an exception to res judicata. The Louisiana Supreme Court held that punitive damages relate to conduct and are separate and distinct from compensatory damages related to a specific injury. Because the plaintiff released all punitive damages arising out of the defendant’s alleged misconduct resulting in his exposure to NORM, res judicata bars his subsequent claim for punitive damages and no exception to res judicata applies. The court reversed the decision of the court of appeal and reinstated the trial court’s judgment. The plaintiff sought rehearing from the Louisiana Supreme Court. The court denied rehearing on February 6, 2015.

In sum, the Louisiana Supreme Court held that a jury’s prior finding of no punitive damages, or a prior release of punitive damages, prevents the same plaintiff from later pursuing punitive damages against the same defendant in a subsequent case for the same exposure.

Singer-songwriter Taylor Swift is primarily known for her musical talents, but the pop star has recently made headlines for her work in the intellectual property realm. According to the database of the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”), Swift has filed several trademark applications to register catchphrases from her 2014 album 1989. Swift has filed applications for registration of “Nice to Meet You. Where You Been?”, “Could Show You Incredible Things”, “Cause We Never Go Out of Style”, “Party Like It’s 1989,” and “This Sick Beat.” In the applications, Swift indicated that she plans to use these phrases on a plethora of different merchandise including apparel, paper products, toys, household items, and Christmas ornaments.

Because less people are buying full albums—instead opting for MP3s of single songs and streaming services—attempting to trademark lyrics may be a shrewd, yet smart, business move. Phrases can immediately “go viral” in today’s Internet age, and a person’s potentially marketable phrase may be quickly used by another for profit. For example, the phrase “Ain’t Nobody Got Time for That,” exclaimed by Kimberly “Sweet Brown” Wilkins in a local news interview turned Internet viral video, is the subject of a pending trademark application filed by Ebony Arrington, who uses the phrase “Ain’t Nobody Got Time for That!” as the title of her regular radio bit. Ms. Arrington has disclosed that she got the name for this radio bit from the “Sweet Brown” video interview. With how quickly other individuals may move in on another person’s creativity, companies and individuals may be inclined to emulate Swift and lock up phrases associated with them and/or their advertising campaigns before anyone else can profit. However, before immediately filing “knee-jerk” applications for trademark protection, potential applicants should consider the trademark-ability of slogans.

A trademark or service mark includes any word, name, symbol, device, or any combination, used or intended to be used to identify and distinguish the goods or services of one seller or provider from those of others, and to indicate the source of the goods/services. See 15 U.S.C. §1127. For a slogan to be protectable as a trademark, it must be either (1) inherently distinctive or (2) have acquired enough secondary meaning to be immediately associated with a particular brand of product or service. Secondary meaning is acquired when the meaning of a phrase transcends the literal meaning of its words and instead identifies a source. An example of a phrase that the USPTO has deemed as achieving secondary meaning is “Mayhem is everywhere,” which was registered in 2012 by Allstate Insurance Company to protect the slogan made popular by their “Mayhem” advertising campaign.

It is worth noting that none of Taylor Swift’s applications nor the “Ain’t Nobody Got Time for That” application have yet been accepted by the USPTO as registered marks. Therefore, their acceptability as a trademark has yet to be determined. However, for those potential applicants that have been inspired by Swift’s intellectual property maneuvers, consultation with a trademark attorney regarding the strength and secondary meaning of their slogans prior to application can be highly beneficial.

The attorney-client privilege ranks among the oldest and most established evidentiary privileges known to our law. This privilege allows clients to communicate freely with legal counsel without worry of disclosure through discovery or at trial. Moreover, the joint defense privilege has been recognized as an extension of the attorney- client privilege which gives attorneys and clients alike additional room to share privileged information to third parties without creating a waiver. However, since its recognition, use of the joint defense privilege has created questions in the legal community regarding the discoverability of such information for use against a party to the joint defense in litigation.

