Environmental Litigation and Regulation

chem

By R. Lee Vail, P.E., Ph.D.

On February 28, 2017, the EPA received a petition from the “RMP Coalition” for reconsideration and a request for a stay from the amendments to the RMP rule. The RMP Coalition consists of several affected industry trade groups, manufacturing groups, and the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America. The petition asserts that:

  • the Local Emergency Planning Committee (“LEPC”) disclosure requirements are open ended, will result in a significant security risk, and that EPA failed to give notice that it may alter the final rule being open-ended;
  • the EPA changed the third-party audit criteria to include an arbitrary trigger that is subject to the whims and imagination of an agency, and EPA did not properly notice or address this change;
  • the EPA did not include information on its cost-benefit findings as required by Michigan v. EPA, 135 S.Ct. 2699 (2015);
  • the scope of the three year audit was expanded to include all covered process without providing notice of the change or the rational;
  • the EPA failed to explain claimed statutory authority to expand the rule;
  • numerous supporting documents were not available during the comment period; and
  • the EPA should reconsider the amendment “in light of the revelations that the West, Texas, incident was an intentional act.”

On March 13, 2017, Scott Pruitt, Administrator of the EPA, convened a proceeding for reconsideration of the RMP rule amendments and signed a letter that administratively delayed the effective date of the rule for 90 days.

plant

By Lee Vail, P.E., Ph.D.

On March 14, 2016, Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) proposed changes to the Risk Management Plan Program (“RMP”) Rule . On January 13, 2017, the EPA published a new final rule.  This is the final article in a series that addresses five major changes: root cause analysis for near misses, third-party audits, inherently safer technology, emergency response, and availability of information. The subject of this discussion is the changes to the emergency response preparedness requirements.

In proposing extensive additions to §68.210, the EPA concluded that Local Emergency Response Committees (“LEPC”) and the public needed additional information about covered facilities and that rule should mandate automatic submission and posting of such information. Instead, the revised rule facilitates the transmission of information to those that request it.

During the comment period, LEPC’s insisted that they neither had the capacity to accept the mandated submission of information nor ever had difficulty acquiring the information they needed. As a result, as part of the emergency response coordination  revisions, LEPCs may request any relevant information. The discussion of relevant information in this section of the preamble pretty well follows the list given in the discussion of the emergency response section:

The LPEC or local emergency response officials may request such as accident histories, portions of incident investigation reports relevant to emergency response planning, incident investigation reports, records of notification exercises, field and tabletop exercise evaluation reports, or other information relevant to community emergency planning.

The EPA then adds:

For example, this may include requesting information on changes made to the facility that affect risk such as incorporating safer alternatives.

82 Fed. Reg. at 4667.

Similarly, rather than requiring that a faculty distribute specific chemical hazard information to the public, owners and operators must notify the public of the availability of such information. See 40 C.F.R. 68.210(c). Among the advantages touted for this approach was that the facilities would be informed about who requested the information (at least the initial recipient). The information available through such requests is limited to “only information that could improve community awareness of risk.” 82 Fed. Reg. at 4669. EPA explicitly rejected comments that Safer Technology and Alteration Analysis (“STAA”), incident investigations, and third party audit reports should also be available to the public.

The revised rule requires that facilities must hold a public meeting follow an incident that meets the accident reporting criteria found in §68.42 (five year update criteria). Information communicated during the public meeting includes the same information included in the five year accident history (e.g., on and offsite impacts, root cause, etc.), as well as the information listed in §68.210(b) that is already available upon request. This public meeting must occur within 90 days of such an incident.

Finally, the EPA also added a requirement that RMPs shall be available to the public consistent with 40 CFR Part 1400. This appears to be little more than a cross reference to notify the public that RMPs are available in federal reading rooms.

On January 26, 2017, the EPA delayed the effective date of several regulations, including these changes to the RMP rule. Whereas this rule is now expected to go in effect on March 21, 2017, this rule is subject to Congressional Review Act and could be undone by that process.

