Admiralty and Maritime

A tow is pushing a barge up the Mississippi River. This single barge will be connected with others for a longer haul.

By McClain R. Schonekas

The M/V HANNAH C. SETTOON, owned and operated by Settoon Towing, L.L.C. (“Settoon”), was towing two crude oil tank barges on the Mississippi River when an attempted passage around the M/V LINDSAY ANN ERICKSON and its tow went badly resulting in a spill of 750 barrels of crude oil. The spill closed a 70-mile stretch of the river to vessels for 48 hours for cleanup and recovery. The United States Coast Guard named Settoon the strictly liable Responsible Party under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (“OPA 90”) (codified at 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2762), requiring it to carry out the cleanup and remediation. Settoon subsequently filed a Limitation of Liability proceeding seeking to limit its civil liability to the total value of the vessel and its freight. Marquette Transportation Company, L.L.C. (“Marquette”), owner of the M/V LINDSAY ANN ERICKSON, filed a claim. Settoon filed a counterclaim against Marquette seeking contribution under the OPA, general maritime law, or both.

Following a four-day bench trial on liability, the district court found both parties at fault for the collision, apportioning 35% of fault to Settoon and 65% to Marquette. The district court also found that Settoon, the Responsible Party, was entitled to contribution for purely economic damages from Marquette, in proportion to its liability. Marquette appealed, arguing that OPA 90 does not allow a Responsible Party to obtain contribution from a partially-liable third party, and even if it does, the district court clearly erred in its allocation of fault. A unanimous panel anchored by an experienced admiralty jurist affirmed the district court.

Judge Southwick, writing for the panel, methodically analyzed the applicable provisions of OPA 90 and dissected Marquette’s statutory argument, ultimately disposing of it. Simply stated, Marquette argued that the right to contribution from a jointly negligent party did not arise under OPA 90. Instead, Marquette contended that any contribution it owed was based on general maritime law and therefore limited by the Robins Dry Dock bar to purely economic damages.[1]

Highlighting the relevant section of OPA 90, at 33 U.S.C. §§ 2709,[2] the panel held “that contribution is available under the OPA.” Despite its clever argument, the panel rebuffed Marquette’s invitation to apply general maritime law and the Robins Dry Dock bar to purely economic damages. The Court stated,

We conclude that the most reasonable interpretation of the language of the OPA, as confirmed by the Act’s legislative history, grants to an OPA Responsible Party the right to receive contribution from other entities who were partially at fault for a discharge of oil. Specifically, a Responsible Party may recover from a jointly liable third party any damages it paid to claimants, including those arising out of purely economic losses.[3]

Unsurprisingly, the panel also quickly disposed of Marquette’s argument that the district court clearly erred in its allocation of fault. AFFIRMED.

*******************************

[1] In Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint, 275 U.S. 303 (1927), a time-charterer of a steamship brought an action against the Dry Dock Company to recover for loss of use of the steamer whose delivery was delayed by the Dry Dock Company’s negligence. The Court found that the time-charter had no cause of action against the Dry Dock Company for the loss of use of the vessel because, among other reasons, the docking contract between the vessel owner and the Dry Dock Company was not for the time-charterer’s direct benefit.

[2] This Section states, “A person may bring a civil action for contribution against any other person who is liable or potentially liable under this Act or another law. The action shall be brought in accordance with section 2717 of this title.”

[3] In re Settoon Towing, L.L.C., No. 16-30459, 2017 WL 2486018, at *10 (5th Cir. June 9, 2017).

Offshore oil rig drilling platform in the gulf of Thailand 2015.

By Daniel B. Stanton

In the recent U.S. Fifth Circuit case of In re Larry Doiron, Inc., 849 F.3d 602 (5th Cir. 2017), the Court considered an often pivotal question in many offshore personal injury cases: is the contract governing the relationship of the parties a maritime contract?

While this issue is not new to the offshore oil and gas industry, it is often one that is hotly contested because of the impacts that follow the determination that a contract is maritime in nature or not. One of the most significant issues resting on this determination is the enforceability of the indemnity provisions which are often included in service contracts. Under general maritime law, indemnity provisions are generally enforceable; under Louisiana law, indemnity provisions are often unenforceable as a result of the Louisiana Oilfield Indemnity Act (“LOIA”). Thus the determination that a contract is maritime in nature, and therefore governed by general maritime law, can have a significant impact on the relationship between the parties to an offshore personal injury action.

