By Lauren J. Rucinski

On Tuesday, December 11, 2018, the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) and U.S. Army Corp. of Engineers (“ACE”) proposed a rule revising the definition of “waters of the United States.” The so-called WOTUS rule defines the scope of Clean Water Act (“CWA”) jurisdiction and the permitting requirements thereunder, and has been in the hot seat for the past two years under both the Trump Administration and a bevy of litigation.

The Obama Administration promulgated the WOTUS rule in 2015, which defined the term “waters of the United States” broadly to cover any lake, stream, wetland, etc. with a “significant nexus” to a navigable water.[1] The regulation was challenged in a number of federal district courts and courts of appeal.[2] Following his election, President Trump issued a February 2017 Presidential Executive Order entitled “Restoring the Rule of Law, Federalism, and Economic Growth by Reviewing the ‘Waters of the United States’ Rule,” requesting that the EPA and ACE repeal and replace the 2015 rule. In response, the agencies repealed the 2015 WOTUS Rule, which is the first step in the process.[3] This rule proposal is the “second step” in the process.

The proposed definition of WOTUS set forth in the proposed rule would replace the 2015 WOTUS rule.[4] Under the proposed rule, the following six “clear” categories of waters would be considered “waters of the United States”:

  1. Traditional navigable waters;
  2. Tributaries;
  3. Certain ditches;
  4. Certain lakes and ponds;
  5. Impoundments; and
  6. Adjacent wetlands.[5]

Each category is supplemented by examples and definitions. Of particular note to Louisiana industry is the sixth category: adjacent wetlands. According to the proposed rule, wetlands would need to “physically touch” or be connected by inundation or perennial flow (including over a levee or berm if applicable) to navigable waters in order to bring the area under CWA rules.

Although the question still remains whether these definitions provide any more clarity than the previous “significant nexus test” under the 2015 WOTUS rule, both the EPA and ACE are optimistic. EPA Acting Administrator Andrew Wheeler stated: “For the first time, we are clearly defining the difference between federally protected waterways and state protected waterways. Our simpler and clearer definition would help landowners understand whether a project on their property will require a federal permit or not, without spending thousands of dollars on engineering and legal professionals.”[6]

It is important to note that the State of Louisiana through the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality (“LDEQ”) defines its own rule for “waters of the state.” The LDEQ rule is much broader and includes “both the surface and underground waters within the state of Louisiana including all rivers, streams, lakes, groundwaters, and all other water courses and waters within the confines of the state, and all bordering waters and the Gulf of Mexico.”[7]

The proposed rule can be found here and the public comment period will be open for the sixty days following the proposed rule’s publication in the Federal Register.

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[1] 80 Fed. Reg. 32054, June 29, 2015.

[2] See “A Plethora of Cases Could Affect WOTUS Rulemaking” (June 1, 2017) available at https://www.louisianalawblog.com/environmental-litigation-and-regulation/plethora-cases-affect-wotus-rulemaking/#_ftn1 (citing and discussing e.g., United States v. Robertson, No. CR 15-07-H-DWM, 2015 WL 7720480 (D. Mont. Nov. 30, 2015); Duarte Nursery Inc. v. Army Corps of Engineers, et al., 17 F. Supp. 3d 1013 (E.D.Cal. 2014); Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. Dep’t of Def., 138 S. Ct. 617, 199 L. Ed. 2d 501 (2018))  

[3] 83 Fed. Reg. 32227, July 12, 2018.

[4] https://www.epa.gov/wotus-rule/step-two-revise.

[5]https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2018-12/documents/factsheet_-_wotus_revision_overview_12.10_1.pdf;

[6] https://www.epa.gov/newsreleases/epa-and-army-propose-new-waters-united-states-definition.

[7] LAC 33:IX.107.

By Troy Charpentier and Matthew Smith

After contesting the construction of the Dakota Access pipeline, environmental advocacy groups have turned their attention to the proposed Bayou Bridge pipeline in South Louisiana. The Bayou Bridge pipeline is a 162-mile-long, 24-inch-wide proposed pipeline which will cross the Atchafalaya Basin to connect facilities in Lake Charles, Louisiana to crude oil refineries in St. James Parish, Louisiana.

