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<title>Business and Corporate - Louisiana Law Blog</title>
<link>http://www.louisianalawblog.com/cat-admiralty-and-maritime.html</link>
<description>Louisiana Lawyers, Attorneys &amp; Law Firm</description>
<language>en-us</language>
<copyright>Copyright 2010</copyright>
<lastBuildDate>Wed, 04 Aug 2010 17:02:09 -0600</lastBuildDate>
<pubDate>Tue, 31 Aug 2010 09:51:02 -0600</pubDate>
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<title>Structuring the Purchase of a Vessel Through a Corporate Entity for Tax Purposes Can Have Unintended Consequences</title>
<description><![CDATA[<p>By <a href="http://www.keanmiller.com/lawyer-attorney-1355945.html">Sean T. McLaughlin</a></p>
<p>It is a fairly common practice for individuals purchasing pleasure yachts to take calculated steps to minimize sales taxes on their purchases. In fact, a simple &ldquo;Google&rdquo; search on the subject reveals many websites offering free advice on this issue. One of the tactics suggested by several websites seems fairly simple: instead of the individual purchasing the yacht, the <em>individual </em>forms a <em>corporation</em>, and the <em>corporation </em>purchases the yacht.</p>]]><![CDATA[<p>First and foremost, the author strongly recommends that any individuals considering purchasing a yacht seek the advice of legal counsel. The author specifically recommends seeking the advice of <u>both </u>a <em>tax </em>attorney and a <em>litigation </em>attorney. Why? A tax attorney can offer qualified legal advice concerning the <em>sales tax </em>issues surrounding the purchase. A litigation attorney can advise that structuring a purchase through a corporate entity can have significant <em>non tax-related </em>implications, including a <u>complete </u>bar against the recoverability of an entire class of damages.</p>
<p>In <em>Kelly v. Porter, Inc., </em>687 F. Supp. 2d 632 (E.D. La. 2010), the Eastern District of Louisiana made it clear that individuals who purchase recreational vessels through corporate entities <u>cannot </u>recover for any emotional distress or loss of enjoyment that the <em>individual LLC member </em>sustains when the vessel is damaged. The <em>Kelly </em>plaintiff wished to purchase a yacht for his own personal use. In an attempt to minimize the sales tax on that purchase, the <em>Kelly </em>plaintiff formed a new limited liability company (LLC) and named himself the sole member. Although the yacht was titled in the name of the LLC, the <em>Kelly </em>plaintiff considered himself to be the &ldquo;true&rdquo; owner of the yacht.</p>
<p>Shortly after it was purchased, the yacht was extensively damaged when it took on water while docked in its slip. The <em>Kelly </em>plaintiff and the LLC filed suit against the defendants alleging that they sustained &ldquo;emotional damages&rdquo; and &ldquo;loss of enjoyment&rdquo; due to the yacht being damaged. In response, the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment seeking to have <u>all </u>of the claims of the <em>individual </em>plaintiff dismissed for lack of standing. The defendants cited La. R.S. 12:1329, which states that the members of a LLC do not have an ownership interest in property owned by the LLC. Although the <em>Kelly </em>plaintiff attempted to claim that he was the &ldquo;equitable&rdquo; owner of the yacht, the Court disagreed and dismissed <u>all </u>of his claims. <br />
<br />
Additionally, the defendants sought to have the LLC&rsquo;s claims for &ldquo;emotional damages&rdquo; and &ldquo;loss of enjoyment&rdquo; (<em>i.e., </em>&ldquo;non-pecuniary damages&rdquo;) dismissed as well. The Court dismissed those claims, citing a litany of cases holding that corporations &ldquo;cannot recover non-pecuniary damages such as loss of enjoyment or emotional damages.&rdquo;</p>
<p>This decision makes it clear the Courts will not allow would-be yacht purchasers to &ldquo;have it both ways.&rdquo; Therefore, the author suggests that individuals considering purchasing a yacht should carefully consider <u>all </u>of the consequences of purchasing a yacht through an LLC and make a well-informed decision.<br />
&nbsp;</p>]]></description>
<link>http://www.louisianalawblog.com/admiralty-and-maritime-structuring-the-purchase-of-a-vessel-through-a-corporate-entity-for-tax-purposes-can-have-unintended-consequences.html</link>
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<category>Admiralty and Maritime</category><category>Business and Corporate</category>
<pubDate>Wed, 04 Aug 2010 17:02:09 -0600</pubDate>
<dc:creator>Steven Boutwell</dc:creator>

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<title>Supreme Court Clarifies Definition of a Corporation&apos;s &quot;Principal Place of Business&quot;</title>
<description><![CDATA[<p>By <a href="http://www.keanmiller.com/lawyer-attorney-1194352.html">Bradley C. Myers</a><br />
&nbsp;</p>
<p>The United States Supreme Court recently resolved conflicts among the Circuit Courts about the citizenship of a corporation for determining diversity of citizenship jurisdiction (1). This will allow corporations to analyze with more predictable results whether to remove a case to federal court. In <em>Hertz Corp. v. Friend</em>, <em>et al,</em> No. 08-1107 (February 23, 2010) (a unanimous decision, which is unusual in and of itself), the Court decided that when determining a corporation&rsquo;s citizenship for diversity of citizenship jurisdiction, the &ldquo;principal place of business&rdquo; of the corporation is &ldquo;the place where the corporation&rsquo;s high level officers direct, control, and coordinate the corporation&rsquo;s activities&rdquo;&mdash;something that courts have referred to as the &ldquo;nerve center&rdquo; of the corporation.</p>]]><![CDATA[<p>Melinda Friend and John Nhieu sued Hertz Corporation in California state court alleging violations of California&rsquo;s wage and hour laws. Hertz removed the case to Federal Court asserting that the federal court had jurisdiction based on complete diversity in that the plaintiffs were citizens of California and Hertz was a citizen of New Jersey. Hertz, in support of its removal, submitted a declaration that identified New Jersey as the location of its executive officers and executive and administrative functions. The declaration also identified the location of Hertz&rsquo;s business activities, about 20% of which were in California.</p>
<p>The District Court and Ninth Circuit determined diversity did not exist because they determined that although Hertz did business in 44 states its business activity was &ldquo;significantly larger&rdquo; and &ldquo;substantially predominated&rdquo; over activity in other states. Therefore, Hertz&rsquo;s &ldquo;principal place of business&rdquo; and thus, its citizenship, was in California. The Supreme Court agreed to review the Ninth Circuit&rsquo;s decision.</p>
<p>The Court&rsquo;s decision focused on the meaning of &ldquo;principal place of business&rdquo; in Section 1332(c)(1). It started its analysis with a discussion of the history and rationale for diversity jurisdiction starting with the first diversity jurisdiction statue enacted in 1789 and ending with the current version of 28 U.S.C. &sect;1332(c)(1) which was enacted in 1958. The court then reviewed the various tests used by federal appellate courts to determine the location of a corporation&rsquo;s &ldquo;principal place of business.&rdquo; For example, the First Circuit used a &ldquo;nerve center&rdquo; test (the location from which the corporations activities are directed and controlled); the Second Circuit used a &ldquo;business activities&rdquo; test (where a corporation&rsquo;s actual business activities are located); the Sixth and Tenth circuits used a &ldquo;total activities&rdquo; test (a combination of the &ldquo;nerve center&rdquo; and &ldquo;business activities&rdquo; tests); the Fifth and Eleventh circuits used a two-part test (are corporate activities &ldquo;centralize or de-centralized&rdquo; and then either a &ldquo;place of operations&rdquo; or a &ldquo;nerve center&rdquo; test.</p>
<p>The old &ldquo;nerve center&rdquo; test won out. The Court found that the best way to identify the principal place of business of a corporation as &ldquo;the place where a corporation&rsquo;s officers direct, control, and coordinate the corporation&rsquo;s activities.&rdquo; This conclusion was reached for three reasons: (1) the statutory language supported the approach of identifying a single state as the principal place of business; (2) it leads to &ldquo;administrative simplicity&rdquo; and predictability that will allow courts to focus on the underlying merits of a case rather than jousting over jurisdiction; and (3) the legislative history supported the conclusion. <br />
&nbsp;</p>
<p>&nbsp;********************************</p>
<p><span style="font-size: smaller">&nbsp;(1) The diversity jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. &sect;1332(c)(1) says that &ldquo;a corporation shall be deemed to be a citizen of any State by which it has been incorporated and of the State where it has its principal place of business.&rdquo; </span></p>]]></description>
<link>http://www.louisianalawblog.com/business-and-corporate-supreme-court-clarifies-definition-of-a-corporations-principal-place-of-business.html</link>
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<category>Business and Corporate</category><category>Class Action</category><category>Commercial Litigation</category><category>General Litigation</category><category>Insurance</category><category>Products Liability</category><category>Toxic Tort Litigation</category>
<pubDate>Thu, 29 Apr 2010 09:38:56 -0600</pubDate>
<dc:creator>Steven Boutwell</dc:creator>