In this case, Plaintiff Peter Savoie, an employee of Specialty Rental Tools & Supply (“STS”), was injured while performing flow-back services on an offshore natural-gas well owned by Apache. Savoie’s services were provided under a master services contract (“MSC”) between Apache and STS which contained a common indemnity provision that required STS to defend and indemnify Apache and its “Company Group” from all claims for bodily injury made by STS employees. Like most service contracts, the MSC operated as a broad blanket agreement that did not describe individual tasks, but contemplated their performance under subsequent oral and written work orders.

Prior to his injury, Savoie attempted several different methods to complete the flow-back process on Apache’s well. After these methods proved unsuccessful, Savoie determined that additional equipment would be needed to perform the operation, including a hydraulic choke manifold, a flow-back iron, and a hydraulic gate valve. Because these pieces of equipment were too heavy to manipulate by hand, a crane barge would be required to move them to and from the wellhead. Apache’s on-site representative made arrangements to procure the necessary equipment. The crane barge was supplied by Larry Doiron, Inc. (“LDI”). Savoie was injured during the process of rigging down the LDI crane. When Savoie made a claim against LDI for his injuries, LDI demanded defense and indemnity from STS under the Apache/STS MSC. STS countered that the MSC was governed by Louisiana law, and as a result of the LOIA, the indemnity provisions of the MSC were rendered ineffective. No party disputed that LDI was part of the Apache “Company Group” to which the indemnity obligation flowed, and ruling on cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court found that the contract was maritime in nature and therefore STS was bound to defend and indemnify LDI. STS appealed the district court’s ruling.

The issue before the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals was simple: what law applied to the indemnity provision of the MSC, maritime law or Louisiana law? But to answer this question, the Court had to examine not only the MSC, but also the oral work order for the use of LDI’s crane barge. First, the Court looked to the MSC and asked the following question: how have contracts for flow-back services historically been treated by courts? Having not previously considered contracts for flow-back services, the Court compared the work to wireline and casing work. Under prior decisions of the Court, contracts for wireline work had traditionally been found to be non-maritime and contracts for casing had traditionally been found to be maritime. The distinction being that wireline services often do not require the use of a vessel, while casing work often does. The Court then considered the task at issue in the present case, flow-back work, and found that the work could be performed either exclusively from a well platform or could require a vessel. Thus based on historical precedent, it was unclear to the Court whether the contract for flow-back services was a maritime or non-maritime contract.

Because the historical treatment of the contract as maritime or non-maritime was unclear, the Court went on to consider the specific facts surrounding the work that produced the Plaintiff’s injury. The Court evaluated the events in light of six factors that were developed by the Court in Davis & Sons, Inc. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 919 F.2d 313 (5th Cir. 1990):

1) [W]hat does the specific work order in effect at the time of injury provide? 2) [W]hat work did the crew assigned under the work order actually do? 3) [W]as the crew assigned to work aboard a vessel in navigable waters[?] 4) [T]o what extent did the work being done relate to the mission of that vessel? 5) [W]hat was the principal work of the injured worker? and 6) [W]hat work was the injured worker actually doing at the time of injury?

Under this framework, the Court found 4 of the 6 factors supported a conclusion that the contract at issue was maritime in nature.

Under the first factor, neither party could produce any documents describing the work order under which the LDI crane barge was procured, but the Court found that the MSC did have language that contemplated the use of vessels to perform work thereunder. Therefore, because the use of vessels during STS’s work for Apache was contemplated by the parties, imposing a maritime obligation on STS should come as no surprise. Under the second factor, the Court found that because the flow-back operation could not be completed without the use of a vessel; this factor favored maritime status. The fourth and sixth factors likewise counseled towards a maritime contract. The Court found that the mission of the vessel at issue was solely the performance of STS’s flow-back work. Plaintiff was also injured by equipment affixed to the vessel – the crane.

Only the third and fifth factors gravitated towards a finding that the contract was not maritime in nature according to the Court. Under these factors, the Plaintiff was neither assigned to work aboard a vessel in navigation nor employed to perform maritime-related work.

Having worked through the applicable analysis, the Court found that the contract at issue – the specific work order for the performance of back-flow services under the MSC – was a maritime contract. As a result, LDI’s demand for defense and indemnity was valid and enforceable, and the district court properly granted judgment in favor of LDI.