In general, the joint defense privilege “extends the attorney-client privilege to any third party made privy to privileged communications if that party ‘has a common legal interest with respect to the subject matter of the communication.’’’ Aiken v. Texas Farm Bureau Mutual Ins. Co., 151 F.R.D. 621, 624 (E.D. Tex. 1993) (citing In re Auclair, 961 F.2d 65, 69 (5th Cir. 1992)). Moreover, the joint defense privilege “encompasses shared communications between various co-defendants, actual or potential, and their attorneys, prompted by threatened or actual, civil or criminal proceedings, ‘to the extent that they concern common issues and are intended to facilitate representation in possible subsequent proceedings’ … ‘or whenever the communication was made in order to facilitate the rendition of legal services to each of the clients involved in the conference.’” Id. at 624.

Continue Reading The “Joint Defense” Privilege

Even if you are using the most current model FMLA forms from the U.S. Department of Labor, some of those forms “expire” at the end of February. When an employee advises his or her employer of the need (or possible need) for FMLA-qualifying leave, the employer must timely provide the employee with a “Notice of Eligibility and Rights & Responsibilities” form, Form WH-381. The employer may also provide the employee with a “Certification of Healthcare Provider” form, such as Form WH-380-E or Form WH-380-F.

Unlike milk, you do not have to open the “carton of forms” and smell them to see if they are expired because each form has an expiration date at the top right. A closer look at each of these forms in their current state reveals that all four “expire” at the end of this month, on “2/28/2015.” Other model FMLA forms that expire this month are Form WH-384, “Certification of Qualifying Exigency for Military Family Leave,” Form WH-385, “Certification for Serious Injury or Illness of Covered Servicemember—for Military Family Leave,” and Form WH-385-V, “Certification for Serious Injury or Illness of a Veteran for Military Caregiver Leave.”

Be sure to check your FMLA forms, and be sure you are using the most current versions of each.

On January 26, 2015, Saks Fifth Avenue withdrew a pleading that had sparked the attention of federal agencies and gender rights activists. In so doing, Saks abandoned its previously-pled position that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the federal anti-discrimination statute, does not protect transgender individuals. Gender rights activities tout the withdrawal as a victory.

A detailed discussion of the lawsuit and recent pleadings can be found here.

By way of brief background, the plaintiff, a former selling associate at a Saks Houston store, filed suit against Saks & Company and alleged that she was discriminated against because of her transgender status and because she failed to conform to gender-based stereotypes. In December 2014, Saks filed a motion in which it asserted, inter alia, that Title VII’s prohibition on sex discrimination does not protect transgender employees. Although legally supported, in the “court of public opinion,” Saks’ legal argument drew much criticism.

Ultimately, on January 26, 2015, Saks withdrew its motion “in contemplation of litigating the matter on the merits rather than asserting its legal defenses under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure at this time.” In its motion, Saks maintained that it did not discriminate against the plaintiff, and that its policies and procedures are effective in ensuring a diverse workplace free of harassment and discrimination.

Shortly after Saks withdrew its motion, the United States Department of Justice filed a 16-page Statement of Interest in the lawsuit, citing its “strong interest in ensuring the proper interpretation and application of Title VII in order to eliminate unlawful employment discrimination” and “setting forth its views regarding the scope of Title VII’s coverage with respect to claims of sex discrimination by transgender individuals.” In particular, the DOJ noted that both of the federal agencies charged with enforcing Title VII (the DOJ and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission) “have determined that Title VII’s prohibition of discrimination ‘because of . . . sex’ necessarily proscribes discrimination because of transgender status.” The DOJ specifically “request[ed] that the Court hold that Title VII’s ban on sex discrimination encompasses discrimination on the basis of gender identity, including transgender status.”

Although the Saks lawsuit is still in somewhat early stages, the DOJ’s pleadings filed in that case provide employers with a detailed view of the federal agency’s position and legal arguments on this issue. Employers can expect the EEOC will raise similar legal arguments in similar cases, to the extent it has not already done so. In case there was any doubt, it is clear that issues related to the scope of Title VII’s prohibition on sex discrimination will remain a significant topic in 2015.

“Throw me something, mister!” A labor dispute between dock workers and shipping companies on the West Coast has delayed shipments of signature Mardi Gras beads to the Big Easy (along with countless other items stuck in gridlock).