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<title>How to Sell Your Business</title>
<description><![CDATA[<p>Cordell and Brian Haymon are attorneys, which means the fine points of selling a business do not intimidate them. Yet when the time came to sell Petroleum Services Corporation, a firm their father started in 1952, they didn&rsquo;t try to do all the work themselves. Instead, they hired Kean Miller's Blane Clark. As Mr. Clark explains, many business owners are far less comfortable with the process.</p>
<p>Read the <a href="http://www.businessreport.com/news/2010/apr/05/how-sell-your-business-lgl1/?legal">entire article</a>.&nbsp;</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>]]></description>
<link>http://www.louisianalawblog.com/business-and-corporate-how-to-sell-your-business.html</link>
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<category>Business and Corporate</category>
<pubDate>Mon, 12 Apr 2010 10:30:29 -0600</pubDate>
<dc:creator>Steven Boutwell</dc:creator>

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<title>U.S. House of Representatives Approves Two Healthcare Reform Bills</title>
<description><![CDATA[<p>By <a href="http://www.keanmiller.com/lawyer-attorney-1190106.html">Clay J. Countryman</a></p>
<p>On March 21, 2010, the U.S. House of Representatives on almost a straight party-line vote passed two final healthcare reform bills late Sunday night. Initially, the House of Representatives passed H.R. 3950, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, by a vote of 219 to 212.</p>
<p>Following the passage of H.R. 3950, the House of Representatives passed H.R. 4872, the Health Care and Education Affordability Reconciliation Act of 2010, by a vote of 220 to 211. This second bill by the House modifies the Senate bill (H.R. 3590), and H.R. 4872 will serve as the foundation for any changes made by Congress to the current healthcare delivery, payment and insurance system. Some of the insurance-related changes that may have immediate impact include: lifetime caps on coverage end; children can stay on parents&rsquo; policies until age 26, and insurance companies can&rsquo;t cancel coverage except in the case of fraud. A significant issue of addressing the Medicare physician payment formula still remains unresolved, as well as medical liability reform.</p>
<p>The changes addressed in H.R. 4872, sought by House Democrats and President Obama, will be considered by the Senate under budget reconciliation rules requiring a simple majority to pass and send it to President Obama for his signature. Senate Republicans have stated their intention to offer numerous amendments and raise multiple points of order to the legislation. If the H.R. 4872 is changed in any way prior to Senate approval, it must return to the House for an additional vote before President Obama can sign it.<br />
&nbsp;</p>]]></description>
<link>http://www.louisianalawblog.com/health-law-us-house-of-representatives-approves-two-healthcare-reform-bills.html</link>
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<category>Business and Corporate</category><category>Health Law</category><category>Louisiana In General</category><category>Medical Malpractice</category>
<pubDate>Mon, 22 Mar 2010 10:22:04 -0600</pubDate>
<dc:creator>Steven Boutwell</dc:creator>

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<title>A Renewed Focus on Independent Contractor vs Employee Issues</title>
<description><![CDATA[<p>By <a href="http://www.keanmiller.com/lawyer-attorney-1189851.html">Dean&nbsp;P. Cazenave</a></p>
<p>As discussed in the recent <em>New York Times </em><a href="http://finance.yahoo.com/taxes/article/108865/us-cracks-down-on-contractors-as-a-tax-dodge?sec=topStories&amp;pos=8&amp;asset=&amp;ccode">article</a>,&nbsp;federal and state officials, many facing record budget deficits, are starting to aggressively pursue companies that try to pass off regular employees as independent contractors.</p>
<p>President Obama's 2010 budget assumes that the federal crackdown will yield at least $7 billion over 10 years.&nbsp; More than two dozen states also have stepped up enforcement, often by enacting stricter penalties for misclassifying workers.&nbsp; This effort is intended to reign in what regulators believe is a trend among companies to cut costs by classifying regular employees as independent contractors, though they often are given desks, phone lines and assignments just like regular employees. Moreover, the experts say, workers have become more reluctant to challenge such practices, given the tough job market.</p>
<p>To determine if&nbsp;you or your company is complying with the rules and regulations as applicable to independent contractors, please call your attorney.&nbsp;&nbsp;</p>]]></description>
<link>http://www.louisianalawblog.com/business-and-corporate-a-renewed-focus-on-independent-contractor-vs-employee-issues.html</link>
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<category>Business and Corporate</category><category>Labor and Employment Law</category>
<pubDate>Fri, 12 Mar 2010 16:44:12 -0600</pubDate>
<dc:creator>Steven Boutwell</dc:creator>

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<title>Securities and Exchange Commission Issues Interpretive Guidance for Reporting Risks Due to Climate Change</title>
<description><![CDATA[<p>By <a href="http://www.keanmiller.com/lawyer-attorney-1192569.html">Maureen Harbourt</a></p>
<p>On January 27, 2010, the SEC voted 3-2 to issue an interpretive guidance &ldquo;on existing SEC disclosure requirements as they apply to business or legal developments relating to the issue of climate change.&rdquo; Chair Mary Shapiro emphasized that the interpretive release is not intended to create new legal requirements, but is to clarify the requirements already applicable for reporting material risks on public disclosure statements. She was careful to avoid arguments on the science, stating: &ldquo;We are not opining on whether the world's climate is changing, at what pace it might be changing, or due to what causes. Nothing that the Commission does today should be construed as weighing in on those topics.&quot;</p>]]><![CDATA[<p>The guidance, which will be posted &ldquo;shortly&rdquo; on the SEC website, provides examples of where climate change issues may require discussion in disclosure reports:</p>
<ul>
    <li><strong>Impact of Legislation and Regulation</strong>: When assessing potential disclosure obligations, a company should consider whether the impact of certain existing laws and regulations regarding climate change is material. In certain circumstances, a company should also evaluate the potential impact of pending legislation and regulation related to this topic.</li>
</ul>
<ul>
    <li><strong>Impact of International Accords</strong>: A company should consider, and disclose when material, the risks or effects on its business of international accords and treaties relating to climate change.</li>
</ul>
<ul>
    <li><strong>Indirect Consequences of Regulation or Business Trends</strong>: Legal, technological, political and scientific developments regarding climate change may create new opportunities or risks for companies. For instance, a company may face decreased demand for goods that produce significant greenhouse gas emissions or increased demand for goods that result in lower emissions than competing products. As such, a company should consider, for disclosure purposes, the actual or potential indirect consequences it may face due to climate change related regulatory or business trends.</li>
</ul>
<ul>
    <li><strong>Physical Impacts of Climate Change</strong>: Companies should also evaluate for disclosure purposes the actual and potential material impacts of environmental matters on their business.<br />
    &nbsp;</li>
</ul>
<p>See SEC <a href="http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-15.ht">Press Release here</a>.&nbsp; <br />
&nbsp;</p>]]></description>
<link>http://www.louisianalawblog.com/climate-change-ghg-securities-and-exchange-commission-issues-interpretive-guidance-for-reporting-risks-due-to-climate-change.html</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.louisianalawblog.com/climate-change-ghg-securities-and-exchange-commission-issues-interpretive-guidance-for-reporting-risks-due-to-climate-change.html</guid>
<category>Business and Corporate</category><category>Climate Change / GHG</category><category>Energy</category>
<pubDate>Thu, 28 Jan 2010 11:22:50 -0600</pubDate>
<dc:creator>Steven Boutwell</dc:creator>