To sign up for Lee Vail’s Process Safety Management e-Alert, send an email to client_services@keanmiller.com

wet

By Trey S. McCowan, Claire E. Juneau, and Tyler Moore Kostal

On March 3, 2017, the United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals issued its long-awaited opinion in the matter of Board of Commissioners of the Southeast Louisiana Flood Protection Authority-East, et al. vs. Tennessee Gas Pipeline Company, LLC, et al., No 15-30162, Slip Op. (5th Cir. 3/3/17). The Fifth Circuit’s decision affirmed the U.S. Eastern District Court of Louisiana’s decision to dismiss an action brought by the Flood Protection Authority against ninety-seven oil and gas and pipeline companies claiming that historic oil and gas exploration, production and transportation activities contributed to wetland loss in St. Bernard and Plaquemines Parishes.

The Flood Protection Authority’s lawsuit asserted claims for recovery based on theories of negligence, strict liability, violations of the natural servitude of drain, public and private nuisance and breach of contract. The Flood Protection Authority also asserted that it was a third-party beneficiary of various wetland permits issued to members of the oil and gas industry. The Flood Protection Authority sought damages and injunctive relief claiming that each canal dredged by defendants would have to be backfilled and revegetated. The Flood Protection Authority also claimed that the industry members were responsible for the costs of “wetlands creation, reef creations, land bridge construction, hydrologic restoration, shoreline protection, structural protection, bank stabilization and ridge restoration” throughout wetlands located in an area in St. Bernard and Plaquemines Parishes described as the “buffer zone.”

The complaint described “a longstanding and extensive regulatory frame work under both federal and state law” that protects against the effects of dredging activities. According to the Flood Protection Authority, these regulations imposed legal duties on defendants to remedy wetland loss caused both directly and indirectly by dredging activities. The complaint specifically enumerated four main components of this framework including the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899;[1] the Clean Water Act of 1972;[2] “regulations related to rights-of-way granted across state-owned lands and water bottoms administered by the Louisiana Office of State Lands” and the Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972.[3] However, the Flood Protection Authority claimed that it was relying solely on state law for recovery.

The Flood Protection Authority’s lawsuit was removed to the U. S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana on multiple jurisdictional grounds including federal question jurisdiction under a narrow exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule as set forth in Grable & Sons Metal Products, Inc. vs. Darue Engineering and Manufacturing, 545 U.S. 308, 125 S. Ct. 2363, 162 L. Ed. 2d 257 (2005) and Gunn v. Minton, ___U.S.____, 133 S. Ct. 1059, 185 L. Ed. 2d 72 (2013).

After the Flood Protection Authority’s motion to remand was denied, defendants filed a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) on the ground that the Flood Protection Authority’s complaint failed to state viable causes of action against defendants. The district court agreed with the defendants and dismissed all claims. The Flood Protection Authority appealed. After taking the matter under advisement for over a year, the Fifth Circuit issued its opinion affirming the district court’s decision finding federal jurisdiction and dismissing the case.

The Fifth Circuit first affirmed the district court’s decision finding federal jurisdiction. The Fifth Circuit held that the claims in the Flood Protection Authority’s suit, although couched in terms of state law, fell within the exception set forth in Grable and Gunn finding that three of the Flood Protection Authority’s claims necessarily raised federal issues: “the negligence claim, which purportedly draws its requisite standard of care from three federal statutes; the nuisance claims which rely on the same standard of care; and the third-party breach of contract claim, which purportedly is based on permits issued pursuant to federal law.”

Under the limited Grable/Gunn exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule, federal jurisdiction exists where “(1) resolving a federal issue is necessary to the resolution of the state-law claim; (2) the federal issue is actually disputed; (3) the federal issue is substantial; and (4) federal jurisdiction will not disturb the balance of federal and state judicial responsibilities.”

In finding that the Flood Protection Authority’s claims relied solely on interpretations of federal law, the Fifth Circuit rejected the Authority’s claim that Louisiana’s coastal use regulation requiring restoration of mineral exploration and production sites “to the maximum extent practicable” imposed an obligation on the defendants. The Fifth Circuit held that “the ‘maximum extent practicable’ language is “a regulatory determination that entails ‘a systematic consideration of all pertinent information regarding the use, the site and the impacts of use… and a balancing of their relative significance.’” No Louisiana court has used this or any related provision as the basis for imposing state tort liability. The Fifth Circuit further stated that “the Louisiana Supreme Court has explicitly rejected the prospect that a statutory obligation of ‘reasonably prudent conduct’ could require oil and gas lessees to restore the surface of dredged land.”[4]

With respect to the second prong of the Grable test, the Fifth Circuit held that there were in fact, federal issues in dispute, i.e. the interpretation of the scope of obligations under the River and Harbors Act and the Clean Water Act. Consequently, this element of the Grable test was satisfied.