The longshoremen in question have been working without a collective bargaining agreement since July, when the prior CBA expired. However, on top of the contract negotiations, labor and management at ports on the West Coast each blame each other for a current cargo backlog that has left goods stranded. The Associated Press has reported  that the Pacific Maritime Association (which represents terminal operators and shipping lines) accuses members of the International Longshore and Warehouse Union of intentionally slowing down work in order to gain bargaining leverage. On the other hand, the union contends that employers are cutting-back jobs and asking for only half of the normal labor force to move the cargo. Additional background information regarding the dispute can be found here  and here.

Locally, the contract dispute is raising concerns in New Orleans that the throws will not arrive in time for Mardi Gras. Businesses in New Orleans are considering alternative options and making adjustments, including diverting products through different ports and using different modes of transportation.

The shipping companies have warned that they are on the verge of a full shutdown. For Mardi Gras revelers, this dispute serves as a reminder that the National Labor Relations Act and bargaining issues can have far-reaching consequences beyond the worksite.

Non-profit organizations have the opportunity to finance the acquisition or renovation of property where they do their good works using qualified 501(c)(3) bonds, which often provide better financing terms and rates than those available from traditional lenders. The proceeds of qualified 501(c)(3) bonds may also be used by the non-profit organization for working capital or to acquire other kinds property, within certain limits.

To be eligible for qualified 501(c)(3) bond financing, the non-profit organization must be exempt from taxation under section 501(a) of the Internal Revenue Code. The organization also must qualify as an “exempt organization” under section 501(c)(3). The organization must maintain its exempt status as long as the bonds are outstanding.

A non-profit organization that shares a building with a for-profit entity may still be eligible for qualified 501(c)(3) bonds. Such a “mixed use” or “multipurpose” facility may be financed in part with qualified 501(c)(3) bonds. The portion that is bond financed must be used by the exempt organization for its exempt purposes or by a governmental unit. The portion used by the private entity must be financed with taxable financing or sources other than bond proceeds. The allocations between the different uses of the facility must be made in proportion to the benefits derived, directly or indirectly, by the various users of the facility. The allocations of the bond proceeds and other sources of funds, and the use of the facility by various parties, must be reasonable and consistently applied.

At least 95% of the net proceeds of the bonds must be used to finance facilities owned and used by the exempt organization or a governmental unit for its related activities. As with other types of qualified private activity bonds, qualified 501(c)(3) bonds have some inherent private use. Use by an exempt organization in its related activities counts as a “good use.”

What about the other 5% of net proceeds? No more than 5% of the net proceeds of the bond issue may be used for any private business use, known as “bad use.” If the exempt organization uses the bond proceeds or bond-financed facilities in an unrelated trade or business activity, it is considered bad use. Costs of issuing the bonds are included in the 5% permitted private business use.

Although exempt organizations cannot use the bond-financed facilities for an unrelated trade or business, or “bad use,” they may contract with a private party to provide services, which may result in private business use. The typical example would be a management contract with a private party to operate a portion of the facility. Fortunately, the IRS has provided safe harbors regarding management service contracts.

With respect to debt service on qualified 501(c)(3) bonds, no more than 5% of the payment of the debt service on the bonds may be directly or indirectly:

  • secured by an interest in property used or to be used for a private business use, or
  • secured by payments in respect of such property, or
  • derived from payments in respect of property, or borrowed money, to be used in a private business.

Of course, interest and principal payments made by the exempt organization are not included, because the exempt organization is treated as a governmental unit.

Qualified 501(c)(3) bonds are not subject to state volume limits, but the aggregate outstanding face amount of qualified 501(c)(3) bonds that may be allocated to an exempt organization is limited to $150 million. Capital expenditures incurred by a 501(c)(3) organization may be financed with proceeds of tax-exempt bonds without regard to the $150 million limitation. And, this limitation does not apply to qualified hospital bonds.

The general rules regarding private activity bond rules are applicable to qualified 501(c)(3) bonds, including limits on the average maturity of the bonds, limits on the types of facilities that can be financed, notice and approval requirements, limits on costs of issuance, change in use rules, arbitrage and rebate rules, and advance refunding rules.