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<title>Cash Donations for Haiti Relief Made Before March 2010 May Be Deducted on 2009 Income Tax Returns</title>
<description><![CDATA[<p>By <a href="http://www.keanmiller.com/lawyer-attorney-1190226.html">Kevin C. Curry</a></p>
<p>On January 22, 2010, President Obama signed a law which allows taxpayers to claim a charitable deduction in the 2009 tax year for cash donations made through March 1, 2010 for the relief of victims in areas affected by the January 12, 2010 earthquake in Haiti. The IRS notice on this new law indicates that cash contributions eligible for the deduction against last years taxes include contributions made by text message, check, credit card or debit card. The law gives the taxpayer the option of deducting the cash contribution on his or her&nbsp;2009 return or his or her&nbsp;2010 return, but not both. The law does not change any of the other rules applicable to charitable donations such as the percentage limitations, the requirement that the charity be a qualified charity or the fact that the taxpayer must itemize in order to benefit from the deduction.</p>
<p>Each taxpayer should look at his or her own individual situation to determine whether or not the deduction should be claimed against 2009 income or 2010 income. Generally, the sooner the deduction the better but the taxpayer should consider his or her income in each year, tax rate in each year, and applicability of the itemized deduction phase out which is eliminated in 2010.</p>
<p>Further information regarding the deduction for Haiti earthquake relief donations and the identification of possible qualified charities can be found on the <a href="http://www.IRS.gov">IRS website</a>.<br />
&nbsp;</p>]]></description>
<link>http://www.louisianalawblog.com/state-and-local-taxation-cash-donations-for-haiti-relief-made-before-march-2010-may-be-deducted-on-2009-income-tax-returns.html</link>
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<category>Business and Corporate</category><category>Louisiana In General</category><category>State and Local Taxation</category>
<pubDate>Wed, 27 Jan 2010 15:59:44 -0600</pubDate>
<dc:creator>Steven Boutwell</dc:creator>

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<title>Guidelines for Promoting Your Business Through Social Networking Websites</title>
<description><![CDATA[<p>By <a href="http://www.keanmiller.com/lawyer-attorney-1194320.html">Tara Madison</a></p>
<p>Social networks like Facebook, YouTube and Twitter are transforming the way companies communicate with consumers.&nbsp;  Facebook, YouTube and Twitter can be powerful business tools, but you must be mindful of certain legal limitations and guidelines.</p>
<p>The words &ldquo;Facebook,&rdquo; &ldquo;YouTube,&rdquo; and &ldquo;Twitter&rdquo; are proprietary to the companies that own them. &nbsp; &ldquo;Facebook,&rdquo; &ldquo;YouTube,&rdquo; and &ldquo;Twitter&rdquo; are all registered with the U.S. Patent &amp; Trademark Office.&nbsp;  A trademark is distinctive word, logo or phrase that is used by an individual or business to identify a unique source of products or services. <br />
&nbsp;</p>]]><![CDATA[<p>Facebook, Inc., Twitter, Inc. and Google, Inc., the owner of YouTube, are entitled to prevent others from using their trademarks or something similar in a way that is misleading, deceptive or could cause confusion in the marketplace.  You must first obtain permission before using another&rsquo;s trademark.</p>
<p>Both Facebook and Google authorize the use of the Facebook and YouTube trademarks in specified ways.  These guidelines are set forth in full on each of their websites.  Twitter does not yet have specific guidelines, although I anticipate similar guidelines will be listed on the Twitter website very soon.  Until then, Twitter users should be wary of using the Twitter trademark to promote their businesses in advertising without receiving specific permission.</p>
<p>Google only allows use of the YouTube trademark in a specific way to give attribution to a You Tube video that may appear on a website or blog.  If a YouTube link or video is incorporated into a business&rsquo;s website or blog, then the business owner must use what YouTube refers to as its &quot;Powered by YouTube Badge.&quot;  This badge is available for <a href="http://code.google.com/apis/youtube/branding.html">free download &amp; use</a>.</p>
<p>Additionally, it is important to note that the YouTube license appears to only extend to use of the YouTube Badge to give attribution to a YouTube video on a website, blog, or other such means of electronic communication.&nbsp;  The license does not specifically address print advertisements, such as billboards.&nbsp;  When the YouTube badge is used on a website, it must be &ldquo;clickable&rdquo; so that it links back to <a href="http://www.youtube.com">http://www.youtube.com</a>.&nbsp;  YouTube strictly prohibits changing the YouTube mark in any way, such as &quot;YouTubers,&quot; &quot;Tubing,&quot; You-Tube,&quot; or &quot;YouTubed,&quot; etc.</p>
<p>Facebook actually recommends promoting one&rsquo;s Facebook page outside of Facebook.&nbsp;  Facebook likewise provides guidelines for appropriate use of its trademark.&nbsp; For example, Facebook allows its users to use its trademark to alerts consumers to: &quot;Find us on Facebook to discover more about...&quot; or &quot;Check Out ABC Company on Facebook.&quot;&nbsp;  Facebook, however, prohibits use of its trademark as follows:  &quot;Check out the ABC Company  Facebook Page&quot; or &quot;ABC Company partners with Facebook in social advertising campaign.&quot;&nbsp;  More examples of acceptable and unacceptable uses of the Facebook trademark are provided <a href="http://www.facebook.com/pages/manage/promo_guidelines.php">here</a>.&nbsp;&nbsp; Facebook also gives users permission to use its Facebook Page Badge, which can also be accessed from the website.&nbsp; There are additional guidelines for use of the Facebook badge.<br />
<br />
Facebook may be used in print advertisements, only if a registered trademark symbol &reg; is included each time the Facebook Brand is mentioned.&nbsp;  Where possible, Facebook recommends including its legal copy on all print promotional materials: &ldquo;Facebook is a registered trademark of Facebook, Inc.&rdquo;<br />
<br />
Before delving into the world of social networking advertising, take the time to read the permissions and guidelines of whatever social networking site you may be using.&nbsp;  These guidelines are typically located on the social network&rsquo;s website.&nbsp; If there are no guidelines, the default rule is that specific permission should be sought to use the social network&rsquo;s trademark to promote your business by incorporating a social network&rsquo;s trademark in commercial advertisements. <br />
&nbsp;</p>]]></description>
<link>http://www.louisianalawblog.com/intellectual-property-guidelines-for-promoting-your-business-through-social-networking-websites.html</link>
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<category>Business and Corporate</category><category>Intellectual Property</category>
<pubDate>Mon, 05 Oct 2009 08:41:51 -0600</pubDate>
<dc:creator>Steven Boutwell</dc:creator>

