It took one of the newly-minted judges on the Eastern District bench to finally adopt a working definition for the types of “perils of the sea” that Jones Act seaman are exposed to when analyzing the second prong of the Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis, 515 U.S. 346 (1995) test. That test requires the plaintiff, claiming to be a Jones Act seaman, to “demonstrate a connection to a vessel in navigation (or to an identifiable group of such vessels) that is substantial in terms of both its duration and its nature.” Id. at 368. The two prongs of Chandris are: (1) the plaintiff must show that his duties contribute to the function of the vessel or the accomplishment of its mission, and (2) the plaintiff must demonstrate a connection to a vessel (or an identifiable group of vessels) in navigation.

In Duet v. Am. Comm’l Lines, LLC, No. 12-3025, 2013 WL 1682988 (E.D. La. April 17, 2013), Judge Jane Triche Milazzo, in denying remand, found that a plaintiff who was injured while working aboard the defendant’s vessel was not a Jones Act seaman. Duet, a mechanic, was assigned by his employer to work at a barge repair facility owned and operated by ACL Transportation Services, LLC. The facility consisted of “a number of barges tied together and moored to the riverbank in order to create a stationary work platform (the “floating dock”),” that extended 1-2 miles along the river. The barges serviced by the facility remain in the river but are moored to the floating dock. ACL also owns and operates several smaller push boats to help move the barges in and out of the facility, as well as shift the barges within the floating dock itself. Duet was not assigned to any specific vessel, but performed his mechanic duties on barges and push boats alike. He only boarded the push boats as necessary to complete his work on those boats or to be transported to the more remote locations within the facility that required his work. However, when necessary to reposition barges at the floating dock to facilitate repairs, he would occasionally work as a deckhand, and on two occasions had left the facility by boat to assist in sea trials and help save a sinking vessel. Duet was injured while working aboard one of the vessels and sued several defendants and his employer, alleging to be a Jones Act seaman.Continue Reading Eastern District of Louisiana Adopts Definition for “Perils of the Sea” for Seaman Status Analysis

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1333, federal courts have original subject matter jurisdiction over general maritime law claims. However, 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1), commonly known as the “savings to suitors clause,” preserves a plaintiff’s right to instead file a general maritime law action in state court. Until recently, a defendant sued in state court for a general maritime law claim could not remove the case to federal court unless an independent basis of subject matter jurisdiction existed (such as diversity). See Tennessee Gas Pipeline v. Houston Cas. Ins. Co., 87 F. 3d 150 (5th Cir. 1996). As explained below, several district courts have concluded that recent revisions to the removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1441, have changed this rule and now allow general maritime law claims to be removed to federal court without an independent basis of subject matter jurisdiction.

The basis for the U.S. Fifth Circuit’s prohibition against removal of a general maritime law claim unless an alternative basis of subject matter existed was the provision contained in the then-current version of 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) which stated that “any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction founded on a claim or right under the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States shall be removable without regard to the citizenship or residence of the parties.” The U.S. Fifth Circuit concluded that this portion of the then-current version of 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) – combined with the U.S. Supreme Court’s holding in Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354 (1959), that general maritime law claims do not “arise under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States” – precluded the removal of general maritime law claims unless an independent basis of subject matter jurisdiction existed.Continue Reading Because of Revisions to 28 U.S.C. Section 1441, Several District Courts Have Concluded That General Maritime Law Claims Can Be Removed to Federal Court Without an Independent Basis of Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Traditionally, a party seeking injunctive relief from the courts bears the burden of proving four elements: (1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of their claims; (2) a substantial threat that failure to grant the injunction will result in irreparable injury; (3) the threatened injury outweighs any damage that the injunction will cause to the adverse party; and (4) the injunction will not have an adverse effect on the public interest.  See Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Guidry, 724 F. Supp. 2d 612 (W.D. La. July 12, 2010); Mississippi Power & Light v. United Gas Pipeline Co., 760 F. 2d 618 (5^th Cir. 1985).  Due to the first element – a substantial likelihood of success on the merits – a court that is asked to rule upon a request for injunctive relief in effect pre-judges the entire case.  Although in most cases this is not problematic (and can potentially lead to the matter being resolved without the need for a full trial on the merits), the presence of a mandatory arbitration clause in the parties’ contract can lead to problems.Continue Reading If a Contract Includes a Mandatory Arbitration Clause, the Parties Should be Aware that Injunctive Relief from the Courts can be Available Without the Necessity of Satisfying the Traditional Four-Element Test