While the contractual issues at play in offshore personal injury cases are often less flavorful than the tort issues, they can have substantial impacts nonetheless. With litigation costs rising and the potential for substantial damage awards, contractual defense and indemnity provisions offer very valuable protections to the parties. And while elsewhere in the world, the distinction between a maritime contract and a non-maritime contract may be inconsequential, in the Louisiana oil patch the determination can result in the nullification of these important and valuable protections. Furthermore, this determination may not be as simple as reading the choice of law provision or evaluating the governing service agreement. Fortunately, the Fifth Circuit continues to provide guidance for navigating the sticky issues that arise on the Outer Continental Shelf where maritime law, state law, vessels, seamen, production platforms, and production personnel all interact.

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By Zoe Vermeulen

In the recent case of Halle v. Galliano Marine Service, L.L.C., No. 16-30558, 2017 WL 1399697 (5th Cir. Apr. 19, 2017) the U.S. Fifth Circuit addressed for the first time whether ROV technicians, who are traditionally Jones Act seamen, qualify as seamen under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”). The Court found that the plaintiff, an ROV technician assigned to an ROV support vessel, was not an FLSA seaman. In reaching its decision, the Court reiterated the important difference between a Jones Act seaman and a seaman for purposes of the FLSA.

Under the Jones Act, the term “seaman” is construed broadly to provide protection for a larger group of individuals. Seamen are exempt from the FLSA, so the term is construed narrowly, to ensure that more workers enjoy the benefits granted by the FLSA. The Court was clear that “the definition of ‘seaman’ in the Jones Act is not equivalent to that in the FLSA.”

The FLSA requires employers to provide overtime pay to any employee who works more than forty (40) hours in a workweek, unless the employee is subject to an exemption. Again, “seamen” are exempt from the FLSA’s overtime requirements. Under the FLSA, an employee is a “seaman” if: (1) the employee is subject to the authority, direction, and control of the master; and (2) the employee’s service is primarily offered to aid the vessel as a means of transportation, provided that the employee does not perform a substantial amount of different work. These criteria are very fact specific.

In Halle, there was a dispute as to whether the plaintiff was subject to the authority, direction, and control of the master of the ROV support vessel. Thus, the first factor was not dispositive. In analyzing the second factor, the Court found that the ROV technician plaintiff lived on the ROV support vessel and operated the ROV, which was attached to the support vessel, to perform industrial tasks in the water. He occasionally communicated GPS coordinates to the captain of the support vessel, but did not otherwise help ensure that the support vessel navigated safely or in any particular manner from point A to point B. The plaintiff did not control the vessel’s path to its intended target, steer, anchor, make any navigational decisions, or take any navigational actions. The plaintiff, and other ROV technicians, could not even see if there were navigational issues affecting the support vessel. Under these facts, the Court found that the plaintiff’s service was not “primarily offered to aid the vessel as a means of transportation.” As the plaintiff – a Jones Act seaman – could not meet the second prong of the test, he could not be a seaman for FLSA purposes.

This case provides valuable guidance to maritime employers in classifying employees for FLSA purposes. Employers should never assume that because a worker qualifies as a Jones Act seaman, he or she will automatically be exempt from the overtime requirements of the FLSA. While both the Jones Act and the FLSA employ the term “seaman,” Halle underscores the different tests for seaman status under these Acts. Litigants are cautioned not to borrow an analysis of this term under one Act for use in the other.

Misclassifying an employee as “exempt” can expose employers to back pay, liquidated damages, and attorneys’ fees. And with a recent increase in FLSA claims, correct employee classification is as critical now as ever.

Close-up close-up shots of the tracks

By Michael J. O’Brien

In the recent case of BNSF Railway Co. v. Tyrrell, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected a blatant forum shopping attempt by two railway employees and limited future lawsuits against out-of-state railroads. In BNSF Railway Co., Robert Nelson of North Dakota and Kelli Tyrrell of South Dakota filed separate suits against BNSF Railroad in a Montana State Court pursuant to the Federal Employer’s Liability Act (“FELA”) 45 U.S.C. §51 et sec. which makes railroads liable for on-the-job injuries to their employees. Nelson allegedly injured his knee while working for BNSF in the State of Washington. Tyrrell claimed that her husband died of cancer he contracted after being exposed to chemicals while working for BNSF in South Dakota, Minnesota, and Iowa. Despite the fact that neither Plaintiff resided in Montana, nor sustained any injuries in Montana, they filed their lawsuit against BNSF in that state based upon BNSF’s alleged contacts in Montana.