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<title>Final Increase to Federal Minimum Wage in Effect Pursuant to the Fair Minimum Wage Act of 2007</title>
<description><![CDATA[<p>By <a href="http://www.keanmiller.com/lawyer-attorney-1192600.html">A. Edward Hardin, Jr. </a></p>
<p>Effective July 24, 2009, the federal minimum wage increased from $6.55 per hour to $7.25 per hour for all non-exempt employees.&nbsp; The 2009 increase in the federal minimum wage was the third and final increase to the federal minimum wage pursuant to Fair Minimum Wage Act of 2007.&nbsp; Under the 2007 Act, the minimum wage established by the Fair Labor Standards Act increased in three steps from $5.85 per hour effective July 24, 2007, to $6.55 per hour effective July 24, 2008, and to $7.25 per hour effective July 24.</p>]]><![CDATA[<p>The Fair Labor Standards Act is enforced by the U.S. Department of Labor&rsquo;s Wage and Hour Division.&nbsp; The first federal minimum wage, set October 29, 1938, was $.25 per hour. The federal minimum wage broke the $1.00 threshold effective March 1, 1956; $2.00 effective May 1, 1974; $3.10 effective January 1, 1980; $4.25 effective April 1, 1991; and $5.15 effective September 1, 1997.</p>
<p>In addition to the establishment of the minimum wage, the Fair Labor Standards Act establishes overtime pay requirements, record keeping and posting requirements, and youth employment standards.&nbsp; Under the Fair Labor Standards Act, non-exempt&nbsp;employees must be paid at least the minimum wage per hour, and one and one half times the employee&rsquo;s &ldquo;regular rate of pay&rdquo; (not necessarily their hourly rate) for all hours worked&nbsp;over forty hours per work week.&nbsp;</p>
<p>Section (13)(a)(1) of the Fair Labor Standards Act provides an exemption to both the minimum wage and overtime obligations. Under Section (13)(a)1, employees employed as bona fide executive administrative, professional employees, and outside sales people are considered &ldquo;exempt&rdquo; if: (1) certain tests regarding their job duties are met;&nbsp;and (2) the employee is paid on a &ldquo;salary basis.&rdquo;&nbsp; The employee&rsquo;s specific job duties, not title, dictate whether the employee is exempt or non-exempt. Although state law provides for breaks for minors, the Fair Labor Standards Act does not require breaks or meal periods.&nbsp; Nor does the Fair Labor Standards Act define &ldquo;full-time&rdquo; employment.&nbsp; This designation &ldquo;full-time&rdquo; (versus part-time) employment is determined by the employer.&nbsp; Likewise, the Fair Labor Standards Act does not require severance pay, sick leave, vacation, or holidays.</p>]]></description>
<link>http://www.louisianalawblog.com/labor-and-employment-law-final-increase-to-federal-minimum-wage-in-effect-pursuant-to-the-fair-minimum-wage-act-of-2007.html</link>
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<category>Business and Corporate</category><category>Labor and Employment Law</category>
<pubDate>Mon, 28 Sep 2009 14:40:03 -0600</pubDate>
<dc:creator>Steven Boutwell</dc:creator>

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<title>Patent Infringement Opinions Continue To Be Important</title>
<description><![CDATA[<p>By <a href="http://www.keanmiller.com/lawyer-attorney-1255917.html">Pamela A.&nbsp; Baxter</a></p>
<p>Recent court decisions show that patent infringement opinions are still important for any person or entity that becomes aware of a United States patent that is similar to their products, methods or processes.</p>
<p>Under federal patent law, anyone who either makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention in the United States or actively induces another to do so is liable for patent infringement.&nbsp;&nbsp;In addition to regular damages, courts may award up to three times the damages for willful infringement.&nbsp; Under the 1983 <em>Underwater Devices Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co. </em>opinion, if a party had actual notice of another person&rsquo;s patent rights, then that party had an affirmative duty to exercise due care to determine whether that party was infringing those patent rights.&nbsp; This affirmative duty included the duty to obtain patent infringement opinions prior to engaging in any potentially infringing activities. <br />
&nbsp;</p>]]><![CDATA[<p>In 2007, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit readdressed the duty of care required for willful infringement and expressly overruled its <em>Underwater </em>decision.&nbsp; In the&nbsp;<em>Seagate </em>case [see 497 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2007)]., the Federal Circuit stated that there is no affirmative duty of care in determining willfulness for direct infringement.&nbsp; Direct infringement only encompasses the making, using, offering for sale, or selling the patented invention, not inducement.&nbsp; The new standard for willfulness for direct infringement is more akin to negligence in that the patent owner must show that the infringer acted despite an objectively high likelihood that its actions constituted patent infringement and that the infringer either knew or should have known of that risk.&nbsp; Therefore there is no longer an affirmative duty for parties who are accused of directly infringing a patent to obtain a patent infringement opinion.</p>
<p>However, in 2008, the Federal Circuit found that patent infringement opinions can be used as evidence of intent, or the lack thereof, for claims of inducing patent infringement.&nbsp; To be liable for inducing patent infringement, the patent holder must show that the alleged infringer knew or should have known that their actions would induce direct patent infringement.&nbsp; The fact that the alleged infringer fails to produce or obtain a patent infringement opinion may be used as evidence that the alleged infringer knew or should have known that their actions would induce direct patent infringement.</p>
<p>To reduce the risk of an adverse judgment awarding a patent owner triple damages, any party that is aware of a patent that is similar to a product, method, or process which they utilize should consider obtaining a patent infringement opinion.</p>]]></description>
<link>http://www.louisianalawblog.com/intellectual-property-patent-infringement-opinions-continue-to-be-important.html</link>
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<category>Business and Corporate</category><category>Intellectual Property</category>
<pubDate>Fri, 17 Jul 2009 08:25:52 -0600</pubDate>
<dc:creator>Steven Boutwell</dc:creator>

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<item>
<title>Definition of Component Parts Clarified for Louisiana Sales and Use Tax Purposes</title>
<description><![CDATA[<p>By <a href="http://www.keanmiller.com/lawyer-attorney-1190316.html">Christopher&nbsp;J. Dicharry </a>and&nbsp;<a href="http://www.keanmiller.com/lawyer-attorney-1415002.html">Jason R. Brown</a></p>
<p>On July 7, 2009, Louisiana Governor Bobby Jindal signed Act 442 (SB 9) into law, preserving Louisiana&rsquo;s long-standing law excluding purchases, rentals and repairs of component parts of immovable property from state and local sales/use tax. Under a law enacted in 2008, purchases of several items previously considered non-taxable component parts of buildings and other immovables (<em>e.g., </em>installed commercial refrigerators and other commercial and industrial fixtures) could have been subjected to state and local sales/use tax. Many taxpayer representatives questioned the constitutionality of the 2008 Act and legislators agreed that it was not their intention to increase sales/use taxes during the 2008 Legislative Session. Act 442 became effective when it was signed by the governor and applies retroactively to all transactions occurring after the July 1, 2008 effective date of the 2008 Act.</p>]]><![CDATA[<p>Under Louisiana&rsquo;s general tax law, all purchases, leases and repairs of tangible personal property, not specifically excluded or exempted from tax, are subject to state and local sales/use tax. The classification of an item as &ldquo;tangible personal property&rdquo; is, therefore, of great importance when determining whether purchases, leases and repairs are taxable. Prior to 2005, Louisiana law did not regard items permanently attached to a building and certain other property that would be expected to be a part of a building (<em>e.g., </em>commercial refrigerators/freezers in a grocery store and certain medical equipment in a hospital ) as &ldquo;tangible personal property.&rdquo; In the 2005 Willis-Knighton decision, the Louisiana Supreme Court rejected twenty-five years of interpretations of Louisiana&rsquo;s property law and ruled that many items formerly considered as component parts (i.e. toilets, doors, cabinets) were properly classified as tangible personal property. In response to the Willis-Knighton decision, the legislature passed remedial legislation in 2005 and 2006 (Acts 301 and 594, respectively) making clear that all items regarded as component parts of an immovable prior to the Willis-Knighton decision retained their status as &ldquo;component parts.&rdquo; For purposes of state and local sales/use tax, therefore, the items did not qualify as taxable tangible personal property and their purchase, lease and repair was, once again, excluded from tax.&nbsp;</p>
<p>In 2008, the Legislature rewrote the law for all purposes, including real estate transactions and lien law. The 2008 Act created a great deal of uncertainty as to whether purchases of many items generally viewed as component parts of an immovable were taxable as tangible personal property. The new law explicitly states that purchases of the type discussed here are not.&nbsp;</p>
<p>Act 442, described in the legislation as &ldquo;remedial, curative&hellip;procedural&hellip;and [to] be applied retroactively,&rdquo; specifically states that the 2005 and 2006 laws (Acts 301 and 594) are controlling for sales/use tax purposes for determining which items qualify as component parts. The Act 442 changes discussed above originated as House Bill 882 by Representative Hunter Greene (HB 882), and was added by amendment to SB 9. Act 442 expressly provides that, &ldquo;for purposes of sales and use taxes&hellip;the term &lsquo;tangible personal property&rsquo; <strong><em>shall not include </em></strong>any property that would have been considered immovable property prior to&rdquo; the 2008 law.&nbsp;</p>
<p>Even with the enactment of Act 442, there will continue to be disputes over what property qualifies as component parts. In the coming months, Kean Miller will be working with the Secretary of the Department of Revenue and others to better define &ldquo;component parts&rdquo; for sales and use tax purposes.&nbsp;</p>
<p>A copy of Act 442 may be found <a href="http://www.legis.state.la.us/billdata/streamdocument.asp?did=665319">here</a>.&nbsp;&nbsp;</p>
<p>If you have any questions regarding the effect that Act 442 may have on your business, please to do not hesitate to <a href="http://www.keanmiller.com/lawyer-attorney-1188409.html">contact us</a>.<br />
&nbsp;</p>]]></description>
<link>http://www.louisianalawblog.com/state-and-local-taxation-definition-of-component-parts-clarified-for-louisiana-sales-and-use-tax-purposes.html</link>
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<category>Business and Corporate</category><category>State and Local Taxation</category>
<pubDate>Fri, 10 Jul 2009 14:47:45 -0600</pubDate>
<dc:creator>Steven Boutwell</dc:creator>