The Fifth Circuit next found that the federal issues were substantial noting the “importance of the issue to the federal system as a whole.”[5] Since the Levee Authority’s claims implicated “an entire industry” and conduct subject to an extensive federal permitting scheme that were issues of “national concern,” the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s finding that the federal issues were substantial and that the third Grable factor was satisfied.

With respect to the final Grable factor, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s finding that the ruling would not cause and enormous shift of traditionally state cases into federal courts reasoning that the Flood Protection Authority was relying on federal law to establish liability and that resolution of its claims could affect coastal land management in multiple states as well as the national oil and gas market.

Finding that the district court had properly retained jurisdiction, the Fifth Circuit next addressed the substantive defenses raised by the defendants and affirmed the district court’s ruling dismissing the Flood Protection Authority’s claims.

First, the court found that the Flood Protection Authority failed to state claims based on negligence and strict liability because the defendants owed no duty to the Authority under federal or state law. Quite simply, the enunciated rules and principles of law cited by the Flood Protection Authority did not extend to and were not intended to “protect this plaintiff from this type of harm arising in this manner.” The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision that the River and Harbors Act, the Clean Water Act, the Federal Coastal Zone Management Act and state law did not create a duty that bound defendants to protect the Flood Protection Authority from increased flood protection costs that arise out of coastal erosion allegedly caused by defendants’ dredging activities.

With respect to the Flood Protection Authority’s claims based on servitude of natural drain, the Fifth Circuit held that there is no basis in law for “finding that a natural servitude of drain may exist between non-adjacent estates with respect to coastal storm surge.” The court also noted that storm surge did not constitute “surface waters that flow naturally from an estate situated above” as specified in the Civil Code articles pertaining to the servitude of natural drain.

Finally, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s holding that the Flood Protection Authority failed to state a valid “nuisance” claim under Louisiana Civil Code article 667 because the Authority did not sufficiently allege in its complaint that it was a “neighbor” of any of defendant’s property. Although, the Flood Protection Authority was correct in its argument that there is no rule of law compelling “neighbor” to be interpreted as requiring certain “physical adjacency or proximity,” the Fifth Circuit has previously found that there must be “some degree of propinquity, so as to substantiate the allegation that activity on one property has caused damage on another.” Consequently, a nuisance claim under article 667 requires more than simply a “causal nexus,” and the Flood Protection Authority failed to set forth sufficient factual allegations mandating dismissal of the nuisance claims.

It remains to be seen if the Flood Protection Authority will pursue further review in its lawsuit against the oil and gas industry in either the Fifth Circuit or United States Supreme Court.

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[1] 33 U.S.C. §§ 401-467.

[2] 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1388.

[3] 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1466.

[4] Terrebonne Parish School Board vs. Castex Energy, Inc., 893 So. 2d 789, 801 (La. 2005)(“We hold that, in the absence of an express lease provision, Mineral Code article 122 does not impose an implied duty to restore the surface to its original, pre-lease condition absent proof that the lessee has exercised its rights under the lease unreasonably or excessively.”).

[5] Citing, Gunn v. Minton, 133 S. Ct. 1059, 1066 (2013) and Smith v. Kansas City Title and Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180, 198-202 (1921).

EPA

By Brittany Buckley Salup

On March 2, 2017, the EPA withdrew its information collection request (ICR) regarding methane emissions from existing oil and gas facilities.  EPA finalized and issued the underlying ICR on November 10, 2016.  Since that time, EPA sent letters to thousands of owners and operators in the oil and gas industry, requiring them to complete surveys regarding their existing facilities.  EPA’s withdrawal of the ICR is effective immediately.  According to the EPA’s website,  industry members who previously received a letter requiring a survey response associated with this particular ICR are “no longer required to respond.”

Additional information is available here.

 

chem

By Lee Vail, Ph.D., J.D.

