In In re Books-A-Million, Inc. Stockholders Litigation, the Delaware Court of Chancery dismissed a suit by minority stockholders (the “Plaintiffs”) alleging that several fiduciaries breached their duties in connection with a squeeze-out merger (the “Merger”) through which the controlling stockholders of Books-A-Million, Inc. (the “Company”) took the Company private.[1] The decision, authored by Vice Chancellor J. Travis Laster, provides additional guidance regarding the utilization of the business judgment rule in the context of controller buyout.
The MFW Requirements
The default standard of review in the context of a controller buyout is the entire fairness test.[2] However, the business judgment rule serves as the operative standard of review if the six requirements set forth by the Delaware Supreme Court in Kahn v. M&F Worldwide Corp. (the “MFW Requirements”) are satisfied, namely:
“(i) the controller conditions the procession of the transaction on the approval of both a Special Committee and a majority of the minority stockholders; (ii) the Special Committee is independent [and disinterested]; (iii) the Special Committee is empowered to freely select its own advisors and to say no definitely; (iv) the Special Committee meets its duty of care in negotiating a fair price; (v) the vote of the minority is informed; and (vi) there is no coercion of the minority.”[3]
Bad Faith and the Second MFW Requirement
In Books-A-Million, the court concluded that all of the MFW Requirements were satisfied. In so doing, the court shed significant light on the second MFW Requirement; namely, that the Special Committee be independent and disinterested.[4] The most significant contribution of the case was the court’s treatment of the plaintiffs’ allegation of bad faith as a basis for their claim that the second MFW Requirement had not been satisfied. The court acknowledged the novelty of the plaintiffs’ claim by stating the following:
“It is not immediately clear how an argument regarding bad faith fits within the M&F Worldwide framework. The Delaware Supreme Court did not discuss whether a plaintiff could seek to call into question the independence of a director by contending that although appearing independent, the director did not in fact act independently for the benefit of the stockholders but rather in pursuit of some other interest, such as to benefit the controlling stockholder.”[5]
The heart of the plaintiffs’ bad faith claim was the fact that a third-party offer existed that was greater than the controller offer. The third party offer was $0.96 more per share. The court summarized the plaintiffs’ argument as follows: “The Complaint contends that it is not rational for a director to take a lower priced offer when a comparable, higher priced offer is available. Because no one rationally would do that, the plaintiffs contend that the independent directors must have had some ulterior motive for not pursuing [the third party offer].”[6]
In rejecting the plaintiffs’ argument, the court quoted extensively from Chancellor Allen’s analysis in Mendel v. Carroll.[7] In Carroll, Chancellor Allen distinguished a third-party offer and a controller offer on the grounds of a control premium:
“The fundamental difference between these two possible transactions arises from the fact that the Carroll Family [the controller] already in fact had a committed block of controlling stock. Financial markets in widely traded corporate stock accord a premium to a block of stock that can assure corporate control.”[8]
The court in Books-A-Million applied the control premium concept as follows in relation to the relative levels of the third-party and controller offers:
“On the facts alleged, one can reasonably infer that Party Y’s [the third party] offer was higher because Party Y was seeking to acquire control and that the Anderson Family’s [the controller] offer was lower because it took into account the family’s existing control over the Company.”[9]
In a footnote, the court cited several sources establishing recognized control premiums and signaled that control premiums falling outside of an acceptable range could potentially give rise to an inference that a company’s fiduciary duties acted in bad faith. [10]
Application of the Business Judgment Rule
Given the satisfaction of each of the MFW Requirements, the court utilized the business judgment rule as the operative standard of review. The utilization of the business judgment rule, as is typically the case, was the death knell for the plaintiffs. The court went so far as to say that: “It is not possible to infer that no rational person acting in good faith could have thought the Merger was fair to the minority. The only possible inference is that many rational people, including the members of the Committee and the numerous minority stockholders, thought the Merger was fair to the minority.”[11]
Conclusion
While Books-A-Million is helpful on several points, the case breaks new ground on the treatment of a bad faith claim within the MFW Framework. Controllers and their counsel should take note of the importance of any control premium falling within the acceptable range cited by the court; namely, from 30% to 50%. Any premium in excess of the range cited could potentially expose a corporation’s fiduciaries to an allegation of bad faith, thereby triggering the entire fairness test as the operative standard of review.
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[1] C.A. No. 11343-VCL, slip. op. (Del. Ch. Oct. 10, 2016, available here.
[2] Id. at 16 (citing Kahn v. Tremont Corp., 694 A.2d 422, 428 (Del. 1997)).
[3] 88 A.3d 635, 645 (Del. 2014).
[4] The plaintiffs did not contest the satisfaction of the third, fifth, and six MFW Requirements. The court’s analysis in the context of the first and fourth MFW Requirements do not advance any new ground and, therefore, are not discussed in this brief article.
[5] Books-A-Million, C.A. No. 11343-VCL, slip op. at 23.
[6] Id. at 25-26.
[7] 651 A.3d 297 (Del. Ch. 1994).
[8] Id. at 304.
[9] Books-A-Million, C.A. No. 11343-VCL, slip op. at 34.
[10] Id. at 35 & n.16.
[11] Id. at 42.