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<item>
<title>Quick Action by Registered Trademark Owners May Prevent Future Facebook Problems</title>
<description><![CDATA[<p>Beginning at 12:01 a.m. (Eastern Standard Time), on Saturday, June 13, 2009, members of the social networking website, Facebook, will be able to claim usernames to associate with their Facebook accounts and Facebook pages. This will allow Facebook pages to be accessed by using a url such as, http://www.facebook.com/unitedairlines, or something similar.</p>
<p>Facebook is taking certain steps to prevent infringement of intellectual property through &ldquo;name-squatting.&rdquo; In connection with this, Facebook is allowing Federally registered trademark holders to prevent the registration of usernames that would infringe their intellectual property rights.</p>
<p>There is a link to the <a href="http://www.facebook.com/help/contact.php?show_form=username_rights">form </a>on Facebook&rsquo;s Web site if you want to complete the form yourself. You will need the trademark registration number and the exact wording of the trademark as registered.</p>
<p>For more information,&nbsp;or to protect your trademark, please contact <a href="http://www.keanmiller.com/lawyer-attorney-1255917.html">Pamela Baxter</a> at pamela.baxter@keanmiller.com (225.389.3761) or <a href="http://www.keanmiller.com/lawyer-attorney-1194919.html">Russel Primeaux </a>at russel.primeaux@keanmiller.com (225.382.3454).</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>]]></description>
<link>http://www.louisianalawblog.com/intellectual-property-quick-action-by-registered-trademark-owners-may-prevent-future-facebook-problems.html</link>
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<category>Business and Corporate</category><category>Commercial Litigation</category><category>Intellectual Property</category><category>Louisiana In General</category>
<pubDate>Fri, 12 Jun 2009 11:36:55 -0600</pubDate>
<dc:creator>Steven Boutwell</dc:creator>

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<item>
<title>Insurance and Hurricanes</title>
<description><![CDATA[<p><a href="http://www.keanmiller.com/lawyer-attorney-1194126.html">By Mark D. Mese</a></p>
<p>June marks the beginning of Hurricane Season and should serve as a reminder to review your personal and business property insurance coverage. The effect of recent Hurricanes on the Gulf Coast generally and Louisiana specifically have been significant with respect to both damages and the insurance covering those damages.</p>]]><![CDATA[<p>The one year anniversaries of the 2008 Hurricanes are rapidly approaching and disputes with insurers covering the 2008 losses which have not been resolved may be prejudiced if lawsuits are not filed before the one year anniversary of the losses.</p>
<p>The losses caused by the 2008 Hurricanes in South Louisiana will make property insurance renewals more difficult and expensive. Coverage provided by many property carriers is expected to be narrowed and subjected to higher named storm deductibles.</p>
<p>Beginning the renewal process on property coverage at least 120 days in advance of the renewal date is advised to ensure a fair opportunity to negotiate acceptable terms and to avoid unpleasant surprises such as excessive rate increases and non-renewals.</p>
<p>When purchasing property insurance an insured should also remember that Business Interruption Insurance is usually included in property insurance coverage. Business Interruption Insurance comes in many forms and must be specifically purchased in most cases as an additional coverage under a property policy. Understanding the different type of business interruption coverage is important and may be the difference between a company surviving or not surviving a catastrophic loss.</p>
<p>A comprehensive legal review of your insurance programs including your property insurance is recommended on a regular basis.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;</p>]]></description>
<link>http://www.louisianalawblog.com/insurance-insurance-and-hurricanes.html</link>
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<category>Business and Corporate</category><category>Hurricane Gustav</category><category>Hurricane Katrina</category><category>Insurance</category><category>Louisiana In General</category><category>New Orleans/Louisiana Recovery</category>
<pubDate>Thu, 11 Jun 2009 10:33:26 -0600</pubDate>
<dc:creator>Steven Boutwell</dc:creator>

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<item>
<title>363 Sales of Assets in Bankruptcy - Chrysler and Beyond</title>
<description><![CDATA[<p><a href="http://www.keanmiller.com/lawyer-attorney-1193394.html">By Eric Lockridge</a></p>
<p>The judge overseeing Chrysler LLC&rsquo;s bankruptcy entered an <a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/15986202/Ruling-Approving-Sale-of-Chrysler">order </a>on June 1, 2009 approving Chrysler&rsquo;s motion seeking permission to sell substantially all of its assets to a new company.&nbsp;&nbsp;The procedure by which this sale was accomplished, and by which a similar sale in the GM bankruptcy will likely be accomplished, is known in the bankruptcy and finance worlds as a &ldquo;363 Sale,&rdquo; after the relevant provision of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code.</p>
<p><em>(For those well-versed in 363 Sales, see Stephen Sather&rsquo;s thoughtful post about practical and ethical concerns with the Chrysler sale </em><a href="http://stevesathersbankruptcynews.blogspot.com/2009/05/chrysler-seeks-ultimate-363-sale-as.html"><em>here</em></a><em>. )</em></p>]]><![CDATA[<p>Section 363(b) of the Bankruptcy Code <a href="http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/11/usc_sec_11_00000363----000-.html">(11 U.S.C. &sect; 363(b)) </a>allows a company that files for bankruptcy (&ldquo;the Debtor&rdquo;) to sell some or all of its assets outside the ordinary course of its business, provided that the Debtor obtains court approval to do so. A 363 Sale can be a particularly attractive option for disposing of assets or business lines that may have long-tail contingent liabilities, such as potential claims for personal injuries or property damage that have not yet been asserted. In many instances, the purchaser who acquires the asset through a 363 Sale will take the asset free and clear of pre-existing liabilities, if the sale is structured correctly.</p>
<p>Companies outside of bankruptcy that have strong cash reserves or access to capital should look for opportunities to acquire new product lines, expand their footprint, or strengthen their intellectual property portfolio when reading headlines about troubled firms.&nbsp; 363 Sales are not just for multi-billion dollar bankruptcies; businesses of any size in any type of industry can sell all or part of themselves through a 363 Sale.&nbsp; There are no restrictions on the type of assets that can be sold through a 363 Sale.&nbsp; Inventory, equipment, patents, trademarks, customer lists, trade secrets, accounts receivable, and other rights to payment are all possibilities for a 363 Sale.&nbsp; There are limitations, however, on the sale of a Debtor&rsquo;s assets in which a third party has an interest.&nbsp; If a third party has an interest in a particular asset, whether a security interest, lien, etc., then that particular asset may only be sold in a 363 Sale if the third party&rsquo;s claim is satisfied from the proceeds, or if other criteria are met.&nbsp;&nbsp;</p>
<p>Generally, the purchaser at a 363 Sale acquires only the Debtor&rsquo;s rights in the asset.&nbsp; For example, if the Debtor was a co-owner of an asset, then the purchaser would only obtain the Debtor&rsquo;s co-ownership interest.&nbsp; In some instances, however, a 363 Sale can deliver outright ownership of an asset to the purchaser even when the Debtor has only a partial ownership interest in the particular asset.&nbsp; This is often an appealing solution to resolve a dispute where a joint venture sours and the partners cannot agree on price or terms to move on.&nbsp; The purchaser can acquire the entire asset&mdash;including an entire operating business or just a part of one&mdash;outright instead of merely owning the Debtor&rsquo;s partial ownership interest in the asset.<br />
&nbsp;</p>]]></description>
<link>http://www.louisianalawblog.com/bankruptcy-and-business-reorganization-363-sales-of-assets-in-bankruptcy-chrysler-and-beyond.html</link>
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<category>Bankruptcy and Business Reorganization</category><category>Business and Corporate</category>
<pubDate>Tue, 02 Jun 2009 08:09:47 -0600</pubDate>
<dc:creator>Steven Boutwell</dc:creator>