On March 14, 2016, Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) proposed changes to the Risk Management Plan Program (“RMP”) Rule.  On January 13, 2017, the EPA published a new final rule.  This a second in a planned series that will address five major changes:  root cause analysis for near misses, third-party audits, inherently safer technology, emergency response, and availability of information.  The third party audit provisions are so significant that I must split it up into two topics, starting with privilege.

The proposed rule contained several provisions that reminded me of the poster hung for all to see in George Orwell’s 1984:  Big Brother Is Watching You.  Promulgation of the proposal would have resulted in submission of potentially flawed draft reports prepared by individuals with no prior knowledge of the facility that would end up in the regulating agency’s hands no later than the facilities; draft reports had to be retained.  For some reason, the EPA believed it was necessary to receive raw, unfiltered, and potentially incorrect conclusions.  Fortunately, all of this was dropped.  Interestingly, and to the alarm of many, the EPA also proposed to add:

The audit report and related records shall not be privileged as attorney-client communications or attorney work products, even if written for or reviewed by legal staff.  81 FR, 13638, 13707 (Mar 14, 2016)

In the final rule, the EPA deleted this provision limiting attorney-client privilege.  Ultimately, the EPA dropped this provision as they:

recognizes that the ultimate decision maker on questions of evidentiary privileges are the courts. Therefore, this rule does not contain a specific regulatory provision prohibiting assertion of these privileges.  81 Fed. Reg. at 4614.

I expect that the EPA did not remove the provision because they found public comments persuasive.  Ultimately they probably received good counsel that inclusion of the provision would have help naysayers strike down the rule. The EPA added, in no uncertain terms how they feel above screening internal deliberations based on privilege:

With regard to information that arguably should be protected under evidentiary privileges, EPA’s view is that the third-party audit reports and related records under this rule, like other documents prepared pursuant to part 68 requirements, such as process safety information, PHAs, operating procedures and others, are not documents produced in anticipation of litigation. With respect to the attorney-client communication privilege specifically, the third-party auditor is arms-length and independent of the stationary source being audited. The auditor lacks an attorney-client relationship with counsel for the audited entity. Therefore, in EPA’s view, neither the audit report nor the records related to the audit report provided by the third-party auditor are attorney-client privileged (including documents originally prepared with assistance or under the direction of the audited source’s attorney).  Id.

Given our litigious society, I would always consider conducting an incident investigation under attorney-client privilege.  I see no reason not to conduct future audits under privilege, but there is no certainty that a court would uphold the privilege (is there ever?).  The EPA reminds us in footnote #32 that they have authority to demand records under Section 114 of the CAA.  If maintaining control of a draft report is important to you (which it should), make sure you have and follow a retention policy that requires destruction of all draft reports.  Make sure to keep the support for the final report.  Contracts with third parties should include the return of all information, materials and drafts.

Next week:  the rest on third-party audits!

The United States Environmental Protection Agency in Washington DC. (Photo by: Loop Images/UIG via Getty Images)

By R. Lee Vail, P.E., PH.D.

On March 14, 2016, Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) proposed changes to the Risk Management Plan Program (“RMP”) Rule. On December 21, 2016, the EPA disclosed its changes via a Pre-Publication Copy.  A series of blogs are planned to address five major changes: root cause analysis for near misses, third-party audits, inherently safer technology, emergency response, and availability of information. This blog addresses the first revision: root cause analysis for near misses.

The actual language of the incident investigation requirement has not changed significantly as a facility always was required to “investigate each incident which resulted in, or could have resulted in a catastrophic release of a regulated compound.” 40 CFR 68.81(a). The revised rule basically says the same thing except that it describes the concept “could have resulted in a catastrophic release” by relating said comment to an undefined term: “near misses.”[1] Citing its own 1996 response to comments, according to the EPA, “the range of incidents that reasonably could have resulted in a catastrophic release is very broad and cannot be specifically defined.” The EPA declined to add a definition in this rule making. So what is a near miss?