Earthjustice attorneys filed suit on January 11, 2018 on behalf of Atchafalaya Basinkeeper, Louisiana Crawfish Producers Association-West, Gulf Restoration Network, Waterkeeper Alliance, the Sierra Club, and the Delta Chapter of the Sierra Club against the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers challenging permits and authorizations issued by the Corps under § 404 of the Clean Water Act (“CWA”) and under the Rivers and Harbors Act (“RHA”) for construction and operation of the pipeline. The environmental groups contend that the Corps did not conduct a sufficient environmental assessment under the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”) or consider various factors required by the CWA, RHA, and NEPA, including reasonable alternatives to the project, public interest, environmental impact, cumulative effects, and adequacy of mitigation.

Shortly after filing suit, the environmental groups filed Motions seeking a Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction to halt construction of the Bayou Bridge pipeline. On January 30, 2018, Judge Shelly Dick of the Middle District of Louisiana denied the environmental groups’ Motion for Temporary Restraining Order, finding that, based on the current record, the groups could not demonstrate a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of their challenge to the issuance of the permits.

In doing so, the court noted the “significant deference” afforded to the Corps’ decision to issue the permits, and that “the existence of opposing views does not render the Corps’ decision arbitrary and capricious.” Despite the contentions of the environmental groups, the court found that it is “undisputed that the Corps held a public hearing and allowed for public comments in accordance with the law.” The court further reviewed a 92 page Environmental Assessment (“EA”) performed by the Corps prior to issuing the relevant permits and found that it “clearly addresses the specific complaints of several Plaintiffs, albeit obviously not to Plaintiffs’ satisfaction.” Specifically, the court found that (i) the EA “reflects that several alternatives were addressed and considered,” (ii) a significant portion of the EA is devoted to consideration of the CWA permit guidelines which the groups contend were not adequately considered, and (iii) the EA included consideration of public interest factors. Accordingly, the court found that “Simply having an opposing opinion, or disagreeing with the mitigation plans imposed, is insufficient to establish a substantial likelihood of success on the merits, especially in light of the high deference that the law requires the Court to afford the Corps.”

The next step in the environmental groups’ attempt to halt construction of the Bayou Bridge pipeline will be the hearing on their Motion for Preliminary Injunction, which is currently set for February 8, 2018.

This is a horizontal, color, royalty free stock photograph shot with a Nikon D800 DSLR camera. The sky at dusk reflects pastel colors on the tranquil water's surface. Lilly pads float on this wetland landscape. Trees fill the background.

By Lauren J. Rucinski

The US Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has an opportunity to rule on controversial Clean Water Act wetlands jurisdictional requirements through the appeal of a Montana man’s conviction for polluting a navigable waterway. US v. Joseph Robertson, No. 16-30178 (C.A. 9). The timing of the appeal could affect the Trump administration’s efforts to take a second look at the Obama-era “Waters of the United States” (“WOTUS”) rule.

Joseph Robertson was convicted by a jury in the U.S. District Court for the District of Montana in April of 2016 for unauthorized discharge of pollutants into waters of the US and malicious mischief for injury or depredation of US property. The charges arose from Robertson’s excavation and construction of 9 stock ponds after being told by the government that he could not do so. The activities caused the discharge of dredged and fill materials into a tributary of the neighboring navigable river and also caused damage to nearby wetlands. Robertson was sentenced to 18 months prison and ordered to pay $129,933 in restitution for ponds dug on Beaverhead-Deerlodge National Forest land and on private property near his mining claim. Robertson now argues that the District Court did not have jurisdiction to hear his case because the government failed to articulate a lawful standard for what qualifies as “waters of the United States.” United States v. Robertson, No. CR 15-07-H-DWM, 2015 WL 7720480 (D. Mont. Nov. 30, 2015).

The Clean Water Act prohibits the discharge of any pollutant without a permit into “navigable waters,” which it defines, in turn, as “the waters of the United States.” 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a), 1362(7), (12). The term “waters of the US” has always included certain wetlands within federal jurisdiction, but the scope of that jurisdiction has been controversial.  The U.S.  Army Corps of Engineers administers the program which issues permits for dredge and fill activities affecting waters of the US. However, for a certain waterbody to be subject to permitting requirements, it must be a “water of the United States.”