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<title>Great Ideas by Employees - Who Owns Them?</title>
<description><![CDATA[<p>By <a href="http://www.keanmiller.com/lawyer-attorney-1194919.html">Russel O. Primeaux</a></p>
<p>As we continue our shift to a more knowledge-based economy, frequently the greatest assets of a company reside in the creativity of its employees. This is especially true for service companies in which the services can be repeated for multiple customers (example: software). Whether or not a company owns something that has been created by one of its employees will depend to a great extent on the category of intellectual property into which the creation is classified. Generally, the creations or discoveries of employees will fall into the intellectual property categories of copyright, patent, or trade secret.</p>]]><![CDATA[<p>Copyright law states that an employer will own a work protected by copyright if the work was created within the employee&rsquo;s &ldquo;scope of employment.&rdquo; In order to determine whether something is created within the scope of employment, one will look at the position description and the practical duties that the employee actually performed. For example, suppose Mr. Jones is a dispatcher for a custom fastener manufacturer. Mr. Jones creates an interface that vastly improves the software system the company uses for taking and fulfilling orders. He is a dispatcher, focused on delivery of orders. Nevertheless, improvements to the overall system of taking and delivering orders will be part of his duties. Therefore, it is likely that such a creation will be found to be within the scope of employment and the property of the employer.</p>
<p>The legal standard used in determining whether a company owns a patentable invention is narrower than the &ldquo;scope of employment&rdquo; standard used in copyright law. For patentable inventions, the courts look to whether the employee had a &ldquo;duty to invent.&rdquo; We return to the above example of Mr. Jones, the dispatcher. Suppose the creation by the dispatcher was capable of patent protection. Because Mr. Jones was a dispatcher, who did not have a specific duty to invent, it is likely the company would not own any patent that might be issued to cover the invention.</p>
<p>For trade secrets, the law is less clear than the law for copyright and patent. Generally, trade secret law states that a trade secret will exist if the underlying information has value by not being generally known and is the subject of reasonable measures to keep it secret. Trade secrets are normally the property of the company, and not the individual employees. However, as a practical matter trade secrets are harder to control than patents or copyrights. If an employee maintains a list of customer contacts on her personal cell phone, and the employer does not have a specific policy stating that customer contacts are the property of the employer; it will be difficult for the employer to assert that the contact information is a company trade secret when that employee leaves the company.</p>
<p>Companies should use their information technology management practices to bolster the company&rsquo;s trade secret practices. For example, if the sales person above had been provided a company Blackberry, and if the system ensured that all contact information was stored on company servers; the company would have a stronger basis for arguing that the customer contact information is a trade secret. The company would be in an even stronger position if it had a written policy regarding the company&rsquo;s trade secret practices. Additionally, trade secret obligations should be included in employment agreements as well.</p>
<p>Employment agreements can also be used to clarify the company&rsquo;s ownership of copyrights and patents. The company can make clear that the &ldquo;scope of employment&rdquo; for copyrights is considered very broad. Also, the company could impose a duty to invent on all employees. Additionally, the employee agreement can clearly state, under a simple contractual basis, that all inventions or works of authorship created by employees are owned by the company.</p>
<p>A company can properly protect and claim ownership over the creations of its employees. Doing so requires a knowledge of the different areas of the law that apply and appropriate company practices. Those practices should take advantage of the applicable law and should fill in the gaps where the law does not adequately address the situation. <br />
&nbsp;</p>]]></description>
<link>http://www.louisianalawblog.com/intellectual-property-great-ideas-by-employees-who-owns-them.html</link>
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<category>Business and Corporate</category><category>Intellectual Property</category><category>Labor and Employment Law</category>
<pubDate>Fri, 29 May 2009 09:08:26 -0600</pubDate>
<dc:creator>Steven Boutwell</dc:creator>

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<title>Recent Case Illustrates Need for Advance Tax Planning When Selling a Business</title>
<description><![CDATA[<p>By <a href="http://www.keanmiller.com/lawyer-attorney-1190226.html">Kevin C. Curry</a></p>
<p>A recent court case illustrates the need for having advance tax planning when selling a business. In the case of Muskat v. U.S., No. 08-1513, 103 AFTR 2d _____, the taxpayer was majority shareholder in a corporation. He and the other shareholders sold all of the stock in the corporation to a third party interested in buying the business. The buyer also agreed to pay the taxpayer $1,000,000.00 for a non-compete agreement. The transaction was documented in this manner.</p>
<p>After the fact, the taxpayer realized that the non-compete proceeds would be taxable as ordinary income to him. He attempted to re-characterize the $1,000,000.00 payment as the sale of his personal goodwill and claim capital gains treatment.</p>
<p>The IRS denied his claim for a refund and the court agreed with the IRS. The court found that the taxpayer had a significant burden of proof to overcome the manner in which the transaction was documented. The taxpayer could not overcome his burden of proving that the payment was not for his non-compete agreement given the fact that all of the documentation reflected that was the purpose for the payment.</p>
<p>Perhaps the result would have been different if the taxpayer had considered this issue prior to the sale and agreed with the buyer that the payment was for his personal goodwill. There have been some cases where courts have allowed shareholders to sell their &ldquo;personal goodwill&rdquo; as opposed to corporate goodwill when selling a business. Therefore, proper tax planning in negotiating a sale or other transaction is very important.<br />
&nbsp;</p>]]></description>
<link>http://www.louisianalawblog.com/business-and-corporate-recent-case-illustrates-need-for-advance-tax-planning-when-selling-a-business.html</link>
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<category>Business and Corporate</category>
<pubDate>Wed, 22 Apr 2009 09:07:38 -0600</pubDate>
<dc:creator>Steven Boutwell</dc:creator>