EPA appears to rely on a vague Center for Chemical Process Safety (“CCPS”) definition that describes a near miss in terms of an event that could have resulted in catastrophic release “if circumstances had been slightly different.” With this as a starting place, the EPA provided several examples of near misses:

  • a runaway reaction that is brought under control by operators is a near miss that may need to be investigated to determine why the problem occurred, even if it does not directly involve a covered process because it may have led to a release from a nearby covered process or because it may indicate a safety management failure that applies to a covered process at the facility;
  • fires and explosions near or within a covered process;
  • any unanticipated release of a regulated substance; and
  • some process upsets.[2]

If not completely clear by the examples, the EPA added that “near misses should also include incidents at nearby process or equipment outside of a regulated process if the incident had the potential to cause a catastrophic release from nearby regulated equipment.” This could result in mandatory RMP incident investigations of utility systems such as power and steam generation.

So what isn’t a “near miss?” Unfortunately, all we have from the EPA is “the intent is not to include every minor incident or leak, but to focus on serious incidents that could reasonably have resulted in a catastrophic release, although EPA acknowledges this will require subjective judgment.” Regardless of examples, the salient point is that the event could have resulted in a catastrophic release. Is that not what the original rule said? As such, lifting of a relief valve that is routed to a properly designed and operated flare would not be expected to have reasonably resulted in a catastrophic release. Some processes are inherently unstable and result in frequent “runaway reactions.” In these cases, the process design probably contains multiple layers of protection. Using a layer of protection, by itself, should be insufficient to declare a near miss.

I also question the EPA’s sole reliance on subjective judgment. “Minor releases” could be objectively defined (e.g., less than a reportable quantity). Whereas a Title V deviation may occur if a control device operates at 99% efficiency instead of the required 99.5%, such can objectively be shown not to result in a possible catastrophic release.

One thing is clear; facilities need to consider, document and follow subjective and objective criteria to define incidents that could have resulted in a catastrophic release. Examples provided by the EPA should be appropriately addressed. Ultimately it may add clarity to minimize use of the undefined term “near miss” as it is ultimately introduced in terms of an incident that could have resulted in a catastrophic release (which is nothing new).  Also clear, the new rule did anything but add clarity.

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[1] To further confuse the issue, the EPA related the undefined term to the concept using the Latin based phrase “i.e.,” which is translated as “namely” or “that is to say” and then states within the preamble, that “near miss is an example of an event that could have reasonably resulted in a catastrophic release.” Typically the Latin based term “e.g.,” is used to introduce examples. Is an event that could have reasonably resulted in a catastrophic release and example of a near miss or is that the de facto definition?

[2] The EPA further cites the CCPS concerning the investigation of process upsets to include: excursions of process parameters beyond pre-established critical control limits; activation of layers of protection such as relief valves, interlocks, rupture discs, blowdown systems, halon systems, vapor release alarms, and fixed vapor spray systems and activation of emergency shutdowns.

The United States Environmental Protection Agency in Washington DC. (Photo by: Loop Images/UIG via Getty Images)

By Lee Vail

On March 14, 2016, Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) proposed changes to the RMP Rule . On December 21, 2016, the EPA disclosed its changes via a Pre-Publication Copy.

In the proposed rule, the EPA essentially agreed that the scope and trigger for post incident investigation was not universally understood or applied. The final rule includes an explicit requirement to include a “root cause” analysis “of catastrophic releases and near miss events and to have the findings of these investigations integrated into the PHA.” The EPA chose not to change the definition of catastrophic release, but instead added guidance to “clarify” which release would be considered catastrophic (including near misses) and which would not. The EPA added that incidents in nearby non-RMP regulated units could be a near miss. Incident investigations must be complete within a twelve month period.

EPA also declined to add a definition for the term “near miss,” although added the circular comment that it was “an example of an event that could reasonably have resulted in a catastrophic release.” Whereas the agency decided not to require classification for events within the five year accident report, the root cause requirement also applies to decommissioned or destroyed processes.

The EPA retained the requirement for certain facilities to conduct a safer technology and alternatives analysis (“STAA”) as part of a Process Hazard Analysis (“PHA”). The EPA revised the evaluation criteria from “feasibility” to “practicability” of any inherently safer technology (“IST”) identified. This requirement is limited to processes in NAICS 322 (e.g. paper manufacturer), 324 (e.g. petroleum refining), and 325 (e.g. chemicals manufacturer).