Over the years, the primary issue concerning which wetlands are subject to regulation was the degree of their connectedness with a “real” navigable water. The current seminal cased interpreting “waters of the United States” is a split 4-1-4 opinion from the US Supreme Court in Rapanos v. US, 547 U.S. 715 (2006). Justice Scalia wrote the plurality opinion which held that the term “waters of the United States” requires wetlands to maintain a “continuous surface connection” to navigable waters. Justice Kennedy wrote a separate concurring opinion with a relatively wider view of jurisdiction under the Clean Water Act, requiring only that the wetland maintain a “significant nexus” to navigable waters. Confusion has ensued, with courts applying the Clean Water Act to any water that satisfied either the Kennedy or Scalia tests. However, the Seventh Circuit, and relevant to the Robertson case, the Ninth Circuit have held that the Kennedy test alone is controlling. N. Cal. River Watch v. City of Healdsburg, 496 F.3d 993, 999-1000 (9th Cir. 2007).

The Corps and EPA sought to resolve the ambiguity created by the Rapanos decision by issuing guidance in 2007, then revising it in 2008.  However, the regulated community found the guidance equally ambiguous and many requested promulgation of rules rather than guidance. The Obama administration promulgated a regulation, referred to as the WOTUS rule, in 2015.[1] The rule used Kennedy’s test only, but that regulation was challenged in a number of federal district courts and courts of appeal.  The litigation has been consolidated nationwide in the US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, where the rule has been stayed pending review.[2]

In the meantime, the Corps permitting and enforcement programs continue under the prior rules, with only Rapanos as guidance. The jury in the Robertson case was instructed to use the Kennedy “significant nexus” test in determining that the tributary Robertson polluted was in fact regulated by the CWA. Two months after Robertson’s conviction, the Ninth Circuit decided United States v. Davis, 825 F.3d 014 (9th Cir. 2016). In Davis, the Ninth Circuit held that a split Supreme Court decision should only bind the federal courts of appeal when a majority of the Justices agree upon a single underlying rationale and one opinion can reasonably be described as a logical subset of the other. Id.at 1021-22. Robertson argues on appeal that the ruling in Davis effectively overturns prior Ninth Circuit precedent applying the Kennedy test as the sole test, teeing up the question of which Rapanos test should be applied, if any, for the Ninth Circuit.

The Ninth Circuit will hear the Robertston case amid a slew of other legal battles over the jurisdiction of the Clean Water Act. For example, a case pending in the Eastern District of California for over a year pivots around the same arguments on the breadth of the Clean Water Act’s jurisdiction. See Duarte Nursery Inc. v. Army Corps of Engineers, et al., 17 F. Supp. 3d 1013 (E.D.Cal. 2014). The plaintiffs in that case have filed a motion to stay the case until the Robertston decision.

Further, a Supreme Court case, National Association of Manufacturers v. Department of Defense, challenges whether law suits over the WOTUS rule should be heard in the federal district courts or federal appellate courts (currently pending in 6th Circuit). If the Supreme Court decides that the district courts should hear these types of cases, it could revive a waterfall of stayed or dismissed district court cases over the WOTUS rule. The Supreme Court decided to take up the case in January, but the Trump administration subsequently asked the Court to stay the case following a February 28, 2017 executive order[3] compelling U.S. EPA and the Army Corps of Engineers to take another look at the WOTUS rule. On the same day, EPA and the Corps announced that their intent is to repeal the WOTUS rule and to propose a new rule.[4] A proposed revision to the rule has been sent to the Office of Management and Budget, but has not yet been released to the Federal Register for proposal.[5] It is widely anticipated that the proposed rule will adopt the Scalia test.

The scope of the Clean Water Act jurisdiction is particularly significant to landowners and industry groups in Louisiana. Obtaining a permit is costly but the penalties for discharging into waters of the United States without one can be rather substantial (criminal conviction and/or civil penalties), and can include an injunction stopping the project. The Trump administration has indicated that it supports the Scalia interpretation which would, to a certain degree, limit the scope the U.S. EPA and Army Corp of Engineers jurisdiction over certain “isolated” waters and wetlands. However, if the Ninth Circuit endorses the Kennedy rule in the Robertson case, it may create more legal hurdles for the Trump administration in overturning the WOTUS rule through rulemaking action.