BNSF was incorporated in Delaware and it maintained its principle place of business in Texas. It operates railroad lines in 28 states, however, it maintained less than 5% of its workforce and approximately 6% of its total track mileage in Montana. Nelson and Tyrell claimed that these contacts with Montana were sufficient for them to sue the railroad in Montana. BNSF disagreed.

After Tyrrell and Nelson filed suit, BNSF moved to dismiss both of their lawsuits for lack of personal jurisdiction. The Montana Supreme Court ultimately denied the motion allowed these cases to move forward holding that Montana Courts could exercise general personal jurisdiction over BNSF because §56 of FELA authorizes State Courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over railroads “doing business” in the state. The Montana Supreme Court further observed that Montana law provides for the exercise of general jurisdiction over “all persons found within the state.” Thus, because of BNSF’s many employees and miles of track in Montana, the Montana Supreme Court concluded that BNSF was both “doing business” and “found within” the state such that both FELA and Montana law authorized the exercise of personal jurisdiction.

The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve whether §56 of FELA authorizes State courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over railroads that do business in states but are neither incorporated, nor headquartered in that state. The Supreme Court also examined whether the Montana Court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction in these cases comported with constitutional due process.

A solid majority of the Court rejected the two theories upon which Nelson and Tyrrell had relied on to justify jurisdiction over BNSF in Montana. First, the Court held that FELA does not itself create a special rule authorizing jurisdiction over railroads simply because they happen to be doing business in a particular place. Next, the Court ordered that an exercise of jurisdiction over BNSF must still be consistent with due process. Thus, the Montana rule that allowed Courts in the state to exercise jurisdiction over “persons found” in Montana did not help the Plaintiffs as it violated due process.

The Supreme Court repeatedly mentioned that BNSF was not incorporated in Montana, and it did not maintain its principle place of business in that state. Further, BNSF was not so heavily engaged in activity in Montana “as to render it essentially at home” in that state. The Supreme Court noted that a corporation that operates in many places can “scarcely be deemed at home in all of them.” Thus, the business that BNSF did in Montana may be sufficient to subject the railroad to specific personal jurisdiction in maritime for claims related to the business activity in Montana. However, simply having in state business did not suffice to permit the assertion of general jurisdiction over claims like Nelson’s and Tyrrell’s that were completely unrelated to any activity occurring in Montana.

Last, it is important to note that this holding is also relevant in maritime cases. Indeed, since FELA case law is applicable to Jones Act cases, BNSF Railway Co.’s holding will, by extension, also limit forum shopping by Jones Act seaman under the same reasoning.

BSEE

By Michael J. O’Brien

Scott Angelle, a native of Breaux Bridge, Louisiana, has been appointed by the Trump Administration to head the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (“BSEE”).  Mr. Angelle first held public office in the late 1980’s. He has since served as a Parish President, Secretary of Louisiana’s Department of Natural Resources, and, most recently, as Chairman of the Louisiana Public Service Commission. Under his leadership as Louisiana’s Secretary of the Department of Natural Resources, the state’s coastal permitting system was reformed, providing for efficient permitting while increasing drilling rig counts in Louisiana by more than 150 percent during his tenure. Mr. Angelle has also served as Chairman of the Louisiana State Mineral Board, and as a member of the Louisiana State University Board of Supervisors, Southern States Energy Board, and the Louisiana Coastal Port Advisory Authority.

Mr. Angelle will become BSEE’s fourth director since it was established six years ago. BSEE was formed after the Deepwater Horizon explosion to promote safety, protect the environment, and conserve resources offshore through “vigorous regulatory oversight and enforcement.”

BSEE is headquartered in Washington D.C. and supported by regional offices in New Orleans, Louisiana, Camarillo, California, and Anchorage, Alaska.  These regional offices review applications for permits to drill, ensure safety requirements are met, conduct inspections of drilling rigs and offshore production platforms, investigate offshore accidents, issue Incidents of Non-Compliance and have the authority to fine companies through civil penalties for regulatory infractions.

Mr. Angelle’s post does not require Senate confirmation; as such, he will start working as the head of BSEE Tuesday, May 23, 2017. Secretary of the Interior, Ryan Zinke, issued the following statement about Mr. Angelle: “Scott Angelle brings a wealth of experience to BSEE, having spent many years working for the safe and efficient energy production of both Louisiana’s and our country’s offshore resources. As we set our path towards energy dominance, I am confident that Scott has the expertise, vision, and the leadership necessary to effectively enhance our program, and to promote the safe and environmentally responsible exploration, development, and production of our country’s offshore oil and gas resources.”