The revised rule retained mandatory third-party audits following an accident meeting the five-year accident history criteria or based on non-compliance with the compliance audit requirements. In the final rule, the EPA modified some of the independence requirements and eliminated the necessity that the team include a Professional Engineer. Facilities may engage a third party firm or hire a third-party individual to lead a team of employees or other non-independent individuals. EPA deleted the requirement that the auditor keep copies of records (including drafts). Audits can be conducted under attorney client privilege.

These and other changes will be further examined in future blogs. So please stay tuned.

middle

By Brittany Buckley Salup

Chief Judge Brian Jackson issued an “Omnibus Order Suspending All Deadlines” for cases pending or to be filed in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana.  The Order explains that the court has been inaccessible—a key term in the Federal Rules of Civil and Appellate Procedure—since August 12, 2016 due to historic flooding in the region.  Until further notice from the Middle District, all deadlines and delays in cases pending or to be filed in the Middle District are suspended.  This suspension expressly applies to prescriptive and peremptive periods.  In addition, all pending criminal cases in the Middle District are temporarily excluded from the time requirements of the Speedy Trial Act.

The Middle District’s Order follows similar Executive Orders from Governor Edwards, which suspended deadlines in Louisiana state courts due to flooding.  More information about the Governor’s Orders is available here.

A copy of the Middle District’s Order (M.D. La. General Order 2016-10) is available here.

 

 

seal

By Claire Juneau

On August 17, 2016, Governor Edwards amended Executive Order JBE 2016-57 which had suspended the running of prescription, peremption, and all legal delays from August 12, 2016 until September 9, 2016. The amendment to Executive Order JBE 2016-57 modifies the suspension of deadlines as follows:

  • Liberative prescription and peremptive periods continue to be suspended throughout Louisiana until Friday, September 9, 2016.
  • Deadlines in legal proceedings currently pending in state courts, administrative agencies, and boards in Acadia, Ascension, Assumption, Avoyelles, Cameron, East Baton Rouge, East Feliciana, Evangeline, Iberia, Iberville, Jefferson Davis, Lafayette, Livingston, Pointe Coupee, St. Charles, St. Helena, St. James, St. John the Baptist, St. Martin, St. Tammany, Tangipahoa, Vermilion, Washington, West Baton Rouge, and West Feliciana, Parishes, continue to be suspended until Friday September 9, 2016. This suspension includes all deadlines set forth in the Louisiana Civil Code, the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure, Title 9 (Civil Code Ancillaries) Title 13 (Courts and Judicial Procedure), Chapter 11 of Title 18 (Election Campaign Financing); Chapter 10 of Title 23 (Worker’s Compensation); Chapter 5, Part XXI-A of Title 40 (Malpractice Liability for State Services); Chapter 5, Part XXIII, of Title 40 (Medical Malpractice), and Title 49, Chapter 13 (Administrative Procedure) of the Louisiana Revised Statutes. This is a modification from the original Exeuctive Order JBE 2016-57 which suspended deadlines statewide.
  • Except for the suspension of prescriptive and peremptive periods and the suspension of deadlines in the parishes listed above, the suspension provided for in original Executive Order JBE 2016-53 shall end Friday, August 19, 2016. If a party can show an inability to meet the deadlines caused the flooding, the court, administrative agency, or board shall suspend deadlines specific to that matter until September 9, 2016.

A copy of the amendment can be found here: JBE-16-57-Amended-Emergency-Suspension-of-Deadlines-in-Legal-Proceedings

A copy of the original executive order can be found here.

flooding3

By Maureen Harbourt

On August 12, 2016, the Secretary of the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality issued an Emergency Administrative Order to provide relief from otherwise applicable state-issued environmental permit terms and rules in order to manage the situations created by the unprecedented flooding in southern Louisiana. The Order is available here.  The Order applies to the same parishes that the Governor has declared to be within the emergency area:  Ascension, East Baton Rouge, East Feliciana, Iberia, Iberville, Lafayette, Livingston, St. Helena, St. James, St. Tammany, Tangipahoa, Washington and West Baton Rouge.  It is effective until 11:59 p.m. on September 12, 2016.

Past experience has indicated that these types of emergency orders are often amended to cover additional areas, extend the time period, or to add other relief.

This link summarizes the key provisions of the Order:  Key Provisions – Emergency Administrative Order

Note that this Order applies only to state issued permits and regulations.  For further information on any updates to the Order, click here.