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[1] 80 Fed. Reg. 32054, June 29, 2015.

[2] In re: United States Department of Defense and United States Environmental Protection Agency Final Rule: Clean Water Rule: Definition of “Waters of the United States”, 803 F.3d 804 (6th Cir. 2015).

[3] See: https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/02/28/presidential-executive-order-restoring-rule-law-federalism-and-economic.

[4] 82 Fed. Reg. 12532, March 6, 2017.

[5] For updates on the current WOTUS rulemaking, see: https://www.epa.gov/wotus-rule.

wet

By Sam O. Lumpkin

On May 31, 2016, the US Supreme Court ruled in United States Army Corps of Engineers v. Hawkes Co., Inc. that a jurisdictional determination issued by the Corps of Engineers under the Clean Water Act constitutes a final agency action that is judicially reviewable under the Administrative Procedure Act.  Justice Roberts wrote the decision of the Court, to which all other justices joined or concurred in the result.

The Clean Water Act prohibits the unpermitted discharge of any pollutant into “the waters of the United States,” including wetlands, without a permit.  However, only wetlands with a “significant nexus” to other waters of the United States are within Corps and EPA Clean Water Act jurisdiction.   Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006).  Dredging and filling activities are considered to be the discharge of a pollutant.   As a result, any dredging or filling activities involving a waters of the US within Corps jurisdiction must be approved beforehand by the US Army Corps of Engineers, which is responsible for issuing permits for discharges that would otherwise be forbidden by the Clean Water Act. The Clean Water Act allows imposition of potentially massive criminal or civil penalties for discharging any pollutant without a permit.

Determination of what constitutes a “wetland” or “other waters” of the US often involves expert determinations.  Further, the process for obtaining a Corps permit can itself be time-consuming and expensive – the Court noted that the average applicant for the type of permit at issue in Hawkes spends “788 days and $271,596 in completing the process,” and “[e]ven more readily available ‘general’ permits took applicants, on average, 313 days and $28,915 to complete.” To aid applicants, the Corps issues “jurisdictional determinations” (“JDs”) on a case-by-case basis. JDs are either “preliminary” – advising that there may be waters of the United States on a piece of land – or “approved,” which definitively states the presence or absence and extent of such waters.  The JDs provide some certainty for a landowner or developer as to whether they are required to endure the permitting process. The approved JDs are administratively appealable to the Corps; however, until the Hawkes decision, it was unclear as to whether judicial review of the Corp decision was available.

In Hawkes, the applicant sought a jurisdictional determination and was granted an approved JD stating that the property contained “water of the United States,”with a delineation of where those waters were located. Central to the case was whether the wetlands had a close enough nexus to a major river 120 miles away such that they were within the Corps’ jurisdiction. The applicants administratively appealed the JD under 33 C.F.R. Part 331, and the Corps reaffirmed its decision with revisions to the extent of the wetlands. Not satisfied, the applicants sought review of the JD in a federal district court under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), which allows district courts to review “final agency actions.” 5 U.S.C.A. § 704. The Corps argued that judicial review was available only at the time of the final permitting decision or on an enforcement action commenced for dredge or fill activity without a permit. The district court agreed with the Corps and dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, holding that a JD is not a “final agency action.” 963 F.Supp.2d 868 (Minn. 2013). The applicants then appealed to the US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, which reversed. 782 F.3d 994 (2015).

The Supreme Court agreed with the Eight Circuit, holding not only that an “approved” JD is a final agency action, but also that there are no adequate alternatives to the APA for challenging a Corps JD in court. On the issue of finality, the Court noted that  JDs give rise to “direct and appreciable legal consequences,” and they are also binding on the Corps and the EPA for five years following the determination.[1] Unlike other possible agency actions which are merely advisory, such as informal advice from an agency or a preliminary JD, an approved JD follows extensive fact-finding, marks “the consummation of the agency’s decision-making process” and constitutes a final determination of rights and obligations “from which legal consequences will flow.” The Court further held that there are no adequate alternatives to an APA challenge to the Corps’ JD, noting that the only alternatives available were to forego a permit altogether or proceed with the permitting process. Without a permit, the applicant could either proceed with its proposed activity and be exposed to the civil and criminal penalties of the Clean Water Act, or abandon its proposed activity altogether. But the permitting process also poses a highly expensive, time-consuming, and uncertain proposition, for which judicial review would only be available when complete. As a result, the Court held that an approved JD is reviewable in federal district court under the APA.