Federal tax law generally provides that tax-exempt bonds can only be issued to finance property for governmental or public use. If the property to be financed with bonds would be privately used, i.e., in a trade or business, the interest generated from the bonds will be included as income for federal income tax purposes. However, there are a few exceptions for certain non-profit corporations and other facilities that, although privately owned and operated, provide enough of a public benefit to qualify for the exception. Small issue manufacturing bonds, also known as Industrial Development Bonds (IDBs), are such an exception.

Manufacturing facilities include any facility used in the manufacture or production of tangible personal property, including processing that results in a change in the condition of such property. It also includes facilities that are directly and ancillary to the core manufacturing facility if they are located on the same site and not more than 25% of net bond proceeds are used for such ancillary facilities, i.e., office facilities.

IDBs may be issued in two amounts:

(1) Up to $1 million. This limit includes the outstanding amount of prior small issues with the same principal user or related person. However, capital expenditures are not taken into account.

(2) Up to $10 million. This limit includes prior small issue bonds and capital expenditures paid or incurred during the six-year period surrounding the bond issue with the same principal user or related person. The capital expenditures limit is $20 million minus the amount of the proposed bonds. Capital expenditures include (a) any expenditure chargeable to the capital account of any person (except to replace property due to catastrophic loss), (b) moved equipment that is acquired within the six-year measurement period, and (c) certain governmental expenditures that solely benefit the principal user or related person. Leased equipment can be excluded if leased from a manufacturer or leasing company.

These issues are subject to an outstanding limit of $40 million, which includes all exempt facility bonds, other small issue bonds, and qualified redevelopment bonds that are issued for the same substantial user.

There are a number of rules that govern the issuance of such bonds:

(1) The bonds are subject to state volume cap and must be allocated to the project by the Governor’s office.

(2) 95% of the proceeds must be used to provide the facility.

(3) Not more than 2% of the proceeds may be used for costs of issuance.

(4) Costs to be reimbursed include expenditures paid within 60 days prior to the adoption of an official intent resolution to issue the bonds.

(5) All costs must be reimbursed not more than 18 months after the facility is placed in service or 3 years after the allocation of bond proceeds to the expenditure, whichever is earlier.

(6) The weighted average maturity of the bonds cannot exceed 120% of the average economic life of the facilities to be financed.

(7) Not more than 25% of the bond proceeds may be used to acquire land.

(8) There must be a TEFRA hearing for public comment.

(9) A substantial user or related party cannot purchase the bonds.

Bonds issued under this exception cannot be used to finance working capital or inventory and may only be used to finance property or items that are capital in nature, i.e., depreciable under Section 167. IDB bond proceeds may be used to finance existing facilities and used equipment if:

(1) For a structure other than a building, an amount equal to at least 100% of the acquisition price is spent on rehabilitation of the structure.

(2) For an integrated building with equipment, an amount equal to at least 15% of the acquisition price is used for rehabilitation.

There are a number of Louisiana statutes that address industrial development and create conduit issuers. La. R.S. 51:1151, et seq. authorizes the incorporation of industrial development boards as private corporations of municipalities or parishes. These boards are authorized to issue revenue bonds, which require approval by the State Bond Commission and the Department of Economic Development. La. R.S. 51:1157; La. R.S. 51:1157.1. La. R.S. 51:1789 authorizes the issuance of revenue bonds in enterprise zones for business or industry. La. R.S. 39:551.1 authorizes parishes and municipalities to issue bonds to encourage the location or expansion of industrial facilities. La. R.S. 39:551.2 authorizes the creation of industrial districts, and La. R.S. 39:551.3 authorizes the creation of industrial parks. La. R.S. 39:991 authorizes the issuance of bonds to acquire plant sites and industrial plant buildings.

The procedure to issue an IDB is fairly straightforward:

(1) Apply to conduit issuer to issue bonds for the project.

(2) Complete conduit issuer’s preliminary approval process.

(3) Apply to State Bond Commission (and Department of Economic Development, as applicable) for preliminary approval.

(4) Complete SBC’s preliminary approval process.

(5) Conduct public hearings.

(6) Obtain final approval from conduit issuer.

(7) Obtain final approval from SBC (and DED, as applicable).

(8) Price and issue bonds.

The process takes about 90 – 120 days to complete.