 

By J. Eric Lockridge

Large and small offshore service companies are turning to the Bankruptcy Code for help with restructuring their balance sheet, and turning to Washington for help with generating more work.

One of the largest offshore service companies in the world, Tidewater, announced this week that it will file a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition in Delaware on or before May 17, 2017. This is not a surprise to the markets. Tidewater received notice from the New York Stock Exchange in April that it is at risk of being delisted before the end of the year because its average stock price sat below $1.00 per share for too long. Tidewater’s press release announcing the upcoming bankruptcy says the company has secured broad support from secured creditors for a pre-packaged plan that will effectuate a form of debt-for-equity swap. The plan will also reject certain sale-lease back agreements for a portion of Tidewater’s fleet. Expect a fight over lease-rejection damages.

A smaller operator focused on the Gulf of Mexico, GulfMark Offshore, also announced this week that it is planning a Chapter 11 filing. Offshore Support Journal reported that GulfMark Offshore’s most recent SEC filing discloses the company will likely file a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition on or before May 21, 2017. The company is working with advisors to secure support for a restructuring agreement that will include a backstop commitment from certain note holders and a debt-for-equity swap.

Some in the offshore industry are lobbying the White House and others to extend the “America First” agenda to the offshore-service industry in hopes that might provide a boost. For example, see Harvey Gulf’s recent open letter to President Donald Trump here. Many in the offshore service industry would like to see the current administration enforce regulations requiring proper plugging and abandonment (P&A) of many non-producing or low-producing wells in the Gulf of Mexico’s shallow water. They have to be careful about how loudly they push that agenda, however, or they may alienate the very exploration and production (E&P) companies that would hire them. Many E&P companies would like to see enforcement of those regulations delayed as long as possible, and at least until the price of oil is higher.

Enforcing P&A obligations would likely create thousands of jobs and boost the economy along the Gulf Coast, where President Trump received strong electoral support. The House Majority Whip, Rep. Steve Scalise (R-LA), represents a district along the Louisiana coast that is home to scores of offshore service companies and their vendors, which gives that industry some important clout on Capitol Hill. Delaying enforcement of P&A obligations and/or making them less onerous might be more consistent with a “regulation-roll-back” agenda and with the interests of many E&P companies, several of which have strong ties to the current administration and deep relationships in Congress.

Will Washington take any action to provide some relief for offshore service companies, their employees, vendors, and lenders? How will an increase in Chapter 11 cases for offshore service companies affect the industry and the companies that have (so far) avoided bankruptcy? Kean Miller and many of our clients will keep a close watch as events unfold.

 

7th

By Erin Kilgore and Scott Huffstetler

On April 4, 2017, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that sexual orientation discrimination is prohibited by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

As previously noted, there has been much debate among the courts regarding the meaning of the term “sex” under Title VII and whether discrimination based on sexual orientation and/or transgender status falls within the scope of Title VII’s protection. With yesterday’s 8-3 ruling, the Seventh Circuit became the first appellate court to interpret Title VII’s prohibition on discrimination based on “sex” as barring discrimination based on sexual orientation.   The ruling is consistent with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s interpretation of Title VII and is particularly significant given that the Seventh Circuit is considered among the relatively conservative federal appellate courts. Additional information regarding the decision can be found here.

This decision is only binding on employers in the Seventh Circuit (which encompasses Illinois, Indiana, and Wisconsin).   Courts in other jurisdictions have reached the opposite conclusion. For example, just a few weeks ago, a panel of the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, another conservative jurisdiction, ruled that Title VII does not protect employees from discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.  The Supreme Court may ultimately weigh-in on this issue to resolve the emerging split among the appellate courts.

The Fifth Circuit (which encompasses courts in Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas) has not held that Title VII prohibits discrimination based on sexual orientation. Nevertheless, all employers should be aware of this decision. It is likely that attorneys, advocates, and federal agencies will rely on this ruling in an effort to expand the scope of Title VII in other jurisdictions.

 

 

GOM

By Tod J. Everage

With less than one week on the job, newly-confirmed Secretary of the Interior, Ryan Zinke announced that BOEM will offer 73,000,000 acres of lease space located in the Gulf of Mexico for oil and gas exploration. Proposed Lease Sale 249 is currently scheduled for August 16, 2017, and will include all unleased areas of federal waters in the GOM. The sale will be livestreamed from New Orleans.