The Hawkes ruling is a narrow one, and applies only to approved JDs. However, because JDs are literally determinations of the extent of the Corps’ jurisdiction, the scope of the Corps’ authority will likely be subjected to many more challenges than in the past, when such objections would have to wait until the permitting process was complete. As a result, in the future the Corps’ jurisdiction may face additional restraints imposed by federal courts.

Because an adverse ruling on an approved JD is appealable beyond the Corps after Hawkes, a thorough record in the initial JD proceeding is more important than ever. Ordinarily, a consultant will prepare a draft JD for submission to the Corps, which may or may not visit the site in question; the Corps then issues its decision on the record. This process, however, does not offer the applicant any further opportunity to develop the record. Any administrative appeal and subsequent judicial review is limited to the administrative record before the Corps, unless good cause is demonstrated as to why additional information should be admitted. As a result, applicants should ensure that their consultant’s initial submittal is thoroughly documented and, possibly, subjected to legal review prior to submission. Because federal district courts do not possess the same expertise as the Corps, a well-documented and clearly explained initial proposal will aid a district court with the information it needs to review the Corps’ decisions.

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[1]  There were three concurring opinions taking differing positions on whether a Memorandum of Agreement between the Corps and EPA makes the JDs binding on EPA. This aspect could bear further review.

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By Tyler Moore Kostal

A federal judge dismissed the lawsuit that the New York Times referred to as “The Most Ambitious Environmental Lawsuit Ever” on February 13, 2015, with a finding that the plaintiffs did not state a viable claim for relief.

The Board of Commissioners of the Southeast Louisiana Flood Protection Authority-East (“SLFPA-E” or “Authority”) filed a lawsuit in the Civil District Court in Orleans Parish, Louisiana, against more than 90 oil and gas and pipeline companies on July 24, 2013.  The SLFPA-E filed the suit individually and as the Board governing the Orleans Levee District, the Lake Borgne Basin Levee District, and the East Jefferson Levee District, contending that it manages and is responsible for more than 150 miles of levees, 50 miles of floodwalls, and numerous drainage structures, pump stations, and floodgates in an area it described as the “Buffer Zone,” which includes coastal wetlands in eastern New Orleans, the Breton Sound Basin, and the Biloxi Marsh.  The SLFPA-E alleged that historical and current oil and gas and pipeline activities in the Buffer Zone, including the construction and use of oil and gas canals and pipeline canals, caused “direct land loss and increased erosion and submergence in the Buffer Zone, resulting in increased storm surge risk, attendant increased flood protection costs, and, thus, damages” to the Authority.

With this lawsuit, the SLFPA-E sought damages and injunctive relief “in the form of abatement and restoration of the coastal land loss” including backfilling and revegetating all canals, “wetlands creation, reef creation, land bridge construction, hydrologic restoration, shoreline protection, structural protection, bank stabilization, and ridge restoration.”

On August 13, 2013, the oil and gas defendants removed this case from state court to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana.  On September 10, 2013, the SLFPA-E filed a motion to remand the matter to state court.  On June 27, 2014, the federal court denied the SLFPA-E’s motion to remand.  As a result, this matter continued in federal court, and the court considered a number of dispositive motions.

On February 13, 2015, the federal judge dismissed the wetlands damage lawsuit against 88 remaining oil and gas defendants.  At issue before the court was the defendants’ motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  Rule 12(b)(6) provides that an action may be dismissed “for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.”  Therefore, for the Authority’s action to survive, its petition needed to contain sufficient factual matter to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.  A claim is considered facially plausible when the pleaded facts allow the court to draw a reasonable inference that the defendants are liable for the alleged misconduct.  All parties extensively briefed the issues, and the court heard oral argument.  The court then applied this legal standard to each of the causes of action brought by the SLFPA-E in its petition—(1) negligence, (2) strict liability, (3) natural servitude of drain, (4) public nuisance, (5) private nuisance, and (6) breach of contract as a third party beneficiary.