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<title>American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009:  New COBRA Rights and Obligations</title>
<description><![CDATA[<p><a href="http://www.keanmiller.com/lawyer-attorney-1192600.html">By A. Edward Hardin, Jr. </a></p>
<p>On February 17, 2009, President Obama signed into law the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (the &ldquo;ARRA&rdquo;), the comprehensive economic stimulus package. Among its other provisions, the ARRA includes an extension of the right to elect COBRA coverage, a reduction in COBRA premiums for eligible participants, and new notice obligations for employers.</p>]]><![CDATA[<p><u><strong>Extension of COBRA Election:</strong></u> Under the ARRA, employees who were <em>involuntarily </em>terminated between September 1, 2008 through February 16, 2009, and who do not have COBRA coverage because they either did not initially elect COBRA or elected COBRA, but are no longer covered, will have a second opportunity to elect COBRA coverage or to re-establish COBRA coverage. The new election period began on February 17 (the day the President signed ARRA into law) and ends 60 days after the required notice of the special election period is given. The second election period does not extend COBRA coverage beyond the original maximum period, but simply allows a second opportunity to elect COBRA coverage or re-establish coverage that was originally elected, but thereafter lost.</p>
<p><u><strong>Reduction of COBRA Premium: </strong></u>In addition to the opportunity to elect COBRA coverage, the ARRA offers a reduction in COBRA premiums for assistance eligible individuals. Assistance eligible individuals can receive a 65% premium reduction subsidy for the cost of COBRA coverage after February 17, 2009 (the day the ARRA was signed). But the premium reduction ends upon the sooner of: the eligibility for other group coverage or Medicare; after 9 months of receiving the reduction; or when the maximum period of COBRA coverage ends, whichever occurs first. Individuals paying reduced COBRA premiums must also inform their plans if they become eligible for coverage under another group health plan or Medicare.</p>
<p>Assistance eligible individuals are those former employees (and members of their families) who were eligible for COBRA at anytime between September 1, 2008 and December 31, 2009, lost their job due to an involuntary termination, and who elect COBRA coverage. Assistance eligible individuals are required to pay only 35% percent of the COBRA premium. Under the ARRA, once the beneficiary pays his or her 35% of the COBRA premium, the COBRA premium is considered paid. The employer, insurer, or health plan then picks up the remaining 65% of the premium, but is allowed a tax credit against certain employment taxes. The credit can only be taken after the 35% premium has been paid. According to the IRS, if the credit claimed is greater than the tax due, the Secretary of the Treasury will directly reimburse the employer, insurer or plan for the excess. The premium reduction only applies to periods of coverage beginning on or after February 17, 2009.</p>
<p><u><strong>Additional Notice Obligations: </strong></u>Finally, the ARRA requires employers or plan administrators to provide eligible employees and covered family members with notice regarding the special COBRA-election period on or before April 17, 2009. Notice must also be provided regarding the premium reduction for those who had a COBRA-qualifying event between September 1, 2008 and December 31, 2009. This notice must be sent regardless of whether COBRA coverage was elected.</p>
<p>The Employee Benefits Security Administration is working on guidance regarding the ARRA, and the IRS may be able to provide additional guidance. Also, model notices are expected to be issued.<br />
&nbsp;</p>]]></description>
<link>http://www.louisianalawblog.com/labor-and-employment-law-american-recovery-and-reinvestment-act-of-2009-new-cobra-rights-and-obligations.html</link>
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<category>Business and Corporate</category><category>Health Law</category><category>Labor and Employment Law</category>
<pubDate>Wed, 11 Mar 2009 20:15:36 -0600</pubDate>
<dc:creator>Steven Boutwell</dc:creator>

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<item>
<title>A Taxpayer&apos;s Post-Closing Remorse Relating to Tax Allocations</title>
<description><![CDATA[<p>by <a href="http://www.keanmiller.com/lawyer-attorney-1189851.html">Dean P. Cazenave</a></p>
<p>The federal First Circuit Court of Appeals recently rejected a taxpayer&rsquo;s claim for a refund based on recharacterization of a payment for a non-competition agreement. Muskat v. United States, 2009 WL 211067 (1st Cir. 2009).</p>
<p>In connection with the sale of a business structured as an asset sale, the Buyer and the CEO (who was also the largest shareholder of the Seller) agreed in definitive documents that $1.0 million of the retained CEO&rsquo;s new compensation package would be allocated to his non-compete covenants. Although the CEO initially recorded that payout as ordinary income for his 1998 taxes, in 2002 he filed an amended return for 1998, recharacterizing the $1 million payment as consideration of his personal goodwill, which he argued entitled him to capital gain treatment (which would have entitled him to a refund of over $200,000). The IRS denied Muskat&rsquo;s request so he brought an enforcement action against the IRS. The district court, too, denied his request, finding that Muskat lacked &ldquo;strong proof&rdquo; that the non-competition payment was intended as payment for personal &ldquo;goodwill&rdquo; rather than as a covenant not to compete.<br />
&nbsp;</p>]]><![CDATA[<p>The First Circuit noted two basic principles at play in reviewing the appeal: first, generally speaking, payments in return for covenants not to compete are taxable as ordinary income and payments for goodwill are taxable as capital gains; and, second, ordinary income is usually taxed at a higher rate than capital gains. It also explained the &ldquo;strong proof&rdquo; rule of which Muskat&rsquo;s claim was subject. This rule of heightened burden for one appealing a decision of the IRS applies &ldquo;when the parties to a transaction have executed a written instrument allocating sums of money for particular items, and one party thereafter seeks to alter the written allocation for tax purposes on the basis that the sums were, in realty, intended as compensation for some other item.&rdquo; Muskat argued, among other things, that his non competition agreement was in reality a payment for his personal goodwill as president of the company. The First Circuit rejected that argument, noting that his non competition agreement was a &ldquo;garden-variety agreement not to compete&rdquo; and it affirmed the district court&rsquo;s decision. It reiterated that compensation for non-competition agreements remain ordinary income. It is only if an agreement is actually a purchase of goodwill that the compensation may be classified as a capital gains.</p>
<p>This case, however, raises a point of consideration for drafters and parties to non competition agreements and asset purchase agreements where one of the primary assets is goodwill. Although Muskat had to overcome a significant burden (of strong proof) to reverse the IRS qualification, the First Circuit did note that the compensation under the agreement expressly was for Muskat&rsquo;s promise not to compete against the Buyer and &ldquo;to protect [the target&rsquo;s] goodwill.&rdquo; Query whether Muskat would have prevailed if the documents allocated a portion of the consideration paid to his personal goodwill. Companies and individuals dealing in non-competition agreements in connection with the sale of a business or goodwill should consult a tax professional for advice about these issues.<br />
&nbsp;</p>]]></description>
<link>http://www.louisianalawblog.com/business-and-corporate-a-taxpayers-postclosing-remorse-relating-to-tax-allocations.html</link>
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<category>Business and Corporate</category><category>Estate Planning, Tax, and Probate Law</category>
<pubDate>Wed, 04 Mar 2009 08:26:20 -0600</pubDate>
<dc:creator>Alan J. Berteau</dc:creator>