This sale is the first under the new Outer Continental Shelf Oil and Gas Leasing Program for 2017-2022 (Five Year Program). The plan includes two GOM lease sales each year, including all available blocks in the combined Western, Central, and Eastern GOM. It is estimated that there are approximately 211 million to 1.118 billion barrels of oil and 0.547-4.424 trillion cubic feet of gas available for production in those available leases. The available land for lease includes approximately 13,725 unleased blocks located between 3-230 miles offshore, and ranging in depth between 9-11,115 feet of water.

Excluded from the lease sale are blocks subject to the Congressional moratorium established by the Gulf of Mexico Energy Security Act of 2006; blocks that are adjacent to or beyond the U.S. Exclusive Economic Zone in the area known as the northern portion of the Eastern Gap; and whole blocks and partial blocks within the current boundary of the Flower Garden Banks National Marine Sanctuary. The full text of BOEM’s press release can be found here.

The current Five Year Program [2012-2017] will have its final lease sale today, March 22, 2017, which includes approximately 48 million acres off the coast of Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama comprised of 9,118 blocks. The sale will be livestreamed started at 9 am via BOEM’s website.

A United States Coast Guard Cutter of the Marine Protector class. This is an 87' vessel capable of 30+ knots and it is used for law enforcement, and search and rescue operations.

By Michael J. O’Brien

U.S. Coast Guard Form 2692 has been used for over forty (40) years to report marine casualties, commercial diving casualties, or outer continental shelf related causalities. Recently, the Form received a long overdue update. The new version of the form, effective as of 2017, is available here as well as the Coast Guard Home Port.  The new version of the form allows the document to be filled out electronically and to add a digital signature. There are also revised addendum forms for barge involvement, personnel casualties, witnesses, and any chemical testing. Further, the form’s data fields have been streamlined to align with statutory and regulatory language.

Please be sure to use new 2692 Form for all future incidents rather than the old form as we have received reports that the Coast Guard has rejected submissions using the old form.

BSEE

By Tod J. Everage

On February 3, 2017, BSEE issued its first Notice to Lessees (NTL) of 2017, advising of the revised OCSLA Civil Penalty Assessment Matrix. For the second time in 6 months, BSEE has increased the maximum civil penalty to $42,704 per day per violation, up from $42,017 per day per violation that was set in July 2016. These new changes were effective for all civil penalties assessed on or after February 3, 2017, even if the alleged violation predated February 3, 2017. The new matrix is shown below.

OCSLA Civil Penalty Assessment Matrix

February 3, 2017

GENERALIZED MATRIX FOR OCSLA CIVIL PENALTY ASSESSMENTS IN $/DAY/VIOLATION

Enforcement Code

Category A Category B Category C

W

$5,250-42,704

($15,750)*

$10,500-42,704

($21,000)*

$21,000-42,704

($26,250)*

C

$10,500-42,704

($21,000)*

$15,750-42,704

($26,250)*

$31,500-42,704

($36,750)*

S

$15,750-42,704

($26,250)*

$21,000-42,704

($31,500)*

$36,750-42,704

($38,850)*

Note: W=Warning, C=Component Shut-in, and S=Facility Shut-in

* = Starting Point for Assessment

Category A

Category B

Category C

Threat of injury to humans.

Threat of harm or damage to the marine or coastal environment, including mammals, fish and other aquatic life (threat may or may not involve endangered/threatened species).

Threat of pollution.

Threat of damage to any mineral deposit or property.

Injury to humans that results in 1-3 days away from work or 1-3 days on restricted work or job transfer.

Minor harm or damage to the marine or coastal environment, including mammals, fish, and other aquatic life (harm to aquatic life did not involve an endangered/threatened species).

Pollution caused by liquid hydrocarbon spillage of up to 50 barrels (bbls).

Minor damage to any mineral deposit.

Minor property damage equal or less than $25,000.

Additional incidents required to be reported under 30 CFR 250,188, except (a)(6), (b)(1), (b)(4).

Loss of human life.

Injury to humans that results in more than 3 days away from work or more than 3 days on restricted work or job transfer.

Serious harm or damage to the marine or coastal environment, including mammals, fish, and other aquatic life (harm to aquatic life involved numerous individuals or involved one or more members of an endangered/threatened species.

Pollution caused by liquid hydrocarbon spillage of more than 50 barrels (bbls).

Serious damage to any mineral deposit.

Serious property damage greater than $25,000.

The full text of the NTL can be found here.