To state a claim for negligence, a plaintiff must establish five elements:  duty, breach, cause-in-fact, scope of liability, and damages.  The Authority failed to show the threshold element of a legal duty owed by defendants.  Finding no legal duty under state law, the court reiterated its prior finding that oil and gas companies do not have a duty under Louisiana law to protect members of the public from the results of coastal erosion allegedly caused by operators that were physically and proximately remote from the Authority or its property.  The court also found that the federal statutes on which the SLFPA-E relied to establish the requisite standard of care—namely the Rivers and Harbors Act, the Clean Water Act, and the Coastal Zone Management Act—were not intended to protect the Authority.  Because the Authority failed to demonstrate that defendants owe a specific duty to protect it from the results of coastal erosion allegedly caused by defendants’ oil and gas activities, the court concluded that the Authority did not state a viable claim for negligence.

A claim for strict liability also requires a showing of a legal duty owed to the plaintiff.  Because the court already determined that defendants do not owe a legal duty to the SLFPA-E to protect it from the results of coastal erosion, the court found that the Authority did not state a viable claim for strict liability.

A claim for natural servitude of drain involves the interference with the natural drainage of surface waters over property—i.e., from an estate situated above (dominant estate) to an estate situated below (servient estate).  The owner of the lower estate may not do anything to prevent the flow of the water, and the owner of the higher estate may not do anything to render the flow more burdensome.  The SLFPA-E alleged that defendants possessed temporary rights of ownership in the lands they dredged to create the canal network and that those lands constituted a dominant estate from which water flowed onto its servient estate.  However, the Authority failed to show that a natural servitude of drain may exist between nonadjacent estates with respect to coastal storm surge.  As such, the court concluded that the Authority did not state a viable claim for natural servitude of drain.

The parties and the court addressed the Authority’s public and private nuisance claims together.  The obligations of neighborhood are the source of nuisance actions in Louisiana.  Generally, the owner of immovable property has the right to use the property as he pleases, but the owner’s right may be limited if the use causes damage to neighbors.  A claim for nuisance requires a showing of (1) a landowner (2) who conducts work on his property (3) that causes damage to his neighbor.  The court determined that the Authority failed to show sufficiently that it is a “neighbor,” within any conventional sense of the word, to any property of defendants.  To recover, the SLFPA-E must have some interest in an immovable “near” the defendant landowners’ immovable property; yet, it did not allege physical proximity of the servient and dominant estates whatsoever.  Moreover, nuisance claims after 1996 require the additional showing of negligence, except for damages resulting from pile driving or blasting with explosives.  Because the Authority did not allege that defendants engaged in pile driving or blasting with explosives, and it failed to state a claim for negligence upon which relief may be granted, the court dismissed the Authority’s claims for public and private nuisance.

For its breach of contract claim, the SLFPA-E characterized some of the dredging permits at issue as “contracts” between defendants and the US Army Corps of Engineers to maintain and restore.  The Authority contended that it is a third party beneficiary of those contracts; however, the Authority failed to present any authority suggesting that a dredging permit issued by the federal government is a contract.  The court noted that neither a permit nor a license is a contract.  Therefore, the court concluded that because the dredging permits do not constitute contracts, the third party beneficiary doctrine is not applicable.  The court additionally found that even if the permits were construed as contracts, the Authority did not establish that it is an intended beneficiary under the terms of the permits.  To be a third party beneficiary to a government contract, a third party must be an intended, rather than an incidental, beneficiary.  As such, the court found that the Authority failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted for breach of contract as a third party beneficiary.

Because the SLFPA-E did not state a viable claim for relief, the court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss and dismissed the Authority’s claims against all remaining defendants with prejudice.  The SLFPA-E filed an appeal from this ruling, and the court’s prior remand ruling, with the Fifth Circuit on February 20, 2015.

The dismissal of this lawsuit by the federal court may not be the final word on coastal erosion lawsuits in Louisiana.  As noted, the SLFPA-E has appealed the court’s dismissal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.  Further, local governmental bodies and private landowners have filed over 30 additional lawsuits against various oil and gas and pipeline entities for related claims.