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<title>New Louisiana Regulation Creates Safe Harbor For Certain Equity-Based Compensatory Plans of Privately-Held Companies</title>
<description><![CDATA[<p>by <a href="http://www.keanmiller.com/lawyer-attorney-1189851.html">Dean P. Cazenave</a></p>
<p>Offers and sales of &ldquo;securities&rdquo; must be registered unless there is an applicable exemption from the federal and state securities laws. The most commonly known exemption is the private placement exemption set forth in Regulation D promulgated by the Securities and Exchange Commission under the Securities Act of 1933 (and corresponding private placement exemptions under applicable state &ldquo;blue sky&rdquo; laws).</p>
<p>Regulation D was primarily designed to facilitate capital raising transactions, as opposed to employee stock option or stock purchase plans. Many people are unaware that when an employer (or controlling Shareholder) sells stock to an employee (even at a discount, or even if to an executive), such a sale is subject to the securities laws and applicable federal and state exemptions from registration must be found.<br />
&nbsp;</p>]]><![CDATA[<p>Federal Rule 701</p>
<p>In 1988, the SEC adopted Rule 701 which exempts from registration securities issued pursuant to a written compensatory employee benefit plan or written contract by a nonreporting (i.e., privately held) company. An employee benefit plan includes any purchase, savings, option, bonus, stock appreciation, profit sharing, thrift, incentive, pension, or similar plan. The participants in the plan (or party to the contract) must be employees, directors, general partners, trustees (if a business trust), officers, consultants, or advisers.</p>
<p>The plan or the contract setting forth the arrangement must be in writing and a copy must be given to the employees. The exemption is available only to the securities offered or sold by the issuer, which means the employee must find another exemption for their resale.</p>
<p>Rule 701 contains a limitation on aggregate sales price or amount sold in any consecutive 12-month period based upon the greatest of $1 million, 15 percent of the company&rsquo;s assets, and 15 percent of the outstanding securities of the class.</p>
<p>Rule 701 also contains a disclosure requirement. The disclosure requirements apply only if the aggregate sales price or amount of securities sold during any consecutive 12-month period exceed $5 million. Subject to that qualification, an issuer relying upon Rule 701 is required to provide to investors, a reasonable period of time prior to sale, (1) a copy of the plan or contract; (3) a copy of the summary plan description required by ERISA or, if the plan is not subject to ERISA, a summary of the material terms of the plans; (3) information concerning risks associated with the securities sold; and (4) financial statements required by Part F/S of Form 1-A as of a date no more than 180 days prior to sale. Providing financial statements would be difficult for some issuers since, even though the statements do not have to be audited unless the issuer otherwise has audited statements available, they must be prepared in accordance with GAAP. It should err on the side of caution and make the required disclosures if there is a possibility that sales will exceed the $5 million limitation.</p>
<p>State Law</p>
<p>Until recently, Louisiana did not exempt sales of stock by employers to employees unless the sale was effected pursuant to a special type of stock option plan or pursuant to a stock purchase plan qualified under the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (as amended), as Louisiana did not automatically exempt all types of transactions exempt under Federal Rule 701. Thus, unless one of the narrow Louisiana exemptions applied, privately held companies which desired to sell stock to Louisiana employees were forced to try to find another exemption, absent which they were forced to either (a) register the transactions with the Louisiana Commissioner of Securities, or (b) as was more likely the case, simply not proceed with the proposed sale to employees. However, the Louisiana Office of Financial Institutions recently promulgated a rule which provides that any transaction exempt under Federal Rule 701 is now exempt under Louisiana law. Louisiana Administrative Code, Title 10, Part XIII, &sect; 801. A copy of the Rule can be found at www.ofi.louisiana.gov. The promulgation of this new rule has the effect of broadening the exemptions available to privately held companies which desire to sell stock to Louisiana employees.</p>
<p>For example, the sale of stock pursuant to a stock purchase plan (regardless of whether qualified under the Internal Revenue Code) or other written compensatory agreement which meets the requirement of Federal Rule 701 will now be exempt under Louisiana law. In addition, although Louisiana law has long exempted the issuance of stock options (and the exercise of such options) if issued pursuant to a plan which limited participation to employees only, Louisiana law did not exempt stock plans if the plan allowed for the issuance of options to non-employees (e.g., non-employee directors). Federal Rule 701 contains no such limitation with respect to option plans which authorize the issuance of options to non-employees and thus the new Rule seems to provide more flexibility for stock option plans as well.</p>
<p>Privately held companies which desire to sell stock or other equity ownership to one or more Louisiana employees should consider the securities laws implications of doing so before effecting any offers or sales.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>]]></description>
<link>http://www.louisianalawblog.com/labor-and-employment-law-new-louisiana-regulation-creates-safe-harbor-for-certain-equitybased-compensatory-plans-of-privatelyheld-companies.html</link>
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<category>Business and Corporate</category><category>Labor and Employment Law</category>
<pubDate>Fri, 21 Nov 2008 07:02:51 -0600</pubDate>
<dc:creator>Alan J. Berteau</dc:creator>

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<title>IRS Requires Employer Identification Numbers for Disregarded Entities Beginning in 2009</title>
<description><![CDATA[<p><a href="http://www.keanmiller.com/lawyer-attorney-1190226.html">By Kevin C. Curry</a></p>
<p>Historically, the IRS has said that a disregarded entity could (and maybe should) use the owner's taxpayer identification number for income and other tax purposes. For employment tax reporting, the IRS issued Notice 99-6, 1999-1 CB 321 , which said that employment taxes for employees of a disregarded entity could be reported by a disregarded entity in one of two ways:</p>
<p style="margin-left: 40px">(1) Calculation, reporting, and payment of all employment tax obligations with respect to employees of a disregarded entity by its owner (as though the employees of the disregarded entity are employed directly by the owner) and under the owner's name and taxpayer identification number; or</p>
<p style="margin-left: 40px">(2) Separate calculation, reporting, and payment of all employment tax obligations by each state law entity with respect to its employees under its own name and taxpayer identification number.</p>]]><![CDATA[<p>Beginning next year, disregarded entities with employees must have their own employer identification numbers (EIN's) for employment tax purposes. The IRS has issued final regulations providing that for wages paid on or after Jan. 1, 2009, a disregarded entity is treated as a separate entity for purposes of employment taxes and related reporting requirements. Under the final regulations, the separate entity is treated as a corporation for purposes of employment taxes and related reporting requirements. (The regs also treat disregarded entities as separate entities for certain excise taxes, effective for liabilities imposed and actions first required or permitted in periods beginning on or after Jan. 1, 2008). ( Reg. &sect; 1.1361-4(a)(7) , Reg. &sect; 301.7701-2(c)(2) ) . Under the final regulations, an owner of a disregarded entity treated as a sole proprietorship is subject to self-employment taxes. ( Reg. &sect; 301.7701-2(c)(2) ) .</p>
<p>The regulations provide the following example:</p>
<p style="margin-left: 40px">(i) LLCA is an eligible entity owned by individual A and is generally disregarded as an entity separate from its owner for Federal tax purposes. However, LLCA is treated as an entity separate from its owner for purposes of subtitle C of the Internal Revenue Code. LLCA has employees and pays wages as defined in sections 3121(a), 3306(b), and 3401(a).</p>
<p style="margin-left: 40px">(ii) LLCA is subject to the provisions of subtitle C of the Internal Revenue Code and related provisions under 26 CFR subchapter C, Employment Taxes and Collection of Income Tax at Source, parts 31 through 39. Accordingly, LLCA is required to perform such acts as are required of an employer under those provisions of the Internal Revenue Code and regulations thereunder that apply. All provisions of law (including penalties) and the regulations prescribed in pursuance of law applicable to employers in respect of such acts are applicable to LLCA. Thus, for example, LLCA is liable for income tax withholding, Federal Insurance Contributions Act (FICA) taxes, and Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA) taxes. See sections 3402 and 3403 (relating to income tax withholding); 3102(b) and 3111 (relating to FICA taxes), and 3301 (relating to FUTA taxes). In addition, LLCA must file under its name and EIN the applicable Forms in the 94X series, for example, Form 941, &ldquo;Employer's Quarterly Employment Tax Return,&rdquo; Form 940, &ldquo;Employer's Annual Federal Unemployment Tax Return;&rdquo; file with the Social Security Administration and furnish to LLCA's employees statements on Forms W-2, &ldquo;Wage and Tax Statement;&rdquo; and make timely employment tax deposits. See &sect;&sect;31.6011(a)-1, 31.6011(a)-3, 31.6051-1, 31.6051-2, and 31.6302-1 of this chapter.</p>
<p style="margin-left: 40px">(iii) A is self-employed for purposes of subtitle A, chapter 2, Tax on Self-Employment Income, of the Internal Revenue Code. Thus, A is subject to tax under section 1401 on A's net earnings from self-employment with respect to LLCA's activities. A is not an employee of LLCA for purposes of subtitle C of the Internal Revenue Code. Because LLCA is treated as a sole proprietorship of A for income tax purposes, A is entitled to deduct trade or business expenses paid or incurred with respect to activities carried on through LLCA, including the employer's share of employment taxes imposed under sections 3111 and 3301, on A's Form 1040, Schedule C, &ldquo;Profit or Loss for Business (Sole Proprietorship).&rdquo;</p>
<p>These regulations do not change the fact that a disregarded entity will continue to be disregarded for other Federal tax purposes. <br />
&nbsp;</p>]]></description>
<link>http://www.louisianalawblog.com/business-and-corporate-irs-requires-employer-identification-numbers-for-disregarded-entities-beginning-in-2009.html</link>
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<category>Business and Corporate</category><category>Estate Planning, Tax, and Probate Law</category><category>State and Local Taxation</category>
<pubDate>Mon, 27 Oct 2008 14:01:55 -0600</pubDate>
<dc:creator>Steven Boutwell</dc:creator>

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